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Interdisciplinary research in computer science and economics shows that great ad-
vancements are taking place in the areas of distributed computing, social networks,
market mechanisms, game theory and artificial intelligence. Prominent examples
of these developments are search engines like Google search, knowledge engines like
WolframAlpha, electronic markets like eBay, Cloud computing markets like Ama-
zon’s EC2 Spot Instances, Google’s AppEngine and SpotCloud, social networks like
Facebook and LinkedIn, and many more.
Market mechanisms are studied for years to determine how goods and services can
be allocated to consumers efficiently. In economic theory, market mechanisms often
refer to design incentives and pricing to achieve a common goal by guiding the be-
havior of self-interested agents. In the field of market-based scheduling, consumers
often demand and use different applications, providers offer heterogeneous comput-
ing services with different business models, therefore, the behavior and goals of both
parties on the market can be highly heterogeneous. The research on bidding strate-
gies is prevalently based on simplified assumptions about the type of agents, which
are often assumed to be homogeneous, rational and sharing their true preferences
with each other. Novel interdisciplinary research in Computational Mechanism De-
sign aims to relax these assumptions by enhancing promising economic theories and
evaluating them extensively in more realistic experiments by utilizing a high number
of computing services over the Internet.
This work contributes to the research on Computational Mechanism Design by pro-
viding novel theoretical and software models – a novel bidding strategy called Q-
Strategy, which automates bidding processes in imperfect information markets, a soft-
ware framework for realizing agents and bidding strategies called BidGenerator and
a communication protocol called MX/CS, for expressing and exchanging economic
and technical information in a market-based scheduling system. The interdisciplinary
approach to this research deals with the areas of design science, game-theoretic mod-
eling, mechanism design, software engineering, agent-based modeling, discrete event
simulation, scientific computing on cluster machines and statistical analysis. This
work provides a full-fledged analysis of bidding strategies, bidding agents and commu-
nication protocols and is based on commonly applied methodologies for agent-based
and technical evaluations. Evaluation of the Q-Strategy against benchmark strategies
iv
in spot market scenarios showed that, on average, agents applying the Q-Strategy
outperformed benchmark strategies in homogeneous and heterogeneous competition
settings. As proof-of-concept, BidGenerator, the Q-Strategy and MX/CS have been
implemented and integrated in a real running prototype for market-based scheduling
and three real application case studies, which are all part of the SORMA project.
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Acknowledgments
I am deeply grateful for the support and contributions of many people without whom
this dissertation would not have been possible.
Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor
Dr. Christof Weinhardt, for his continuous support and patience, and for the freedom
that allowed me to pursue my PhD research. I was very pleased to be a part of his
Information and Market Engineering group at the Institute of Information Systems
and Management (IISM) and for the opportunity he gave me to participate in the Eu-
ropean research project SORMA. I would like to thank Professor Dr. Dirk Neumann
for co-advising this thesis and guiding me during the starting phase of my research. I
am very grateful for his allowing me the opportunity to work with great people, and
to grow and learn with various technical and administrative responsibilities within
the SORMA project. I appreciate the support of my dissertation committee and the
great atmosphere provided by the examiners, Professor Dr. Andreas Oberweis and
Professor Dr. Martin Ruckes.
I owe my deepest gratitude to Dr. Simon Caton who accompanied me during the final
phase of my PhD research by proofreading major parts of my work and for offering
critical and constructive questions and comments. Special thanks go to Dr. Wibke
Michalk, Dr. Thomas Meinl, Dr. Arun Anandasivam, and Dr. Carsten Block for
proofreading parts of this work.
I am indebted to many of my colleagues in the Information & Market Engineering
group at the Institute of Information Systems and Management (IISM), Forschungszen-
trum Informatik (FZI) and Karlsruhe Service Research Institute (KSRI) for their
continuous support, feedback, and valuable discussions. It was also an honor for me
to work with the colleagues from the SORMA project. I will always remember with
fondness the times when we met in Barcelona to code and prepare the project’s pro-
totype and deliverables. I would especially like to thank Dr. Garry Smith, Professor
Dr. Jens Nimis, Dr. Simon Caton, Niklas Wirström, Dr. René Brunner, Mario
Maćıas, Pablo Chacin, and the rest of the development team. It was a pleasure code,
publish, learn from and with you.
Thanks to Christian Haas and all contributors for the nice graduation cap. I love it.
viii
I am very indebted to my family, who provided me with the tools I have needed
to succeed in life, along with the support and courage I have needed to overcome
life’s challenges. My greatest thanks go to my wife, Petya, for giving me her love








List of Tables xvi
List of Figures xviii
List of Notations xxi
Part I Foundations 1
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Research Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Summary of the Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Structure of This Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Related Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Chapter 2. Preliminaries and Related Work 17
2.1 Computing Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.1 Utility Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.2 Grid Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.3 Cloud Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.1.3.1 Infrastructure as a Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.3.2 Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1.4 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2 Bidding, Agents and Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 The Microeconomic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.1 The Microeconomic System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Table of Contents xii
2.3.2 Classification of the Transaction Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3.3 Economic Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3.4 Market Mechanisms for Scheduling Computing Services . . . . 45
2.3.5 The Continuous Double Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.6 Consumer and Provider Bidding Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4 The Technical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.1 Application Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4.1.1 Batch Supply Chain Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4.1.2 Interactive Sensor Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4.2 Technical Challenges for the Market System . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.3 A Technical Architecture for Market-Based Scheduling . . . . . 59
2.4.3.1 Layer 1: Core Market Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4.3.2 Layer 2: Open Market Middleware . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4.3.3 Layer 3: Consumer and Provider Bidding Tools . . . . 62
2.4.3.4 Layer 4: Applications and Resources . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4.4 Bidding Scenario for Computing Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.5 Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Part II Design and Implementation 69
Chapter 3. Economic Design of Bidding Strategies 71
3.1 What is a Bidding Strategy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 Design Desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3 Existing Bidding Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.1 Bidding in Games with Perfect Information . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.2 Bidding in Games with Imperfect Information . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.3 Non-Adaptive Bidding Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3.4 Adaptive Bidding Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3.5 Analytical Comparison to the Desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4 The Q-Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.4.1 Why Reinforcement Learning-Based Bidding? . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.4.2 The General Q-Learning Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.4.3 The Q-Strategy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4.3.1 Automating the Bidding Processes . . . . . . . . . . . 101
xiii Table of Contents
3.4.3.2 State Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4.3.3 Action Representation and Adaptive Bidding . . . . . 103
3.4.3.4 Goal Representation and Q-Value Update . . . . . . . 105
3.4.3.5 Realization of the Q-Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.4.3.6 Complexity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4.3.7 Critical View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Chapter 4. Architectural Design of a Bidding Framework 112
4.1 What is a Bidding Agent? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.2 Design Desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.3 Existing Agent Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.3.1 Selection of Existing Agent Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.3.2 Analytical Comparison to the Desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.4 Architecture of the Bidding Agent Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.4.1 Decoupling of Market Platform and Bidding Agents . . . . . . 125
4.4.2 Methodic Realization of Agents and Bidding Strategies . . . . . 127
4.4.3 Using Well-Defined Communication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.4.4 Applicable in a Market-based Scheduling Domain . . . . . . . . 132
4.4.5 Integrating Market Information Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.4.6 Supporting Secured and Trusted Communication . . . . . . . . 134
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Chapter 5. Communication Protocols 138
5.1 Design Desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2 Existing Communication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.2.1 Selection of the Communication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.2.2 Analytical Comparison to the Desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.3 Message Exchange in Computing Service Markets . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.3.1 Private Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.3.2 State Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.3.3 Public Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.3.4 Market Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.3.5 Market Information Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.4 Matchmaking of Public Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Table of Contents xiv
5.5 The MX/CS Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.6 Extensions for Combinatorial Bids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Part III Evaluation 163
Chapter 6. Agent-Based Numerical Experiments 165
6.1 Evaluation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.1.1 Setup of Market and Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.1.2 Setup of Bidding Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.1.3 Setup of the Multi-Agent System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.1.4 Analyzing the Efficiency of Bidding Strategies . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.1.5 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.1.6 Correlation Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.2 Evaluation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.2.1 Consumer Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.2.2 Provider Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.2.3 Combined Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
6.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Chapter 7. Technical Analysis and Application 201
7.1 Technical Analysis as Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
7.2 Case Study 1: Batch Supply Chain Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 202
7.2.1 TXTDemand and Its Market Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
7.2.2 TXTDemand Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
7.2.3 Integration of BidGenerator and MX/CS Protocol . . . . . . . 205
7.2.4 Summary of Case Study Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
7.3 Case Study 2: Interactive Sensor Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.3.1 Visage and Its Market Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.3.2 Visage Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.3.3 Integration of the BidGenerator and MX/CS Protocol . . . . . 209
7.3.4 Summary of Case Study Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7.4 Case Study 3: e-Service Level Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.4.1 Service Level Agreements in SORMA and Requirements . . . . 213
xv Table of Contents
7.4.2 Application of the MX/CS Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.4.3 Summary of Case Study Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
7.5 Further Application Scenarios of MX/CS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
7.6 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
7.6.1 Monitoring of Distributed Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
7.6.2 Technical Performance Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
7.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Part IV Conclusion 223
Chapter 8. Summary of This Work and Future Research 225
8.1 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
8.2 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
8.2.1 Hierarchical Bidding and Transfer Learning . . . . . . . . . . . 229
8.2.2 Automated Bidding for Complex Service Mashups . . . . . . . 230
8.2.3 Design of Flexible Market Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
8.2.4 Legal Issues and Matchmaking of Service Level Agreements . . 231
8.2.5 Information Services for Computing Service Markets . . . . . . 231
8.2.6 Economic Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
8.2.7 Cloud Application Engineering and Standardization . . . . . . 232
8.2.8 Complementary Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Appendices 234
Appendix A. Sensitivity Analysis 235
Appendix B. Full Tables of the Evaluation Results 240
B.1 Consumer Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
B.2 Provider Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
B.3 Combined Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Appendix C. MX/CS – Communication Protocol Specification 264
C.1 MX/CS – XML Schema Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
C.2 MX/CS – OWL Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
C.3 State Message and Market Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Table of Contents xvi
List of Tables
2.1 Cloud deployment models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Computational mechanism design desiderata (Myerson and Satterth-
waite, 1983; Krishna and Perry, 1998; Shneidman et al., 2005; Parkes,
2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1 Mapping of the desiderata for strategy design to existing bidding strate-
gies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.1 Standardization of agent frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.2 Comparison of the agent frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.1 Comparison of communication protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.1 Design of the experiments and variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.2 Winning performance of the Q-Strategy against the benchmark strate-
gies, ZIP and GD, in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings of con-
sumers and providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.3 Top 10 consumer outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL
data profile. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome
of the setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.4 Top 10 consumer outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the
LLNL data profile. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the
outcome of the setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.5 Top 10 consumer outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the HPC2N
data profile. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome
of the setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.6 Top 10 consumer outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the
HPC2N data profile. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the
outcome of the setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.7 Top 10 provider outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL
data profile. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.188
6.8 Top 10 provider outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL
data profile. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.188
6.9 Top 10 provider outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the HPC2N
data profile. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.189
6.10 Top 10 provider outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the HPC2N
data profile. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.189
7.1 Detailed time performance analysis of the integrated system in settings
with 20 and 40 Truth-Telling agents, as well as Q-Strategy agents . . 221
A.1 Selection of Q-Strategy’s parameters in settings with Q-Strategy con-
sumers and providers with the LLNL data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . 236
A.2 Selection of ZIP-Strategy’s parameters in settings with ZIP consumers
and providers with the LLNL data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
A.3 Selection of GD-Strategy’s parameters in settings with GD-Strategy
consumers and providers with the LLNL data profile. . . . . . . . . . 237
A.4 Selection of Q-Strategy’s parameters in settings with Q-Strategy con-
sumers and providers with the HPC2N data profile. . . . . . . . . . . 238
A.5 Selection of ZIP-Strategy’s parameters in settings with ZIP consumers
and providers with the HPC2N data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
A.6 Selection of GD-Strategy’s parameters in settings with GD consumers
and providers with the HPC2N data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
B.1 Consumer outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL work-
load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
B.2 Consumer outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL work-
load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
B.3 Consumer outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the HPC2N
workload. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
B.4 Consumer outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the HPC2N
workload. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
B.5 Provider outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL workload.248
B.6 Provider outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL work-
load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
B.7 Provider outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the HPC2N work-
load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
B.8 Provider outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the HPC2N
workload. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
B.9 Combined outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL work-
load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
B.10 Combined outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL work-
load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
B.11 Combined outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL work-
load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
B.12 Combined outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL work-
load. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Table of Contents xviii
List of Figures
1.1 Structure of this work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 Cloud services (own representation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Static versus dynamic pricing (adopted from Lai (2005)) . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Consumers’ (CS) and providers’ surpluses (PS) out of equilibrium
(adopted from Gjerstad (2007)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Microeconomic system (Neumann, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Scenario for supply chain data analysis with local and externally pur-
chased computing services (own representation, based on the SORMA
project) (Windsor et al., 2009; Nimis et al., 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 Scenario for on-demand video data analysis with local and externally
purchased computing services (own representation, based on the SORMA
project) (Windsor et al., 2009; Nimis et al., 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.7 SORMA architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.8 Scenario for bidding on computing services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1 Standard reinforcement learning interaction loop (adopted from Kael-
bling et al. (1996)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.2 Example of Q-Strategy’s multi-states with multi-action arms . . . . . 104
3.3 Q-Strategy’s implementation in BidGenerator . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.1 A bird’s-eye view of the interactions between BidGenerator and related
components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.2 BidGenerator architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.3 BidGenerator’s dynamic view of bidding processes . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.4 BidGenerator communication components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.5 BidGenerator security integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.1 Communication protocols for the automated provisioning and usage of
computing services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.1 Distribution of the job durations and cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the data profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
xix Table of Contents
6.2 Architecture of an agent-based experimental environment with a De-
screte Event Service Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.3 Consumer outcomes in settings with GD-Providers and the LLNL data
profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.4 Consumer outcomes in settings with GD-Providers and the HPC2N
data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.5 Consumer outcomes in settings with ZIP-Providers and the LLNL data
profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.6 Consumer outcomes in settings with ZIP-Providers and the HPC2N
data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.7 Consumer outcomes in settings with Q-Providers and the LLNL data
profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.8 Consumer outcomes in settings with Q-Providers and the HPC2N data
profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.9 Provider outcomes in settings with competing consumers and the LLNL
data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.10 Provider outcomes in settings with competing consumers and the HPC2N
data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.11 Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with GD-Providers
and the LLNL data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.12 Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with GD-Providers
and the HPC2N data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.13 Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with ZIP-Providers
and the LLNL data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.14 Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with ZIP-Providers
and the HPC2N data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.15 Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with Q-Providers
and the LLNL data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
6.16 Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with Q-Providers
and the HPC2N data profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
7.1 TXTDemand: An application for supply chain management and data
analysis (screenshot provided by the SORMA project) . . . . . . . . . 202
7.2 Integrated view of TXTDemand SaaS, TXTOrchestrator, BidGener-
ator, MX/CS and the SORMA Market for Computing Services (own
representation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
7.3 TXTOrchestrator: General view (screenshot provided by the SORMA
project) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.4 TXTOrchestrator: Job details (screenshot provided by the SORMA
project) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
7.5 Integrated view of TXTDemand SaaS, TXTOrchestrator, BidGener-
ator, MX/CS and the SORMA Market for Computing Services (own
representation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
7.6 Visage client invoked BidGenerator with the Q-Strategy, received an
allocation of Visage with an endpoint reference and started an analysis
of video data sequences (screenshot provided by the SORMA project) 210
7.7 Visage integration (Garry Smith, demonstration at IES 2009, project
SORMA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
7.8 Transformation of the MarketMessage concepts into a WS-Agreement
(Borissov et al., 2009b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
7.9 Performance Monitor: System specific data with Java’s VisualVM
(own screenshot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
7.10 Distributed service process monitoring: SORMA Dashboard (screen-
shot provided by the SORMA project) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
7.11 Time performance chart of the integrated system in settings with 20
and 40 Truth-Telling agents, as well as Q-Strategy agents . . . . . . . 220
List of Notations
A, a Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
B, b Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B Public message type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
c Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166
E Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
E, e Expected utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
F Time to complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
G, g Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
H, h History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
M,m Bidding language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
μ Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
N, n Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Π Payment method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Δ Penalty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
π Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
P Private message type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
R, r Reward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
ρ Transition probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Q, q Bid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Ω, ω State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
S State message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .150
S, s Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Υ Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Θ Technical description attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
T, t Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
θ Transaction object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
U, u Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
V, v Valuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
X Market message type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152








nterdisciplinary research in computer science and economics shows that great
advancements are taking place in the areas of distributed computing, social net-
works, market mechanisms, game theory and artificial intelligence (Blume, 2010).
Prominent examples of these developments are search engines like Google search,
knowledge engines like WolframAlpha, electronic markets like eBay, Cloud comput-
ing markets like Amazon’s EC2 Spot Instances, Google’s AppEngine and SpotCloud,
social networks like Facebook and LinkedIn, and many more. Market mechanisms are
studied for years to determine how goods and services can be allocated to consumers
efficiently (Sutherland, 1968; Buyya, 2002; Heydenreich et al., 2010). In economic
theory, market mechanisms often refer to design incentives and pricing to achieve a
common goal by guiding the behavior of self-interested agents. In the field of market-
based scheduling, consumers often demand and use different applications, providers
offer heterogeneous computing services with different business models, therefore, the
behavior and goals of both parties on the market can be highly heterogeneous (Blume,
2010; Levine, 2010). Moreover, bidding strategies implement individual decisions in
software agents and are still based on simplified assumptions about the type of agent,
which is often assumed to be homogeneous, as well as about the type of information
available and it is often assumed that agents share their actions and allocations (Das
et al., 2001; Reeves et al., 2005; Vytelingum et al., 2008; Schvartzman and Well-
man, 2009). Novel interdisciplinary research in Computational Mechanism Design
aims to relax these assumptions by enhancing promising economic theories and eval-
uating them extensively in more realistic experiments by utilizing a high number of
computing services over the Internet (Parkes, 2008; EGEE, 2009).
This work contributes to the research on Computational Mechanism Design by pro-
viding novel theoretical and software models – a novel bidding strategy called Q-
Strategy, which automates bidding processes in imperfect information markets, a
software framework for realizing agents and bidding strategies called BidGenerator
and a communication protocol calledMX/CS for expressing and exchanging economic
and technical information in a market-based scheduling system. The interdisciplinary
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approach to this research deals with the areas of design science, game-theoretic mod-
eling, mechanism design, software engineering, agent-based modeling, discrete event
simulation, scientific computing on cluster machines and statistical analysis. This
work provides a full-fledged analysis of bidding strategies, bidding agents and commu-
nication protocols and is based on commonly applied methodologies for agent-based
and technical evaluations. Evaluation of the Q-Strategy against benchmark strate-
gies in spot market scenarios showed that, on average, agents that apply Q-Strategy
outperformed benchmark strategies in homogeneous and heterogeneous competition
settings. As proof-of-concept, BidGenerator, the Q-Strategy and MX/CS have been
implemented and integrated in a real running prototype for market-based scheduling
and three real application case studies, which are all part of the SORMA project.
1.1 Motivation
The economics of computing service provisioning refers to mechanisms that improve
the efficiencies of their realization and utilization. Studies have shown that, on av-
erage, 5% to 20% of computing center resources are utilized (Armbrust et al., 2009;
Greenberg et al., 2008) and in companies, around 60% (Symantec, 2008). Current
workload logs of the MonALISA1 repositories confirmed these low average rates of
utilization. The current top ten computing centers of the Top500 list2 provide more
than 12 petaFLOPS3 of computing power, which is used by research institutions
and can also be made available to industry. Such a shift in provisioning to business
has considerable implications for scheduling policies. Current cluster or Grid com-
puting (decentralized coordination of connected cluster systems among distributed
sites based on common interfaces and tools) resource managers execute technical and
agreement-based policies rather than economic ones. Consumers of such resources
are often grouped into virtual organizations with specific privileges and quotas for
resource usage (Feitelson et al., 2005; Elmroth and Gardfjall, 2005; Elmroth et al.,
2008). For example, the execution of a job depends on several technical factors, in-
cluding the quotas and permissions granted to the consumer, the part of a virtual
organization it is assigned to, the type and amount of the computing instance’ re-
sources (CPU, memory, storage, bandwidth), the estimated job duration, the current
1<http://nui.uits.indiana.edu:8080/reports/weekly/latest/index.html#3>, last ac-
cessed on 17 Apr. 2011.
2“TOP500 list – November 2010”: <www.top500.org>.
3Equivalent to more than 200K single Intel CPU Core i7 965 machines.
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utilization of the system and availability of the computing instances. The group quo-
tas and technical requirements for the job are used to calculate the job’s priority level
and resulting schedule in the system. This rather simplified example shows the scope
of decision variables a consumer has to deal with when submitting a job for computa-
tion. The group’s usage information history, usage policies between institutions and
groups, as well as the technical job descriptions reported for the consumer, influence
the outcome of the resource manager. Thus, the efficiency of the outcome depends
on the correctness of the consumer’s estimated values. Economic incentives are not
incorporated into allocation processes. Moving computational services to the market
demands the incorporation of price-based allocation and incentive mechanisms on top
of technical schedulers.
In this context, the paradigm shift after Grid computing is Cloud computing, which
focuses on the business view of differentiated service types – infrastructure, platform
and application services (Foster et al., 2008; Lenk et al., 2009). Consumers are able to
scale their applications on demand with Cloud services and only pay for what they
use. Studies show that businesses can reduce their total IT costs by using Cloud
services to cover their peaks, instead of maintaining their own computing and ap-
plication infrastructures (Mell and Grance, 2009a). Symantec (2008) reported that,
on average, companies work with more than 1000 applications, most of which are
web applications, as well as transactional, messaging, and collaboration applications.
Current technologies like Cloud computing allow these applications to be carried out
efficiently, in terms of scalability, resource utilization and costs since “using 1000
servers for one hour costs no more than using one server for 1000 hours” (Armbrust
et al., 2009; Amazon, 2010b). Scalability is achieved through abstraction, distribution
and virtualization techniques for infrastructures, platforms and application services.
On the one hand, consumers profit from transparent, flexible and scalable services
with on-demand usage and payment; on the other hand, providers profit from effi-
cient resource management, as well as resource utilization due to economies of scale
(Armbrust et al., 2009).
The pricing models most commonly offered today are pay-per-use and subscription,
for which consumers pay fixed (or static) prices for a Cloud service unit, e.g. CPU-
hours and GB-storage (Weinhardt et al., 2009). Pay-per-use is a static pricing model
for service usage, whose price per time unit remains stable over time and does not
depend on dynamic parameters like supply and demand. This model is typically
used for products or services, which are supplied for the short term, on demand, and
have similar qualitative characteristics (e.g. Amazon EC2 instances). Through the
subscription pricing model, the consumer subscribes to use a Cloud service with a
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well-defined quota on a monthly or yearly basis. Static pricing models simplify the
planning of billing rates for consumers and providers, however, due to the insurance
and convenience effect, consumers tend to overestimate their usage when choosing a
static price tariff (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006). In the case of resource reservation,
such overestimation will produce inefficiencies in service usage. Moreover, static
prices introduce unrealized utilities by consumers and providers when prices are not in
keeping with the demand and supply (Lai, 2005). Lai (2005) discusses the application
of market mechanisms for the dynamic pricing of computing services, which considers
fluctuations in supply and demand, thereby resulting in a more efficient allocation of
computing services to consumers as compared to static pricing. Furthermore, on-
demand service usage versus guaranteed static quotas incentivize consumers to be
more careful when developing their jobs or applications (Armbrust et al., 2009).
In this context, Amazon started a spot market service for EC2 instances, where
prices are determined based on current supply and demand (Amazon, 2009). Current
snapshots show that, on average, spot prices of EC2 instances are 30% lower than the
static ones.4 Emerging open standards, web interfaces and tools strive to overcome
usage barriers to such markets by reducing switching costs and offering guarantees
for service availability and data protection.
In a scenario where computing services are allocated with market mechanisms, con-
sumers and providers need a set of tools and methodologies to interact with the mar-
ket. The decision of what to bid for on-demand computing services is performed by
the so-called bidding strategy, which implements the related logic of information ag-
gregation from locally (own preferences and past experience) and publicly available
sources (market information). Technical interaction with the market is facilitated
through bidding agents and a well-defined communication protocol.
1.2 Research Outline
The overall goals of this thesis is to provide i) a theoretical framework for design-
ing bidding strategies within a market-based scheduling context and ii) a technical
framework for implementing bidding agents, bidding strategies and a communica-
tion protocol. The target market mechanism of this work belongs to the class of
double-sided auctions addressing a scenario with multiple providers and consumers,
and dynamic supply and demand (Lai, 2005). The trading objects are computing
4The Cloud Market provides information on actual Amazon spot prices, as well as spot price
history for various computing instances, <http://thecloudmarket.com>.
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services (or infrastructure services, IaaS), which are realistic candidates for perfect
substitutes – offered by different providers, but uniformly consumable from each ap-
plication based on uniform APIs. Moreover, the literature mainly focuses on the
general design of auction mechanisms and bidding languages, and less on the design
of bidding agents, bidding strategies and communication protocols for the field of
market-based scheduling (Chevaleyre et al., 2006; Parsons and Klein, 2009).
The overall goals are investigated on the basis of four main research questions, which
represent the research outline of this work. The first goal (i) of this thesis is addressed
in research questions 1 and 4; and the second goal (ii) is addressed in research ques-
tions 2, 3 and 4.
The first research question, RQ 1, deals with the elaboration of design characteristics
for bidding strategies within the context of market-based scheduling:
Research Question 1 ≺Design of Bidding Strategies
How can bidding strategies for market-based scheduling be designed and implemented,
which when instantiated into bidding agents, automate the bidding process for con-
sumers and providers?
The original term, bidding strategy, used in game theory refers to the set of possible
actions and probability distribution function with regard to these actions at any stage
of a game (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009). This postulates the fact that each of
the agents makes decisions based on given local or commonly shared knowledge about
the actions of other agents, as well as the actual system state. Classic approaches
suggest that controlled laboratory experiments with human participants should be
performed when designing bidding strategies for a given market mechanism (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981; Selten et al., 1997). Human participants are allowed to play
with the market mechanism for a certain time and later asked to implement their
bidding strategies in code, which reproduces their bidding behavior. In later multiple
numerical experiments with continuous double auction, Das et al. (2001) showed that
software agents are able to outperform humans. Moreover, software agents “don’t
get distracted” or are indifferent between decisions and do not suffer from “auction
fever” (Greenwald et al., 2003; Ku et al., 2005).
Recent research shows that bidding strategies are implemented as complex algo-
rithms with multiple functional steps, which aggregate data according to individual
demand functions, experience from past actions and shared market information of
other agents’ actions (Parsons and Klein, 2009). Moreover, a major part of the
literature elaborates on bidding strategies in the context of financial markets utiliz-
ing scoring functions for monetary profit maximization, however, there is a lack of
1.2. RESEARCH OUTLINE 8
research for bidding strategies in the context of market-based scheduling with applica-
tions or computing services for specific scoring functions, which consider additional
metrics like makespan (Parsons and Klein, 2009; Reeves et al., 2005; Heydenreich
et al., 2010).
A bidding strategy executes a policy, a so called scoring function, which formally
defines the goals and constraints that govern the decisions. “Even a goal as su-
perficially simple as maximize utility will require a human to express a complicated
multi-attribute utility function” (Kephart and Chess, 2003). A common evaluation
methodology for bidding strategies is their instantiation into software agents and the
execution of numerical experiments in an agent-based environment (MacKie-Mason
and Wellman, 2006; Tesfatsion, 2006). A detailed elaboration of an appropriate eval-
uation methodology of complex strategies is part of RQ 4.
While RQ 1 focuses on the game theoretic design of bidding strategies, the second
research question, RQ 2, deals with the technical design and realization of software
agents and bidding strategies within a general software framework with well-defined
interfaces and methodology:
Research Question 2 ≺Design of a Framework for Automated Bidding
What are the characteristics of bidding agents and how can they coincide with bidding
strategies in an agent framework for market-based scheduling?
A system for market-based scheduling is distributed and contains the market middle-
ware with related components for running auctions, contract management, enforce-
ment of service level agreements and security, as well as the consumer and provider
tools to interact with the market and execute consumer applications on the provider’s
computing services (Nimis et al., 2008). A “grand challenge” of such complex systems
is to make them self managing, since many components implement their own logic
and functionality and run “beyond company boundaries into the Internet” (Kephart
and Chess, 2003). Kephart and Chess (2003) identified that such systems have to be
designed to run autonomously since rising complexity “appears to be approaching the
limits of human capability” “for even the most skilled system integrators to install,
configure, optimize, maintain, and merge.” The basic entity of systems’ components
are agents, which interact autonomously according to high-level objectives, set by
their owners or administrators. Moreover, each of the autonomous components is
“responsible for managing its own internal state and behavior and for managing its
interactions” with the related components in the system (Kephart and Chess, 2003).
Therefore, a system for market-based scheduling will, in fact, be a multi-agent system
built with commonly accepted principles and communication protocols.
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In order to interact with the market mechanism, consumers and providers need bid-
ding tools, which coordinate and execute the bidding processes autonomously, and
integrate with the heterogeneous system through well-defined interfaces and commu-
nication protocols. The here developed Framework for Automated Bidding called Bid-
Generator provides interfaces and a methodology for implementing bidding strategies
and bidding agents. Existing agent frameworks are either generic or domain specific,
e.g., for realizing mobile agents, robots, search engines and bidding agents for finan-
cial markets (known also as algorithmic traders) (Jennings et al., 1998; Bergenti and
Poggi, 2002; Sturm and Shehory, 2004). Moreover, there are existing agent frame-
works, which are either designed for experimental purposes or tournaments (Wellman
et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2009). However, there is a lack of research in the area of agent
frameworks in the domain of market-based scheduling and its characteristics, which
is the area that RQ 2 investigates. Common evaluation methodologies of software
frameworks are based on functionality comparison, proof-of-concept implementation
or integration in running systems according to the investigated use cases (Lind, 2001;
Zambonelli et al., 2003; Sturm and Shehory, 2004; Bartolini et al., 2005). Such inte-
grated systems are often evaluated with performance tests.
A distributed system for market-based scheduling interacts by exchanging messages
over well-defined (Web service) interfaces. The aim of the third research question,
RQ 3 is the specification and the realization of protocols for the exchange of context-
specific messages between the bidding tools and related market components:
Research Question 3 ≺Communication Protocols
What are the characteristics of a message exchange within a market-based scheduling
context? How can technical and economic preferences be expressed, communicated
and matched between consumers, providers and the market?
The communication in a distributed system for market-based scheduling is ruled
according to a well-defined protocol with specific information content between the
different components and communication directions, which is referred to here as a
communication protocol. For example, bidding strategies generate bids of economic
and technical attributes in the form of multi-attributive messages, which are submit-
ted through the bidding agents to the market. The market returns multi-attributive
match messages as well as market information on the actions of other agents. The
protocol specifies the types of messages exchanged between specific components –
application and bidding agent, market and bidding agent, etc. There is a need for
formal languages that enable the expression of economic and technical information
(multi-attributive), where the language concepts, their properties and relations are
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commonly accepted to create an ontology (Kephart and Chess, 2003). The economic
and technical information represents the needs and preferences of consumers and
providers regarding the demanded and traded computing service. System developers
“will need tools that help them acquire and represent policies – high-level specifi-
cations of goals and constraints, typically represented as rules or utility functions”
(Kephart and Chess, 2003). The economic and technical information communicated
in the form of bids and the resulting matches are not only used to execute consumer
applications to the allocated provider’s computing service, but controlling system
components use it to monitor and enforce the agreements (market match of legally
binding consumer and provider bids) as a result of the matchmaking process.
A semantic specification of bidding languages is crucial in a distributed system since
the related components, the consumer’s applications and provider computing ser-
vices can span across different administrative domains – on premiss, as well as off
premise. This will enable more comprehensive usage and trust, and increase the
validation and verification capabilities of the controlling components (Kephart and
Chess, 2003). Furthermore, consumers and providers can easily reason about the
posted bids and their technical descriptions in the market, as well as derive better
knowledge with regard to the supply and demand of computing services.
Available communication protocols for auctions are often proprietary (e.g., eBay,
Amazon Web Services), consisting only of technical attributes (e.g., Job Submission
and Description Language) or developed for tournaments, such as the Trading Agent
Competition (Anjomshoaa et al., 2005; Niu et al., 2009). There is a lack of research on
communication protocols that also express economic data to the technical attributes
and in a market-based scheduling context (Andreetto et al., 2010; Laure et al., 2006;
Smirnova, 2009). Similarly to RQ 2, the evaluation methodology of communication
protocols (as part of a distributed system) is analytical and combined with proof-of-
concept implementation and performance tests.
The fourth research question, RQ 4, refers to the evaluation of complex bidding
strategies in homogeneous and heterogenous settings, and also contains the proof-
of-concept evaluation of the Framework for Automated Bidding and communication
protocol developed here.
Research Question 4 ≺Evaluation of Bidding Strategies
How do learning-based bidding strategies score against benchmark bidding strategies
in settings with homogeneous and heterogeneous agents?
There is no established and clear methodology for evaluating complex bidding strate-
gies and their interactions in markets. This has to do with the target use cases
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evaluated, the assumptions selected, as well as the scenarios and types of market
mechanisms analyzed. Common assumptions in classic game theory are that agents
are rational, perfectly informed and apply bidding strategies that are the best re-
sponse to the actions of other agents. Furthermore, the mathematical model of the
bidding strategies is similar for all agents, thus, they are often assumed to be homoge-
neous (Shi and Jennings, 2010). In game theory, finding the Nash equilibrium is one
of the main goals in analyzing bidding strategies (Shi and Jennings, 2010; Wellman,
2006; MacKie-Mason and Wellman, 2006). As a system grows in complexity, game
theoretic models quickly become unfeasible. This is a reflection of the “strategies
space, number of agents, degree of incomplete and imperfect information, and dy-
namism” (MacKie-Mason and Wellman, 2006; Tesfatsion, 2006). In realistic settings,
the number of consumer and provider agents is asymmetric, not all agents share the
same information, agents do not share the same preferences as well as demand and
supply is dynamic over the time. In respect to their use cases – e.g. interactive appli-
cations or batch jobs – consumers are interested for immediate or delayed purchases
of online computing services. Thus, realistic settings require market mechanisms
with continuous matching and allocation of computing services (e.g., spot market5)
or markets for short-time future contracts for their batch jobs (call market6). In
online settings, demand and supply fluctuates over time and agents are continuously
making decisions based on the available information about the other agents’ actions.
Computing Nash equilibrium is an NP-complete problem and feasible in perfect in-
formation market scenarios with a small number of agents and manageable action
space.
In order to evaluate bidding strategies for realistic online scenarios, extensive ex-
periments in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings need to be carried out. The
research in this direction is still ongoing and generally addresses financial markets
scenarios than trading computing services (Das et al., 2001; Tesauro and Das, 2001;
Vytelingum et al., 2008; Phelps et al., 2010a). A commonly applied market mech-
anism in these settings is the continuous double auction. Moreover, these bidding
strategies are developed in the context of financial markets with common goal of
profit maximization. In the context of market-based scheduling there is a lack of
research in appropriate bidding strategies with sophisticated scoring functions, e.g.
“maximize profit and utilization,” “minimize time to complete and payments” or
5A market in which a commodity is bought or sold for immediate delivery or delivery in the very
near future, <http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Spot+market>.
6A market in which trading in individual securities occurs at specific times as opposed to con-
tinuously, <http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Call+Market>.
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other important performance indicators of a technical or economic nature (Reeves
et al., 2005; Heydenreich et al., 2010). Furthermore, evaluation of heterogeneous
agents, which apply different bidding strategies in competing online market settings,
is partially explored in the existing research, and virtually unexplored in the context
of market-based scheduling. Therefore, RQ 4 evaluates complex settings of mar-
kets and agents’ bidding strategies; and the proof-of-concept implementation shows
the feasibility of the models and methodologies developed here (MacKie-Mason and
Wellman, 2006; Tesfatsion, 2006; Sturm and Shehory, 2004; Bartolini et al., 2005).
Moreover, the models presented in this work are implemented, integrated and tested
in a real project according to real use cases for batch and interactive applications
(Nimis et al., 2008, 2009; Neumann et al., 2007).
1.3 Summary of the Research Contributions
This work contributes to the research questions introduced by providing novel theo-
retical and software models – a novel bidding strategy, called Q-Strategy, a software
framework for realizing both bidding agents and bidding strategies, called BidGen-
erator and a communication protocol for expressing and exchanging economic and
technical information within a system for market-based scheduling, called MX/CS
(Message Exchange in Computing Service Markets). The contributions of this work
can be summarized in the following way:
Development and realization of a novel, adaptive and configurable bid-
ding strategy called Q-Strategy: The first contribution of this work, the Q-
Strategy, is a novel model for structuring trading activities for trading objects in
terms of related consumer and provider requests, their bids, and observed rewards.
Consumer and provider requests consist of multi-attributive technical and economic
preferences for each of their applications or computing services. Furthermore, each
of the trading objects can be associated with an own scoring function. Thus, the
Q-Strategy aims to solve a so-called multi-armed bandit problem, where each of the
arms represents a long-term optimization problem for a given type of trading object
(Borissov and Wirström, 2008; Borissov, 2009; Borissov et al., 2010). Section 3.4
presents the design model of the Q-Strategy, its realization methodology and integra-
tion into a market-based scheduling scenario.
Development and realization of a novel agent framework for automated
bidding called BidGenerator: The second contribution of this work, the BidGen-
erator framework, offers well-defined interfaces and a methodology for implementing
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any kind of bidding agent and bidding strategy. As a proof-of-concept, it contains im-
plementations of several state-of-the-art bidding strategies, as well as the Q-Strategy.
Based on consumer and provider preferences, as well as the target market mech-
anism, bidding agents can be associated with different adequate bidding strategies
from the available pool (Borissov et al., 2010). Each of the bidding agents connects to
the SORMA market over well-defined interfaces and exchanges secured and binding
market messages. The architecture of the BidGenerator framework is presented in
Section 4.4.
Development and realization of a communication protocol for market-
based scheduling called MX/CS: As part of the distributed system for market-
based scheduling, the third contribution of this work is the definition of a commu-
nication protocol, which defines the type of information exchanged between related
system components in the message chain, from the application request to the bidding
agent, from the bidding agent to the target market, and from the market back to
the application. As proof-of-concept, the communication protocol has been devel-
oped, integrated and tested on top of the Job Submission and Description Language
(Borissov et al., 2009b). A detailed presentation of the communication protocol can
be found in Section 5.3.
Development of a methodology for evaluating bidding strategies in com-
plex settings : This work provides a full-fledged analysis of bidding strategies in
homogeneous and heterogeneous settings using recognized methodologies for agent-
based simulations. The lessons learned from the derived evaluation scenarios, their it-
erative evaluation over the years and the search for an appropriate evaluation method-
ology has led to the development of a more detailed methodology for agent-based
experiments, which is presented in Section 6.1. As part of the fourth contribution
of this work, the developed methodology was applied by evaluating the Q-Strategy
against benchmark strategies in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings in a spot
market. Furthermore, the evaluation results in Section 6.2 show that the Q-Strategy
outperforms the benchmark strategies in most of the scenarios and elaborate the
cases in which the benchmarks were more successful than the Q-Strategy.
Proof-of-concept implementation of BidGenerator, the Q-Strategy and
MX/CS in a real running prototype for market-based scheduling as part
of the SORMA project:7 The fifth contribution of this work is the proof-of-concept
implementation, integration and successful testing of the BidGenerator framework
7<http://sorma-project.eu/>
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with the Q-Strategy and the MX/CS communication protocol in a real running pro-
totype for market-based scheduling (Nimis et al., 2008, 2009; Neumann et al., 2007).
The integrated prototype has been evaluated according to two case studies, which
execute batch and interactive applications through distributed providers of comput-
ing services. The technical analysis of integrations with BidGenerator and MX/CS
is showed in Chapter 7. Performance experiments demonstrated the efficient proof-
of-concept implementation and integration with the related core components of the
overall prototype.
1.4 Structure of This Work
Figure 1.1 depicts the overall structure of the thesis. Chapter 1 introduces the topic,
research questions and contributions of this work. Chapter 2 discusses the target
domain of this research and specifies the economic and technical environments of
the market-based scheduling system. The economic environment describes the mi-
croeconomic model of the system, a definition of the transaction object traded and
challenges when designing markets for scheduling computing services. The techni-
cal environment introduces two application scenarios for batch and interactive jobs,
describes the realization challenges of the system for market-based scheduling from
technical perspective, depicts the technical architecture of the system and introduces
the target bidding scenario. It concludes with a presentation of the research method-
ologies applied in the evaluation of the economic and technical models developed.
Chapter 3 elaborates on the field of bidding strategy design. It starts with the defi-
nition of the term bidding strategy and the specification of related design desiderata
from a computational mechanism design perspective. Subsequently, existing non-
adaptive and adaptive bidding strategies are investigated and evaluated according
to the design desiderata derived and applied in a market-based scheduling domain.
Finally, a novel adaptive bidding strategy called the Q-Strategy is introduced as part
of RQ 1.
Chapter 4 presents the design and realization of a framework for automated bidding
called BidGenerator. The chapter starts with a discussion of what a bidding agent is.
Design desiderata for developing bidding agents are derived; based on these, existing
agent frameworks are elaborated and evaluated. As a contribution to RQ 2, the
chapter concludes with the presentation of the BidGenerator framework.
Chapter 5 focuses on the design and realization of a communication protocol for
market-based scheduling. The chapter starts with specification of the design desider-
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ata for developing communication protocols in the target domain. Subsequently,
it presents and evaluates related works on existing communication protocols to the
design desiderata. The contribution to RQ 3 is a formal definition of a novel commu-
nication protocol called MX/CS, specifically designed for a market-based scheduling
domain.
Chapter 6 presents the results of the agent-based experiments performed – the evalua-
tion of the Q-Strategy against benchmark bidding strategies in homogeneous and het-
erogeneous settings. The chapter starts with a description of the evaluation method-
ology and presents the design of the numerical experiments. The contribution to
RQ 4 is an insightful presentation of the results on the impact of the learning-based
adaptive bidding strategy, Q-Strategy, against benchmark bidding strategies in a spot
market for computing services, realized with the continuous double auction.
Chapter 7 is a technical analysis of the BidGenerator framework and MX/CS applied
in real case studies. Two case studies for batch and interactive applications show how
BidGenerator and MX/CS are applied for automating provisioning and acquisition
processes in markets for computing services. A third case study shows how MX/CS
is applied in the creation of electronic contracts. In this chapter, the adoption of
MX/CS in an application scenario for sharing storage services in social networks
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called Social Cloud is also described. The chapter is concluded with a performance
analysis of the integrated system of BidGenerator, MX/CS and market components.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a summary of the research contributions
and an overview of related future research topics.
1.5 Related Publications
The preliminary ideas for the Q-Strategy were first presented in Borissov (2009)
and Borissov and Wirström (2008), including its definition, realization and primal
evaluation. The evaluation compares aggregated consumer utilities in scenarios with
symmetric and asymmetric agents for specific market mechanisms. Borissov et al.
(2010) present a comprehensive view on the BidGenerator framework and provides a
fully-fledged evaluation of the Q-Strategy in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings.
Borissov et al. (2009b) present a specification for a bidding language called EJSDL (in
this work renamed to MX/CS ), for expressing and exchanging economic preferences
in the context of market-based scheduling. A detailed description of such a bidding
language is shown with a corresponding realization scenario for exchanging private,
public and market data between the actors in the environment, such as consumers,
providers, bidding agents and auctions. The bidding language is associated with a
corresponding ontology, which defines the semantics of concepts and relations utilized
with links to recognized upper ontologies.
Developed within the scope of the SORMA project, Borissov et al. (2008b); Nimis
et al. (2009, 2008); Neumann et al. (2007) describe the proof-of-concept implementa-
tion and integration of the BidGenerator framework and MX/CS in a real prototype.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Related Work
T
he aim of this chapter is to introduce the research field of market-based schedul-
ing of computing services. The chapter begins with a comparison of emerging
service paradigms with the aim of deriving tradable computing service objects. It
motivates the application of market mechanisms, which can improve the efficiency of
provisioning and usage of computing services. The application of market mechanisms
imply economic and technical challenges for the design of mechanisms and strategies,
as well as for the design of related software tools like agent frameworks. The eco-
nomic and technical challenges are discussed in the subsequent sections, followed by
an analysis of existing works in the research field investigated. Finally, the chapter
concludes with a discussion of the research methods available, in order to select an
appropriate evaluation methodology for the contributions of this work.
2.1 Computing Services
The computer became the working unit in society for executing a multitude of tasks
from simple data processing and storage to complex processing of simulations, as well
as sensor and enterprise data. To execute these tasks, different computing services are
often required. For personal uses, a single computing instance is needed for document
creation and editing, audio and video streaming and data aggregation. Industrial and
research applications in the form of information systems often produce big logs from
GB to PB of data, which can only be processed in a time-efficient manner with a
bundle of computing instances that can work together.
Application services became complex, connecting hundreds to millions of people, are
distributed over the network and scalable. Such applications aggregate and provide
data from various sources like sensors, audio and video, finance and forecasting ser-
vices. Each of these applications has varying technical requirements for scalability,
performance and security. The following sections briefly introduce actual computing
paradigms, discussing the shift from utility computing to Cloud computing.
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2.1.1 Utility Computing
The first ideas to provide computing power as a utility (similar to energy, water and
communications) had been discussed back in the 60s (Armbrust et al., 2009). How-
ever, it really started to gain attention in the 90s, together with the increase in com-
puting usage and Internet technologies in everyday life. Through the restructuring
of existing computing infrastructures, utility computing aims to provide computing
power in a more flexible and effective way, in order to reduce IT costs and improve
provider profits. In Rappa (2004), the following characteristics of utility computing
are identified:
• Necessity. Utility computing offers a certain value for the consumers to fulfill
their day-to-day needs.
• Reliability. The utility computing services provided must be readily available
anytime and anywhere.
• Usability. Utility computing services have to be simple at the point of use
(“plug and play”) and hide the system complexity from the consumer. This
consideration implies the existence of standards for technical access (interfaces)
and message protocols.
• Utilization rates. Providers have economic interests in maintaining higher uti-
lization rates and increasing profits for their computing infrastructures. Their
utilization rates may fluctuate over time and across geographic regions, which
have to be taken into consideration in providers’ business models.
• Pay-per-use. This pricing method stipulates that prices of utility computing
services are calculated according to their actual usage. The prices of utility
computing services can vary based on actual system utilization, time of day,
geographic region and consumer type, i.e., price and client discrimination poli-
cies (Püschel et al., 2007). Providers can offer discounts during low peak times
in order to shift consumer demand from higher peak times.
• Scalability. The scalability property of utility computing services refers to the
fact that, on the one hand, consumers can get as much capacity as they are
willing to pay for; on the other hand, providers can benefit from economies of
scale by reducing the costs per unit when consumer usage increases.
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• Service exclusivity. Service exclusivity represents the set of conditions and usage
policies for utility computing services. The conditions are specified in the form
of provisioning and usage policies, which are usually set by providers, however,
they often have to be in keeping with policies of common regulative instance
(e.g., government).
The characteristics of utility computing mentioned above imply challenges of a tech-
nical, business and political nature. Related processes of utility computing like
repetitive tasks, service provisioning and usage, monitoring, payment and billing are
not manually manageable (Kephart and Chess, 2003). Well-defined interfaces and
methodologies, as well as tools, are required in order to automate these processes on
the behalf of the provider and simplify access for the consumer.
2.1.2 Grid Computing
The idea of Grid computing originated from metacomputing projects like I-WAY,
where metacomputing denotes “a networked virtual supercomputer, constructed dy-
namically from geographically distributed resources linked by high-speed networks.”
I-WAY was one of the first projects, which connected supercomputers from seventeen
different sites, mainly in the USA, using preliminary versions of the Globus Toolkit
Grid middleware (Foster and Kesselman, 1997). The Grid computing paradigm incor-
porates ideas and relates them to paradigms like distributed and cluster computing.
Distributed computing is a computing paradigm, in which software applications are
executed on one or more computing instances (also called computing nodes), which
are connected and communicate through a computer network. To achieve their scal-
ability, the software applications are usually modularized and executed on multiple
computing instances in parallel (Naor and Stockmeyer, 1993). The general advantage
of distributed systems over centralized systems is the ability to enable modulariza-
tion of complex systems, where each of the modules are executed on different nodes
connected through a network. Therefore, distributed applications can be more easily
configured to avoid a single-point of failure, to improve scalability and fault tolerance
through the redundancy of application modules.
A cluster contains a set of locally installed and independent compute instances (also
called nodes) that are interconnected through a dedicated network. All components of
a cluster system belong to a single administrative domain and usually reside in a single
room (Baker and Buyya, 1999). A cluster system usually consists of homogeneous
computing nodes, installed with the same operating system and software. In order to
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submit their applications, the users connect to a so-called user interface (also called
head node or UI node) in order to interact with Cluster Management Systems (CMS).
One of the main CMS components is the scheduler, which uses well-defined policies
to allocate submitted applications to computing nodes.
In contrast to distributed and cluster computing, a Grid computing system spans
across multiple sites, each of them coordinating and sharing their own computing
service instances to the research community. A global resource scheduler monitors
the state of each of the registered sites in terms of the current site utilization, as well
as the number of running and allocated jobs. The decision to allocate jobs to sites is
made by the global resource scheduler according to the job’s technical requirements,
the assigned Virtual Organization1 (VO) of the job owner and the utilization of the
target Grid sites assigned to the owner’s VO. The local scheduler of the allocated
Grid site performs the final scheduling actions. An overview of common scheduling
mechanisms for Grid systems is presented by Dong and Akl (2006).
According to the three point checklist, a Grid i) “coordinates resources that are not
subject to centralized control,” ii) “uses standard, open, general-purpose protocols
and interfaces,” and iii) “delivers non-trivial qualities of service” (Foster, 2002). Grid
systems have been in place for a decade mainly in the field of research. Prominent
projects like TeraGrid,2 Open Science Grid3 and EGEE 4 (Enabling Grids for E-
sciencE) already connect many sites around the world, enabling the calculation of
huge amounts of data, which is generated by experiments in areas like physics, biology
and chemistry. With more than 80K CPU cores, distributed in around 250 computing
centers with more than 9K users, the EGEE Grid handles more than 200K jobs each
day (Lingrand et al., 2009).
In order to integrate, provide and perform Grid computing, one needs well-defined
interfaces and standards that that are supported by each provider (e.g., through com-
mon Grid service management tools), in order to prepare computing services for the
Grid. Grid standards are mutually created and approved by global standardization
entities like the Open Grid Forum5 (OGF) and the Organization for the Advancement
of Structured Information Standards6 (OASIS). The Open Grid Services Architecture
1The “project community” of a consumer or provider is called Virtual Organization or VO. A
VO can contain Grid services of many geographically distributed Grid sites.
2<https://www.teragrid.org>, last visited on 15 Mar. 2010.
3<http://www.opensciencegrid.org>, last visited on 15 Mar. 2010.
4<http://www.eu-egee.org>, last visited on 15 Mar. 2010.
5<http://www.ogf.org>, last visited on 15 Mar. 2010.
6<http://www.oasis-open.org/home/index.php>, last visited on 15 Mar. 2010.
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(OGSA) is a reference model for implementing Grid systems, which defines its con-
cepts, components and relations (Foster et al., 2005). The realization of Grid services
is based on open standards, which is why the Web service approach was selected. The
original Web service approach supports only stateless communication. Based on a
decentralized control of the Grid, there was a need for new protocols on top of the
Web service protocols, which enable the management of Grid service states. Such
protocols have been defined within the Open Grid Services Infrastructure (OGSI)
document and later refined and implemented as the Web Services Resource Frame-
work (Foster et al., 2005). The Simple API for Grid Applications (SAGA) provides
a common API for application submission and management, data management and
monitoring facilities (Goodale et al., 2008). This API is designed to work with and
support most available Grid middlewares through connectors. The most prominent
Grid middlewares are the Globus Toolkit, gLite and UNICORE (Ellert et al., 2007). A
Grid middleware offers software packages, which enable the provider to connect their
computing instances to the Grid as well as for development, deployment and man-
agement tasks, such as Grid service deployment, monitoring, discovery, management
and security. For consumers, the Grid middleware provides the necessary APIs to
prepare their applications for the Grid, as well as tools for application management,
monitoring and communication with the Grid system.
Consumers willing to utilize Grid services need to prepare their application according
to the APIs of the target Grid middleware. The application’s technical (hardware
and software) requirements, as well as application specific attributes (e.g., for ap-
plication execution and data staging) are expressed with a well-defined description
language like the Job Submission and Description Language(JSDL) (Ellert et al.,
2007). The Grid scheduler acts as a central broker and schedules the consumer’s
applications to Grid sites according to the globally available Grid site information,
the associated consumer’s VOs and the technical requirements of the applications.
The current achievements in Grid computing are the ability to connect geograph-
ically distributed grid sites and manage VOs, enabling a distributed and managed
execution of applications across the available Grid services of the consumer’s VO.
Like with utility computing, the provisioning and usage of Grid services should make
current infrastructures technically and economically more efficient and sustainable.
As such, the so-called Grid Economy (Buyya et al., 2005) discusses market models
for offering Grid services as commodities through negotiation or auctioning processes
between consumers and providers. Economic efficiency refers to the fact that market
mechanisms for computing services can take the technical and economic preferences
of consumers and providers into consideration and match them more efficiently than
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current technical schedulers and static prices. On the one hand, consumers execute
different applications with varying requirements, depending on application type, as
well as time and budget constraints. On the other hand, providers want to achieve
higher utilization and profits with their computing infrastructures (Dong and Akl,
2006). To achieve this, the Grid Economy has to offer appropriate market mech-
anisms, bidding tools and communication protocols, which support the market al-
location and bidding processes of consumers and providers. The literature on Grid
economics has become a significant milestone for the next wave to move the Grid
vision to business and expand it with new types of services such as Cloud computing.
2.1.3 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing builds on the ideas of Grid computing, but focuses more on the
business view of differentiated service types – infrastructure, platform and applica-
tion services. Since the Cloud computing hype has started, the term has been defined
differently by experts and market analysts from research and industry (Foster et al.,
2008; Geelan, 2009; Mell and Grance, 2009b; Plummer et al., 2008). Furthermore,
several joint efforts have been started to define a common view of the characteris-
tics, the related technical and economic challenges of the Cloud stack and to work
on standardization of the related APIs. Organizations like the Open Grid Forum,
Distributed Management Task Force’s Cloud Incubator (DMTF, 2010a), the Open
Science Grid and the Open Cloud Manifesto (Nelson, 2009) already include repre-
sentatives from research and industry, however, this research field is just opening
up and many challenges including, but not limited to security, interoperability and
economics have to be elaborated.
The general idea shift from Grid to Cloud computing is provided in the following
definition (Foster et al., 2008):
Definition 2.1.1 (Cloud computing). A large-scale distributed computing paradigm
that is driven by economies of scale, in which a pool of abstracted, virtualized, dy-
namically scalable, managed computing power, storage, platforms, and services are
delivered on-demand to external customers over the Internet.
The key points of the definition are that Cloud computing services i) scale based on
consumer demand, which allows for efficiency through economies of scale, where ii)
scalability is achieved through abstraction and virtualization over the three Cloud
computing service types – infrastructure, platform and application services, and iii)
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the Cloud computing services are dynamically configured and delivered on demand,
where iv) the consumer pays for usage time.
A more detailed definition of Cloud computing is provided by Mell and Grance
(2009b), which fundamentally contains the definition of Foster et al. (2008), but
extends it by describing the three Cloud service types – Infrastructure as a Service,
Platform as a Service and Software as a Service (Figure 2.1) – as well as the four
possible deployment models of the Cloud computing paradigm – public, private, com-
munity and hybrid Clouds. The following sections will look into more details of the
Infrastructure as a Service model, which is the focus of this research, as well as its
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2.1.3.1 Infrastructure as a Service
Towards the shift of Cloud computing, computing centers aim to organize and coordi-
nate their computing resources (computing nodes, storage nodes, network bandwidth,
etc.) more efficiently, in order to provide scalable computing power on demand as
well as to identify idle capacities. Such free capacities can be offered for public use
in order to increase the provider’s profit.
Most providers of infrastructure services adopt static pricing models like subscription
and pay-per-use, where the price for a service instance is fixed in the time (Weinhardt
et al., 2009; Clemons, 2009). Static prices do not reflect changing market conditions
in supply and demand, therefore providers’ computing infrastructures have idle ca-
pacities. In order to respond to this issue, Amazon started a spot market7 where free
capacity is allocated dynamically based on the current supply and demand. Prices
in the spot market vary dynamically (Amazon, 2009).
In the context of Cloud computing, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) refers to the
type of fundamental computing services running on top of hardware infrastructures,
such as bandwidth (network), computing, storage and database services (definition
of Resource in Treadwell (2007); Mell and Grance (2009b)). In the case of purchasing
a computing service, a consumer has controlled access to it, which enables deploy-
ment of the target execution environment in terms of software dependencies and
environmental settings (e.g., environment variables and network security settings).
Definition 2.1.2 (Computing Service Instance). A computing service instance (CSI)
provides a computing environment that enables the execution of applications by sat-
isfying their technical requirements for a specified number of processors, main mem-
ory, storage, bandwidth and operating system. The functionality to be able to access
a CSI in terms of transferring and executing an application, as well as retrieving the
related result is enabled through well-defined APIs (Treadwell, 2007). The exact de-
scription of the application execution plan in terms of usage, duration, payment
methods, deployment, execution and result retrieval is provided in a well-defined mes-
sage protocol (i.e., an application description language). The application execution
plan is locally performed by the runtime environment of the computing service. A
well-defined message protocol refers to a standardized means of describing applica-
tions’s requirements, CSIs and their properties.
7A market in which a commodity is bought or sold for immediate delivery or delivery in the very
near future.
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Based on this definition, a provider of IaaS instances enables the transfer and exe-
cution of applications on its CSIs, which can be physical or virtual machines (Nurmi
et al., 2009). Consumers receive the necessary access control to communicate with
the provider IaaS infrastructure and applies the related tools to prepare the target
environment and their applications in order to be executed on the allocated CSI.
Dependencies on third party software components and related licenses are optional
services, which can be additionally purchased by the IaaS provider or consumers can
transmit them together with their applications. In the end, when the application is
completed and results transferred, the computing service is released and reverted to
its initial state.
According to Foster et al. (2006), Infrastructure Services consist of several manage-
ment units – execution management services, data services, resource management
services, security services and monitoring services, which enable management of the
IaaS-Platform:
• Execution Management Services. The execution management (also called run-
time management) controls the starting, execution and termination processes
of a deployed application (Papazoglou and van den Heuvel, 2007). In the Grid
computing context, the Globus Resource Allocation Manager (GRAM) is the
interface service for submitting, locating, monitoring and canceling comput-
ing jobs (Foster et al., 2008). The GRAM also supports the JSDL format,
which consists of elements to specify the runtime scripts and basic configura-
tions of jobs in order to start them on the allocated CSI. Similar, providers
of IaaS-services, which are offered over a market mechanism, need to rely on
standardized interface implementations in order to enable common deployment,
execution and monitoring of batch and interactive jobs.
• Data Services. Applications have different requirements with regards to data
management, data usage and persistence. An IaaS platform has to offer flexible
facilities (APIs) to bind and use storage services to facilitate the requirements
of applications like Document Management, Indexing, Logging and Memory
Management (Buyya et al., 2009).
• Messaging. A crucial part of a computing platform are the message proto-
cols that enable and automate communication with the IaaS services, such
as submitting messages to deploy and start a specific application, but also for
retrieving (monitoring) runtime specific data of the executed application, or ex-
ecute payments for usage. Such message protocols are typically encoded in an
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XML (or a JSON) message format and are communicated through Web service
interfaces (Foster et al., 2009). Standardization plays a crucial role in achiev-
ing interoperability between computing systems with well-designed, useful and
well-accepted message protocols. Standardization bodies like the W3C, OASIS,
DMTF and OGF review and publish various well-defined and commonly ap-
plied message protocols in fields like Web service communication and security
protocols, business process management, job submission and execution (e.g.,
JSDL), to mention just a few. In the context of this work, bidding languages
are a further part of the message protocols of an IaaS platform enhanced with
market-based scheduling facilities (Nisan, 2006).
• Resource Management. Resource management facilitates the execution of IaaS
services on the underlying resource infrastructure of computing nodes, storage
elements and network services. Scalability of an application in IaaS can be
achieved through modularization and parallel execution on more than one node
(Yu and Vahdat, 2006). In the context of this research, consumers are able to
acquire as many CSIs as needed through the computing services market to run
their batch or interactive applications.
• Security Services. The security module handles the processes and methodolo-
gies, which are related to authorization, authentication, secure communication
and data security (Foster et al., 2002; Rittinghouse, 2009; Catteddu and Hog-
ben, 2009). In the context of this work, the communication of consumers,
providers and the market has to be authorized and secured. As a part of the
market model and scenario, all submitted consumer or provider bids are bind-
ing, i.e., the bidders are responsible for using and providing the CSIs as specified
in the bids and matched (a match results in a binding contract) by the mar-
ket. In the context of the SORMA project, the authorization and signature of
bids was realized with the emerging standard for single sign-on authentication
– Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (Armando et al., 2008; Nimis
et al., 2009).
• Monitoring. Monitoring is a significant part of the administration of an infras-
tructure service, which enables controlling the system by measuring for system
failures either proactively or reactively and thus preserving the reliability of
the IaaS platform. Monitoring services provide performance data, utilization
statistics, response times, network load statistics, transaction statistics, load
balancing, health management and troubleshooting (Bernstein, 1996; Foster
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et al., 2006; Papazoglou and van den Heuvel, 2007). IaaS providers use the
monitoring data of applications for auditing and billing purposes. The storing
and analysis of such data has to be in compliance with the legal stipulations of
the institutional policies (e.g., governments) (Mowbray, 2009). In the context
of project SORMA, the monitoring services provided runtime information of
the CSIs to the service level agreement enforcement and contract management
components (Nimis et al., 2009).
• Contract and Payment. A contract is a legal and binding agreement between
a consumer and a provider that captures the already negotiated technical and
economic objectives, which are also called service level objectives (SLOs) are
part of a service level agreement document. To ensure regular execution of the
contract, SLOs are frequently monitored by the target provider and consumer.
They are the main indicators for measuring the success of a contract and the
resulting payments or penalties. SLOs can be assigned any quality level of
service attributes (e.g., “service availability of 99.95%”), technical attributes
(e.g., number of CPUs), payment procedures, penalties or legal aspects (Becker
et al., 2008; Wilkes, 2008; Papazoglou and van den Heuvel, 2007). To provide
this capability, the IaaS platform should ensure that consumer applications
are executed according to contract and react adequately on irregularities. The
irregularities are identified by periodic monitoring of the SLOs. The payment
procedure contains information regarding when and how payments are to be
transferred from the consumer to the provider. So far, current payment transac-
tions are often executed via credit card or online payment services like PayPal.
Online payment services often provide Web service interface, which allows au-
tomation of the payment process (Armbrust et al., 2009). In the context of
SORMA, price, technical requirements, SLOs, penalties, method of payment
and establishing contracts are part of the message protocols and the related
bidding processes of consumers and providers, whose aim is to reach a tech-
nically and economically matching agreement in an auction setting (Borissov
et al., 2009b; Nimis et al., 2009).
2.1.3.2 Deployment Models
Depending on the organizational structure, there are four models for deploying Cloud
services, which can be separated into four main models – Private Cloud, Community
Cloud and Public Cloud, as well as a mixed model called Hybrid Cloud (Mell and
Grance, 2009b; ISACA, 2009; Microsystems, 2009; Craig et al., 2009).
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Table 2.1 summarizes the three main models of Cloud service deployment and their
key characteristics. The three deployment concepts are characterized through the
following criteria (Mell and Grance, 2009b; ISACA, 2009; Microsystems, 2009; Craig
et al., 2009):
• Operation. The usage target group.
• Management. The type of authority responsible for the installation, manage-
ment and maintenance activities.
• Realization Describes whether the Cloud services are deployed within the target
organization’s structures (on premise) or externally deployed at a remote facility
(off premise).
• Security Risk. A low security risk level means that the applications are executed
in a controlled local environment, a moderate risk level means that they are
executed within a controlled organizational environment and a high risk level
means that there is less control of where the applications are executed.
• Agility. Describes the level of agility and flexibility to scale applications and
utilize Cloud services.
Table 2.1: Cloud deployment models
Private Cloud Community Cloud Public Cloud
Operation internal inter-organizational public
Management internal, inter-organizational, third-party
third-party third-party
Realization on-premise, on-premise, off-premise
off-premise off-premise
Security Risk low moderate high
Agility moderate moderate high
Based on the Operational criterion, Private Cloud (PRC) services are visible only
to the members of the target organization (enterprise), which have exclusive access
to all PRC services, as well as stored and produced data, whereas with Community
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Cloud (CC), exclusive access to CC services is relaxed to members of the community
and with Public Cloud (PUC), PUC services can be accessed by everyone.
Private Cloud services are managed by the target organization or subcontracted to
a third party. Community Clouds are managed by the community or a third party,
whereas Public Clouds are managed entirely by a third-party, since the third party
also provides the PUC services.
Private Cloud services of big enterprises are realized within their computing centers
(on premise), where small and medium enterprises achieve higher economic efficiency
by acquiring PRC from third party providers (off premise). The same applies to
Community Clouds, since the crucial factor in determining whether Cloud service
should be on or off premise is the size of an enterprise or community. In contrast,
Public Clouds are realized and provided by third-party Cloud service providers like
Amazon Web Services, Salesforce and Google AppEngine.
Executing applications and preserving the data within private computing infrastruc-
tures reduces risks for the enterprises by providing greater control of their data.
Dedicated – secured and with exclusive access – private Cloud environments are al-
ready provided by third parties in the form of Virtual Private Clouds (VPCs) (Wood
et al., 2009). In the case of VPCs, enterprises have exclusive control of their dedi-
cated environment and contract service level agreements to stipulate how and where
the applications and data are to be handled. Within a Community Cloud, the appli-
cations and data can be processed on computing services, which are owned by the
community members. The provisioning and usage policies, as well as service levels
of Community Clouds are specified within a contract for the target community. The
security risks rise with the size of the community. In the case of Public Clouds, the
applications and data can be handled from any provider around the world or within
a specific geographic region. The risk level depends on provider’s security policies.
Higher security risks can be expected due to the greater number of members, who
execute their applications and data on Public Cloud services. In contrast to private
and community Clouds, service provisioning and usage policies with public cloud
services are limited and lack common regularity control (ISACA, 2009).
The level of agility is reflected through the capacities of the Cloud system. In the case
of private and community Clouds, applications can be scaled to the available Cloud
system resources of the organization or community, whereas with public clouds, the
capacity is practically unlimited. Furthermore, utilization of Cloud system resources
depends on the needs of the organization and community, which may change over
time and produce inefficiencies in how the Cloud system is used in the case of private
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and community Clouds. Public clouds, however, can deal with fluctuating demand
and supply efficiently.
Hybrid Cloud refers to a composition of the three main Cloud deployment types.
A realistic scenario of a Hybrid Cloud model is a load-balancing facility in cases
of over utilization of private or community Cloud services due to daily or event-
driven (project deadlines) computing peaks. In such cases, standardization of Cloud
technologies plays a crucial role in enabling the portability of data and applications
(applications) (Mell and Grance, 2009b). The characteristics of a Hybrid Cloud are
aggregated by combining Cloud deployment models. One can imagine that the mi-
gration policies of applications from private or community to public Clouds will have
to take the security level of the outsourced (for external computing) applications or
data into consideration.
2.1.4 Concluding Remarks
The Cloud computing paradigm, i.e., offering computing, platform and application
services as utilities, represents the next evolutionary step after Utility and Grid com-
puting. Cloud computing provides a way to create new software architectures that en-
able the flexible and efficient provisioning of Cloud services. Furthermore, approaches
from autonomic computing (Kephart and Walsh, 2004a) are becoming important in
order to reduce and hide system complexity from consumers and help system main-
tainers monitor preventive and reactive arrangements in order to provide reliable
Cloud services.
Realizing an autonomic system with self-optimization capabilities is a complex task
that increases with the complexity of the target system, i.e., infrastructure, platform
or application services, where each of them may follow different optimization goals
involving various technical and economic parameters. The literature in economics,
especially (computational) mechanism design, game theory and artificial intelligence
uses the concept of utility functions (also called scoring functions in some cases) to
model and optimize decision parameters in order to achieve a well-defined goal (Walsh
et al., 2004; Kephart and Walsh, 2004a; Wilkes, 2008). Walsh et al. (2004) illustrated
this approach with the management of data centers by translating high-level business
objectives (given service level objectives) into lower-level decision steps as part of a
utility function. Kephart and Walsh (2004a) presented a framework for designing
autonomic systems with policies for action, goals and utility functions. Becker et al.
(2008); Wilkes (2008) investigated the use of utility functions to establish service level
agreements for computing services between providers and consumers. For example,
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the high level business objectives represent the overall preferences of a provider (i.e.,
to maximize revenue); lower-level decision steps may include increasing the target
storage price of a storage unit dynamically, such as when demand and consequently
storage utilization increase. A utility function aggregates a set of (weighted) technical
and economic parameters into a single value (usually a monetary unit).
In their paper, Foster et al. (2004) discuss the need to make the management of
computing systems more intelligent and autonomic. The authors propose the usage
of software agents that enable automated and intelligent monitoring of Grid systems,
service discovery, application submission and execution tasks. Furthermore, they
discuss the need for standardized message protocols, standard APIs and policies to
rule the communication of software agents and make it easier to understand their
intentions. Another proposal is to automate the selling and purchasing processes
through trading agents that negotiate the preferences of consumers and providers in
bilateral negotiations or multilateral auctions (Lai, 2005).
The next section discusses the benefits of dynamic price mechanisms for allocating
computing services, as well as the need for agents, bidding strategies and message
protocols to automate the bidding and matchmaking processes in such markets.
2.2 Why Bidding, Agents and Messages in Markets for Com-
puting Services?
Economic approaches for allocating computing services have been investigated for
many years. Many works have focused on the design of market mechanisms for allo-
cating computing services as commodities (see Section 2.3.4). However, there is very
little reference to the design of bidding strategies and their efficiency in continuous
market mechanisms (i.e., bidders join the market continuously and on demand) with
imperfect information in the existing literature. Each of the bidders have different
goals and do not share or receive full information about the past, present or future
intentions, goals and actions of others. The market mechanism is cleared on a con-
tinuous base, as soon as there is a match between available consumer and provider
bids in the order book.
The aim of economics is to investigate the mechanisms that enable the efficient allo-
cation of resources with respect to demand and supply. Each resource has a certain
value for its owner and different values for the various consumers. Resources are
allocated in an economically efficient manner, at a higher or equal price than offered,
when they are purchased by the consumers who value them most.
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In parallel to the static pricing models for IaaS services, Amazon started a new pric-
ing model – spot market for EC2 spot instances – where consumers can bid on unused
IaaS capacity and execute their applications on those EC2 spot instances as long as
their bid exceeds the current spot price for the current time frame (on an hourly
basis). Amazon adjusts the spot price of an EC2 spot instance, based on the current
supply (free capacities) and demand (consumer bids) (Amazon, 2009). Offering free
capacities of EC2 instances via a spot market incentivizes indecisive consumers to
utilize these to execute their low priority and non-time critical applications for lower
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Figure 2.2: Static versus dynamic pricing (adopted from Lai (2005))
A pricing model, in which the target price is established through dynamic bargain-
ing situations like auctions or negotiations based on supply and demand, is called
dynamic (or variable) pricing (Lai, 2005). Dynamic pricing is typically used for cal-
culating the price of differentiated and high value products (services). Auctions are
established market mechanisms for performing efficient aggregations of fluctuating
supply and demand (Wurman, 2001). Figure 2.2 illustrates three different cases,
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which describe the relationship of static pricing to fluctuating demand and supply,
postulating the fact that market mechanisms with dynamic pricing policies achieve
more (economically) efficient allocations of differentiated services than static pricing
scenarios:
• Case I describes the case where the static (fixed) price exceeds the demand,
e.g., the consumer’s willingness to pay is lower than the requested price. The
welfare (sum of consumer and provider utilities) that would have been gained
by selling and using the service is unrealized.
• Case II shows a situation in which the demand exceeds the fixed price, i.e., the
consumer’s willingness to pay is higher than the provider’s prices. Consumers
are able to purchase the service at the fixed price and a welfare is realized at that
price together with the providers. Assuming that the provider can choose the
consumer with the highest willingness to pay, the difference between the overall
demand curve and requested fixed price is the provider’s unrealized profit (Lai,
2005).
• Case III is a situation in which there is no common information channel, e.g.,
globally open order book of all consumer and provider bids for a given trad-
ing object (computing service). In this case, the providers do not have full
information about the market; they only have information on the visible set
of consumer bids in the provider’s “local” order book. The consumer bids in
the “local” order book have a lower willingness to pay than other interested
consumers in the market (“global” order book). Therefore, due to the fact that
the price is fixed, the provider supplies the service with unrealized profit. The
unrealized welfare refers to the fact that, on the one hand, unaware consumers
with higher demand do not get the service, on the other hand, the fixed price
of the provider restricts the generation of higher profits.
Traditionally, the price determination process of goods and services is described dy-
namically through supply and demand curves, which depict the relationship between
the prices and quantities (Figure 2.3). The demand curve, D, describes the con-
sumer’s willingness to pay in relation to the quantity of a service by taking their
preferences, endowments and the technology required into account. D is almost de-
creasing, assuming that consumers will buy more from the service as the price goes
down. The supply curve, S, represents the quantity and corresponding price of a
service that the market can offer when taking the provider preferences, endowments
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and the technology provided into consideration. The upward curve reflects the fact
that higher prices of a service will stimulate providers to increase the number of pro-
vided services in order to increase their revenue (Varian, 2009; Foley, 2010). Gjerstad
(2007) states that the time pace of bid submission plays a role in the price finding
processes of humans, but also of automated software agents. It has been observed
that if the pace of bid submissions of consumers is lower than the pace of bid submis-
sions of providers, then prices are likely to move below the equilibrium price and vice
versa. Figure 2.3 depicts this loss of efficiency of consumer and provider surpluses
when trades occur out of equilibrium. Here the providers request prices that are
lower than the equilibrium price. The dashed lines represent the quantity and price
offered for the traded service. In this case, consumer demand to purchase the traded
services is higher, consequently, providers will have strong incentive to increase the










Figure 2.3: Consumers’ (CS) and providers’ surpluses (PS) out of equilibrium
(adopted from Gjerstad (2007))
In general, price finding processes between consumers and providers are described
in equilibrium and non-equilibrium trading theory. A service market is in general
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in equilibrium when supply is equal to demand, i.e., in this state, the allocation of
the service is most efficient because the amount of the demanded services is exactly
the same as the amount of the provided services at the given equilibrium price (p∗).
The original idea of price equilibrium was developed by Léon Walras in 1874, who
pointed out that such equilibria can be reached through a price adjustment process,
also called tâtonnement (French for “groping”) or the Walras tâtonnement process.
In such a scenario, consumer and provider agents shout their price signals for a tar-
get good (service). The interactions between agents and the price finding process is
coordinated by a central entity called an “auctioneer.” Based on the price signals
received,, the auctioneer adjusts the price to balance supply and demand by finding
an equilibrium price. A trade between agents is permitted only if the trade price is
in equilibrium (Cheng and Wellman, 1998).
In non-equilibrium theory, agents follow a non-tâtonnement process, where trades
between consumers and providers are allowed before the market has reached equi-
librium (Schlieper, 1974). The non-equilibrium theory is motivated by the fact that
markets are imperfect – online market mechanisms are designed to be computation-
ally tractable and are often executed continuously, services are not homogeneous,
traders are not perfectly informed and their supply and demand (functions) changes
dynamically over time. Here, the allocation of providers’ services to consumers’ ap-
plications takes place in parallel to the price adjustment process. Works showed that
non-tâtonnement processes converge to competitive equilibria (Negishi, 1962; Chan-
der and Tulkens, 2006; Mukherji, 2008). Market mechanisms such as the Continuous
Double Auction implement a non-tâtonnement allocation processes of supply and de-
mand (Wurman et al., 2001; Gjerstad, 2003). Such market mechanisms are widely
applied in practice because of their practicability (see also Section 2.3.5). The trading
behavior of consumers and providers of computing services within market mechanisms
can be described and analyzed as a non-tâtonnement process. Thus, market mech-
anisms and bidding strategies have to deal with a high degree of complexity due to
the reality of imperfect competition, which fosters strategic interactions by traders
and leads to inefficient allocation in comparison to equilibrium-based allocation.
The analysis of tâtonnement processes assumes perfect competition for homogeneous
services, however, computing services are neither storable nor homogeneous, their
supply and demand fluctuates and consumers and providers often do not know their
preferences or do not want to reveal them truthfully (Rothkopf, 2007). Thus, it re-
quires a comprehensive analysis of (dynamic) allocation processes, in which agents
and services are not homogeneous in markets that lack perfect information. These
considerations not only play a crucial role in the design of online mechanisms for
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market-based scheduling, but also in the design of appropriate bidding strategies.
Instantiated into software agents, the bidding strategies can automate bidding pro-
cesses efficiently and the agents can automatically act on behalf of the consumers
and providers (Das et al., 2001; Greenwald et al., 2003; Ku et al., 2005; Kephart and
Chess, 2003).
The (software) bidding agents coordinate and execute the bidding processes au-
tonomously, as well as integrate with the heterogeneous system through well-defined
interfaces and communication protocols (Kephart and Chess, 2003). A distributed
system for market-based scheduling interacts through well-defined (preferably stan-
dardized) and common APIs. The system components exchange messages according
to a well-defined protocol. The protocol specifies the types of messages, which are ex-
changed between specific components – application and bidding agent, bidding agent
and market and vice versa. Moreover, a semantic specification of message protocols
is crucial since there is a need for common understanding, trust, validation and ver-
ification capabilities for the messages within the system components (Kephart and
Chess, 2003).
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present the economic and technical environment of a system
for market-based scheduling of computing services. Moreover, the sections discuss
the challenges that arise when designing and implementing such a system from an
economic and technical point of view.
2.3 The Microeconomic Environment
This section defines the economic environment of the target system for market-based
scheduling. It starts with an overview of the microeconomic system and the concepts
related to it, followed by a definition of the transaction object. Subsequently, the
classic economic challenges of mechanism design are discussed and expanded upon
with the challenges presented by computational mechanism design theory. The last
sections discuss state-of-the-art mechanisms for market-based scheduling, as well as
the target market mechanism for this work – the Continuous Double Auction; in the
conclusion, a summary of available bidding strategies is given.
2.3.1 The Microeconomic System
According to Smith (1982), a microeconomic system is defined by an environment
and institution. The environment E consists of the following elements:
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• N = (n1, n2, · · · ) is a set of consumer and provider agents
• θx is a set of transaction objects of type x (like a computing service)
xi = (2GHz, 10GB Memory, 100GB Disk, 100MB/s)
• A utility function U = (u1, u2, · · · ) for the N agents
• The set of environment settings, which represent the agent’s individual (private)
preferences like taste, knowledge or individual skills, are also called commod-
ity and technology endowments (in an experimental environment these endow-
ments are control variables, which are fixed by the experimenter)
The institution specifies and executes the market mechanism, which consists of the
following elements (Smith, 1982; Wurman et al., 2001):
• The bidding language M , which specifies technical and economic attributes
bi ∈ B. The messages m ∈ M are exchanged between the market actors
– consumers, providers and institution. A message can be a consumer bid,
provider offer or market (clearing) message
• The market clearing policyDX, which determines how the consumer and provider
bids are matched
• Policies for the transaction costs and payments Dπ
• Policies that indicate the time constraints for starting and stopping the ex-
change of messages DT
• Policies for legal rights and usage of the system. Before starting a communica-
tion, each agent has to accept the legal rights Dcontract of the institution
• Policies for information revelation, Dbidding, indicating which information is
public to the participants, e.g., other agents’ bids and clearing prices, average
prices, etc.
Neumann (2007) presents the overall structure of a microeconomic system (Figure
2.4). The Transaction Object, used in this work, is specified in the subsequent section.
To interact with the market, the participating agents have to design and implement
appropriate bidding strategies, which are influenced by the various policies of the
market, the demand of the agents in terms of their preferences, commodity and
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Figure 2.4: Microeconomic system (Neumann, 2007)
technology endowments. The agents’ behavior in a microeconomic environment re-
sults from their actions and decisions, which are implemented through their bidding
strategies.
Agent Behavior has been studied in various contexts in the literature, e.g., in psy-
chology, in economics with respect to mechanism design and game theory, in finance
and in computer science, including AI (Smith, 1982; Jennings et al., 1998; Hommes,
2006; Rahwan et al., 2007; van Dinther, 2007). A general approach to modeling agent
behavior is the Belief-Desire-Intention model (BDI). Beliefs represent the current
state of the environment from the agen’t perspective. Desires refer to the available
options (states) an agent may choose to accept. Intentions stand for the options
(states) selected by the agent. In other words, the agent is continuously reasoning
and updating their beliefs about the environment, receiving the available options and
deciding which to choose. BDI models are often formalized within logic frameworks.
Other works describe the deduction of beliefs from past experience through inference
machines. More concretely, in the field of computational economics, consumer agents
have to be able to plan their demand – the types and number of applications to be ex-
ecuted, their priorities and estimated completion times. When an application request
is received, the consumer agent has to report the application’s technical preferences
in terms of hardware and software parameters, as well as, priority and related bid
(reported maximum willingness to pay). Similarly, provider agents have to be able to
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plan their supply – number and type of services, time frames and offers. In the case
of market-based scheduling, priority information is indirectly contained within the
consumer and provider bids, i.e., the higher the bid, the greater the importance of an
application or the quality of a service. Modeling of Agent Behavior can be separated
into the research blocks Preference Elicitation and Representation (De Boer et al.,
2001; Sandholm et al., 2006; Chevaleyre et al., 2008), Design of Bidding Agents &
Strategies (Rahwan et al., 2007; Wellman et al., 2007; Lin and Kraus, 2010) and Poli-
cies for Market Selection (Vytelingum et al., 2008; Cai et al., 2009; Shi and Jennings,
2010):
• Preferences Elicitation and Representation. Preference elicitation is a research
field of mechanism design, which studies the properties of mechanisms that in-
centivize consumers and providers to report their preferences truthfully (Sand-
holm et al., 2006; Chevaleyre et al., 2008). First, however, consumer and
provider agents need methods and tools to deduce and represent their goals,
beliefs, desires and intentions with respect to the conditions (policies) of the
market mechanisms. To achieve this, the individual preferences need to be
mapped with the conditions (rules) of the market by performing actions and
evaluating their outcome. Preferences of consumer applications and provider
services is a complex task because these preferences are often unknown and can
only be estimated. The literature proposes several techniques to achieve this,
starting with reasoning historic actions and their outcomes, statistical methods
such as clustering, artificial methods like case-based reasoning, to multi-criteria
decision methods like conjoint analysis, the analytic hierarchy process and an-
alytical network process (De Boer et al., 2001).
• Design of Bidding Agents & Strategies. After knowing their preferences, con-
sumers and providers need models and tools to govern the consumer and provider
bidding processes. The bidding processes are designed into bidding strategies
and bidding agents (Rahwan et al., 2007; Wellman et al., 2007). The bidding
strategies are software algorithms that implement an action plan of decision
rules, where the bidding agents implement the reaction to new consumer or
provider requests, as well as to market information – others agents’ bids and
matching messages. The adaption of the agent’s beliefs refers to the fact that
consumer and provider bids are executed with well-defined preferences and their
outcome is measurable, i.e., it can flow into the automatic adaption of their
future intentions when generating new actions. Intelligent strategies will use
such information to dynamically adapt to the state of the market and send more
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competitive bids, e.g., by applying machine learning techniques (Lin and Kraus,
2010). In the case of markets with perfect information, bidding strategies can
apply algorithms to capture opponents’ bids and timings in order to extract the
patterns of prices, as well as supply and demand to forecast others’ behavior.
In the case of imperfect markets, agents act under uncertain conditions and
apply bidding strategies, which can adapt to incomplete market information
and the interaction experience with the environment.
• Policies for Market Selection. Another step is selecting the target market mech-
anism for submitting the consumer and provider bids. The decision of which
market to choose depends on the transaction object traded, market policies,
transaction costs, allocation efficiency, market dynamics (changing demand and
supply over time) and available market information (Vytelingum et al., 2008;
Cai et al., 2009; Shi and Jennings, 2010). Furthermore, the state of the markets,
availability of computing services and prices are dynamic and bidding agents
can gain a profit from choosing the appropriate market and timing based on
their past experiences in the available markets. An example of different markets
for computing services is the Amazon EC2 spot market, which offers consumers
different types of transaction objects – small, medium, large configuration set-
tings for EC2 instances, each traded in a separate spot market.
In the context of Game Theory, the Outcome of a system is the set of action-payoff
pairs resulting from the strategies taken by agents. The payoffs (also called rewards)
are the result of the actions performed by the agents and subsequent allocations
at the different stages of the game (Rubinstein, 1985). A mechanism designer can
measure the Outcome of the system conditionally based on the consumer and provider
rewards reported from their performed actions with economic metrics like aggregated
consumer utilities, aggregated provider utilities and the sum of both, known also as
the welfare of the system. To do this, agents have to reveal their true utility or
scoring functions, which is not always the case in real settings (e.g., due to budget
constraints or business concerns) (Rothkopf, 2007).
The efficiency of a system is also theoretically described with the Pareto criterion,
which states that an allocation is Pareto efficient if (by a given allocation state)
there is no way of making an agent better off without making another worse off. The
change in an allocation, where an agent can be made better off without reducing the
utilities of others is called Pareto improvement (Stavins et al., 2003).
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2.3.2 Classification of the Transaction Object
Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1.3 provides a structured view of the differentiated services
of the Cloud computing stack. According to their level of abstraction Cloud services
are separated into infrastructure as a service (low-level computing services), platform
as a service (for creating and running applications) and application as a service.
Goods or services can be separated into substitutes and complements. Substitute
services are those that are interchangeable (e.g., oil and gas; Tomcat8 and Jetty9
web service container; free and licensed email clients; etc.) and have a similar value
to consumers. Given a set of substitutable services with no or low switching costs,
rational consumers are expected to favor the inexpensive substitute. Rising demand
of standardized computing services is fostering the provisioning of novel substitutes by
reducing proprietary service offerings and the switching costs associated with them.
Thus, competition among consumers and providers will increase. Complementary
services are valuable to consumers when purchased in a bundle, e.g., CPU and storage,
hardware and related proprietary operating system, etc. Complementary services are
often proprietary services and important for a business’s growth and generating profit.
While rising competition through substitutable services may reduce business profits,
complementary services can influence profits in a positive or a negative way (Porter
et al., 2001).
As specified in Section 2.1.3, the IaaS layer represents service types, which are close
to the hardware component, i.e., functional units for managing computing, storage
and network elements. Infrastructure services are based on standardized hardware
connection interfaces and standardized software interfaces for configuration, imple-
mentation, monitoring and communication (POSIX10, SFTP, TLS/SSL to support
VPN connections, etc.). Rising supply and demand for IaaS services will evolve them
into substitutes and increase competition among consumers and providers. Amazon
(2009) attempts to increase profits through economies of scale by offering computing
services as “spot instances,” where the price fluctuates dynamically based on supply
and demand. Example computing service instances (CSI) are depicted in Figure 2.1
– small (CSI-S), middle (CSI-M) and large (CSI-L) instances with rising technical
properties. Other IaaS instances are the storage service instance and virtual pri-
vate network, which can be offered with varying technical properties for storage and
8<http://tomcat.apache.org/>
9<http://jetty.codehaus.org/>
10Portable Operating System Interface, <http://standards.ieee.org/regauth/posix>
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bandwidth units (e.g., Terra Bytes). Description languages like the Job Submission
Description Language, Resource Specification Language and Common Information
Model are commonly used in technical descriptions of computational services and
communicating technical preferences (Anjomshoaa et al., 2005; Laure et al., 2006;
Feller et al., 2007; DMTF, 2010a). Galán et al. (2009) present a promising approach
for automated deployment, configuration and execution of applications on top of IaaS
services. They propose XML schema extensions of the DMTF’s Open Virtualization
Format (OVF) standard for tagging Key Performance Indicators for monitoring pur-
poses and flexible network configuration capabilities. The OVF enables packaging
application components (application server, databases, operating system, etc.), as
well as related environmental parameters into a set of virtual machines. Additional
macro (shell) scripts can be used to setup and start the application environment. In
contrast to OVF, the OASIS’s SDD message protocol provides capabilities to describe
the deployment and configuration procedure of software components. The OVF and
SDD can be combined in order to achieve a global setup of the application environ-
ment in terms of a virtual machine(s), as well as a deployment and configuration plan
of the software components within the virtual machines. The IaaS platform provides
services for runtime and resource management, monitoring and security of CSIs (see
Section 2.1.3.1).
Platform services (PaaS ) enable full management of the application environment
through well-defined functionality units like deployment, execution, monitoring, se-
curity and billing (Mell and Grance, 2009b). Current PaaS offerings are rather pro-
prietary – application owners have to adapt their applications using predefined APIs
of the selected PaaS provider, which result in higher switching costs when migrating
to another PaaS provider – and support a selected set of programming languages.
Management of the application environment is based on tool as well as APIs (e.g,
web services). Amazon Web Services Management Console and CloudWatch are
tools that offer core functionalities for creating, terminating and monitoring (CPU
utilization, disk and network I/O) of (EC2) computing instances. Similarly, the
Google App Engine Admin Console deploying and testing applications, viewing data
logs and monitoring the CPU, memory and I/O traffic (Galán et al., 2009; Dunsav-
age et al., 2010). In contrast to IaaS, the deployment of consumer applications on
the provider PaaS platform is supported by the provider tools. Currently, there is
no standard message protocol for platform service descriptions, however, providers
could apply the SDD message protocol to provide automated deployment of consumer
applications.
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The functionalities of PaaS services are rather more straightforward than those of
application services. Application services, AaaS, (Figure 2.1) are implemented in a
specific domain context (e.g., email, document or music management). Applications
can be implemented as stand-alone services (e.g., “Photo”) or can be combined with
other complementary services to achieve a common goal. For example, a “Shop Pay-
ment and Inventory Service” can combine many stand-alone services like Barcode
Reader for transmitting the price information of a good, Billing Service to prepare
the invoice, Payment Service to execute the online payment, as well as Inventory Ser-
vice and Purchase Service for warehousing and reordering of scarce goods. Atomic
and complex services serve specific domains and differ in their implementation and
communication protocols, e.g., SOAP, RSS, ATOM and XML-based communication
protocols. Maximilien et al. (2007) proposed an abstract programming model that
is able to describe combinations of atomic services. There are still challenges to
configure complementary, mostly proprietary, atomic services to complex ones. The
challenges arise because of the compatibility of data formats, the semantics of at-
tributes, units and interaction protocols. A major issue of application services is
their broad domain of attributes and functionalities, which makes automated match-
making and usage a challenging task. The integration of two complementary services
is executed by integrators, which write API connectors and semantically map both
services to a new integrated service called “mashup”. The automation of these tasks
is still a work in progress in the current research (Maximilien et al., 2007; Rosenberg
et al., 2008; Weber et al., 2009; Dorn et al., 2009).
Based on this background and current research, AaaS and PaaS services are assumed
to be configured manually (through an integrator) and offered with the Subscrip-
tion or Pay-per-use pricing model. The execution, scalability and management of
consumer applications on top of IaaS services can be automated with existing and
standardized protocols. Therefore, IaaS services can be rather seen as substitutes
and thus efficiently and automatically traded with market mechanisms.
2.3.3 Economic Challenges
Trading computing services is a complex problem. The complexity reflects the design
of appropriate and efficient market mechanisms, as well as related bidding strategies.
The latter introduces challenges about decisions on how to bid, how to estimate
the value of a service, how to predict prices and how to model utility functions.
These decisions are often derived from the specified bidding, clearing and information
revelation rules of the target market mechanism (Wurman et al., 2001).
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Table 2.2: Computational mechanism design desiderata (Myerson and Satterthwaite,
1983; Krishna and Perry, 1998; Shneidman et al., 2005; Parkes, 2008)
Desiderata Description
Incentive Compatible This mechanism design property guarantees that agents
can only maximize their expected utilities when reporting
their true preferences, given that all other agents report
honestly.
Individual Rational Agents get non-negative expected gain by participating in
a mechanism, regardless of their valuations.
Allocation Efficient Given all reported agent preferences, a mechanism guar-
antees selection of an allocation that maximizes the utili-
ties of all agents.
Budget Balanced A mechanism is called budget balanced if all of the agent’s
transfer payments sum up to zero, i.e., payments are not
injected into or removed from the mechanism.
Computationally
Tractable
A mechanism is computationally tractable if the match-
making processes scale well with the number of agents’
bids, i.e., real world mechanisms needed to offer a poly-
nomial runtime when matching bids.
Communicationally
Tractable
Computational and communicational tractability are
closely related because the computational complexity of
computing an allocation depends on the number and com-
plexity of the message protocols supported by the target
market mechanism (e.g., single bid or combinatorial, cen-
tralized or decentralized). Therefore, real world mecha-
nisms have to be designed with a lower complexity of mes-
sage exchanges and efficient matchmaking capabilities.
Open Open systems often benefit from innovation and standard-
ization through wider acceptance, contributions and usage
by bigger communities compared to many closed systems.
Consumers and providers are more likely to trust open
source market mechanisms rather than closed source pro-
prietary solutions. The versions of the compiled market
mechanisms source code can be easily verified against the
deployed version by using checksums.
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Table 2.2 presents economic and technical criteria for describing and analyzing mar-
ket mechanisms implemented in computing systems. The design of a mechanism in
terms of policies matters in the sense that it defines the trading and strategy space of
the participating agents. The literature of mechanism design has specified economic
properties (upper part of Table 2.2), which designers have to think about when de-
signing market mechanisms (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; Krishna and Perry,
1998). The so-called impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proves
that there is no mechanism that can be at the same time allocation efficient, indi-
vidual rational and budget balanced at the same time. Besides the design of a good
market mechanism, online systems (e.g., e-commerce) require the design of scalable,
i.e., computationally efficient mechanisms. The discipline, which focuses on both –
the design of economic and computationally efficient mechanisms – is called Com-
putational Mechanism Design (CMD) (Dash et al., 2003; Parkes, 2008). The CMD
properties (lower part of Table 2.2) of a market mechanism increase their practi-
cability in real scenarios through computational and communication tractability, as
well as their acceptance and trust through the openness of their realization. CMD
implies the application of market engineering (Section 2.3) and software engineer-
ing approaches, which postulate the iterative steps of requirements analysis, market
design, implementation and tests in both an economic and computational manner.
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One of the first auction mechanisms for allocating computing services dates back to
the 1960s (Sutherland, 1968). In this auction, the consumers bid by putting their bids
on a printed time sheet for a selected slot on which they can execute their computa-
tions. At the end of the day, the winning consumers are informed of their allocated
slots via a recorded telephone message. The microeconomics of computer services
(also called “raw computing services,” e.g., CPU cycles, memory and bandwidth)
had been discussed in several earlier works (Sutherland, 1968; Nielsen, 1970; Cotton,
1975; Mendelson, 1985), but started to gain attention in the 1990s with the Spawn
system (Waldspurger et al., 1992) and became a more important area of research with
Utility, Grid and Cloud computing (Gagliano et al., 1995; Reeves et al., 2005; Grosu
and Das, 2006; Heydenreich et al., 2010; Nassif et al., 2007; AuYoung et al., 2007;
Campbell et al., 2009; An et al., 2010). A detailed survey of market mechanisms for
computing services is presented by Neumann et al. (2008).
In the Spawn system, each provider machine sells time slices through a second price,
sealed-bid auction mechanism, also called a Vickrey auction. The bids are not visible
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to the other agents and the winning agent pays the amount of the second best bid.
These types of auctions are called strategy proof, i.e, the agents are incentivized
to report their true value for the time slice within the bid. A central authority, the
Resource Manager, manages the auctions of each provider machine. If the application
has not finished within the allocated time slice (consumers report their estimated time
for their applications), the application is allowed to continue its execution, as long
as the agent can pay the current market price of the machine. If the agent does
not pay to continue the execution, the application is terminated and the next time
slice is offered to the market. The Spawn system does not support check pointing
or the migration of applications (Waldspurger et al., 1992). A similar approach
uses the Tycoon system (Lai et al., 2005), which enhances the allocation schema
by introducing an Auction Share Scheduling mechanism. Instead of bidding for time
slices, the consumer agent bids for machine proportions in terms of CPU cycles. Each
application is executed on a virtual machine that runs with the allocated proportion
of CPU cycles. The higher the bid, the higher the proportion of CPU cycles received
for an application. In contrast to Spawn, the Tycoon mechanism is not strategy proof
(Lai et al., 2005; Feldman et al., 2009).
Grosu and Das (2006) investigated three market mechanisms for auctioning com-
puting services – first-price auction, Vickrey auction and double auction. They dis-
covered that the first-price auction protocol favors providers, the Vickrey auction
benefits consumers, while the double auction favors both consumers and providers.
Similarly, Regev and Nisan (2000) evaluated the double auction and k-double auction
mechanism for trading CPU cycles in their POPCORN system. To buy CPU time for
application execution, the applications need to be adapted by using the POPCORN
paradigm.
Amar et al. (2008) presented a market mechanism, which allows the preemption of
“low priority” jobs on a single machine or their migration to other machines. The
theoretical results are based on the assumption of zero migration cost, whereas numer-
ical experiments with real world workloads showed that performance of the system is
also robust with realistic migration costs. The mechanism was evaluated within the
cluster and Grid management system MOSIX,11 which provides the functionality for
migrating jobs and automatic load balancing among connected clusters (Barak et al.,
2005; Amar et al., 2008).
11Multicomputer Operating System for UnIX.
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Past and current research mostly focuses on the design of market mechanisms for
allocating “raw computing services,” as well as on policies for scheduling computing
executed in a Resource Manager component. Yeo and Buyya (2006) and MacKie-
Mason and Wellman (2006) summarize past and current research of market mecha-
nisms and resource management tools. MacKie-Mason and Wellman (2006) discuss
the importance of automating markets and participating agents by well-defined inter-
faces, as well as by the parameterizing the auction design space in terms of auction,
allocation and interaction (bidding) rules (Wurman et al., 2001).
According to the coordination modes, scheduling mechanisms can be categorized
into “centralized mechanisms,” where the allocation decision of bids and offers is
taken by a central unit, and “decentralized mechanisms,” where the allocation de-
cision is decentralized, i.e., taken by the requesters based on all of the responses
received from the environment. According to the allocation modes, scheduling mech-
anisms can be divided into mechanisms that execute periodically (also called “off-line
mechanisms”), and mechanisms that execute continuously (also called “online mecha-
nisms”) (Borodin and El-Yaniv, 1998). Web applications like sensor data processing,
price forecasting processing, and video and audio streaming require mechanisms that
can allocate computing services on demand in quasi real time (Amazon, 2010b).
Therefore, this work focuses on online market mechanisms where the allocation and
pricing of computing services is executed continuously.
The aim of this work is to study the design and implementation of competitive and
adaptive bidding strategies, as well as bidding tools for trading computing services
in Cloud markets. The choice of an appropriate market mechanism was performed
based on several considerations and assumptions. Like with the energy market, it
is assumed that the number of consumers and providers will be high, have variable
preferences, and that supply and demand will fluctuate over time (Shneidman et al.,
2005). Furthermore, such a mechanism should be efficient and scale well with a
varying number of participants. A well-studied, widely applied and centralized online
mechanism is the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) (Friedman, 1993; Kant and
Grosu, 2005; van Valkenhoef and Verbrugge, 2009; Parsons and Klein, 2009). CDA
is a two-sided mechanism, where both consumer and provider bids are permitted (if
only bids or offers are permitted, it is called a one-sided mechanism). This mechanism
is evaluated in the context of a Public Cloud Scenario for trading computing services
as specified in 2.3.2, but analogously applicable in the context of Private Clouds,
where the market is internal within an enterprise. In a Public Cloud scenario, it
is assumed that there are many providers (e.g., computing centers, medium and
big enterprises), which have free computing capacities that can be offered to the
2.3.5 The Continuous Double Auction 48
public, as well as many consumers (e.g., researchers, small and medium enterprises,
and private consumers) which want to consume computing services or cover peak
demands. The CDA mechanism is a well-applied, convergent and computationally
scalable (tractable) for scenarios with many consumers and providers because it is less
message intensive (one message per bid and one for a match; if not matched, the bid
expires) as consumers and providers submit their bids to a central authority, which
matches the requests, and are therefore, Computationally- and Communicationally
Tractable by design. Furthermore, CDA is Budget-Balanced and Individual Rational
(Parkes et al., 2001). Therefore, the CDA market mechanism seems to be a good
candidate for scheduling computing services in the Public Cloud.
2.3.5 The Continuous Double Auction
Commonly employed in commodity and financial markets, the Continuous Double
Auction (CDA) is one of the most well-studied two-sided market mechanisms (Fried-
man, 1993; Das et al., 2001; Parsons and Klein, 2009). In this market, consumer and
provider bids are matched “continuously” in the sense that the market clears instan-
taneously on receipt of a bid. If there is no match, the bid is stored in an order book
until a match arises or the specified valid time (“time to live”) expires. The matching
process in CDA is mostly based on the quantity and price for a target commodity (ser-
vice), where the price is a representation of the consumer’s or provider’s preferences,
i.e., valuation vj per time unit. Based on a preferred bidding strategy, consumers and
providers generate and submit bids (for consumers: qj ≤ vj; for providers: qi ≥ vi)
to the CDA market. In the case of consumers, qj means the maximum willingness
to pay; in the case of providers, it means the minimum requested price for a target
commodity. A match represents an immediate contract between a provider and a
consumer. Thus the consumer is authorized to immediately consume the allocated
commodity and pay the calculated clearing price π to the provider. The calculation
of the clearing price on a match depends on the selected pricing policy. A common
pricing schema for the CDA market is K-pricing (Satterthwaite and Williams, 1989).
π = kqj + (1− k)qi (2.1)
The choice of the parameter k ∈ [0, 1] in Equation (2.1) influences the price of the
trade. If k = 0, the provider sets the price, whereas when k = 1, the price is set by
the consumer. To have a fair price determination, k is usually set to k = 0.5.
In the case of CDAs, applications compete directly and when matched, they are
immediately executed on the allocated provider computing instances. Thus, the
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maintenance of a waiting queue on each machine is obsolete. For the CDA market,
there is no known optimal bidding strategy that the agents can apply. Therefore, the
CDA has been widely employed in experimental economic studies using the bidding
strategies of different agents to investigate the efficacy of algorithms that automate
the bidding processes (Das et al., 2001; Gjerstad, 2003; Vytelingum et al., 2008;
Schvartzman and Wellman, 2009).
In a market-based scheduling context, project SORMA, the consumer and provider
bids are continuously matched according to a two-phase matchmaking protocol, which
is price-based (plus other economic parameters) with integrated technical matchmak-
ing (see Section 5.4) (Borissov et al., 2009b; Nimis et al., 2009, 2008). The CDA
performs the price-based matchmaking phase.
2.3.6 Consumer and Provider Bidding Strategies
Auction and strategy selection are closely connected in the sense that a given choice
of auction mechanism will affect the choice of target bidding strategy, and vice versa.
For example, some bidding strategies perform well in a CDA, but not in other auc-
tions like Dutch or English auctions. This also implies that an agent’s success in a
particular auction type depends on the selected bidding strategy. Classic approaches
to designing (programmable) bidding strategies suggest performing controlled labo-
ratory experiments by letting participants “play” and iteratively develop their own
bidding strategies in the defined market mechanism game. Participants develop their
own bidding strategies based on the rules of the market, their intuition or experience
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). Selten et al. (1997) proposed a strategy development
method, in which participants are allowed to play their strategies in a laboratory set-
ting in order to gain experience of the “market game” and then are left to implement
their strategies for further investigation.
There has been increased attention on recent research on the automation of negotia-
tion and bidding processes with software agents that apply bidding strategies using
information from the environment and that can interact with the market mechanism,
as well as against other agents (software or human) efficiently. One of the reasons
is that software agents can deal with the complexity of negotiation and bidding in
asymmetric environments (different market mechanisms and agent strategies) more
efficiently than human agents can, i.e, software agents can extract and aggregate
environmental information in near time and store it in databases to be used in fu-
ture decision-making algorithms. Furthermore, learning algorithms can deal with
the uncertainty of preferences and adapt them to maximize a given scoring function.
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Another important fact is that human agents suffer from emotional affects12 and do
not follow equilibrium strategies, i.e., “when playing with humans, the theoretical
equilibrium strategy is not necessarily the optimal strategy” (Lin and Kraus, 2010).
Thus, game theory and computer science became closely connected to elaborate prag-
matic solutions in mechanism design, and the design of artificial agents, such as for
electronic commerce, monitoring, algorithmic trading in finance markets, negotiation
and bidding (Shoham, 2008).
Early approaches to software agents for negotiating and bidding in auctions are inves-
tigated in Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994); Chavez and Maes (1996); Doorenbos et al.
(1997); Wurman et al. (1998); Hu and Wellman (1998). Later research explored trad-
ing agents and bidding strategies in various fields like financial markets (Das et al.,
2001; Sherstov and Stone, 2005; Vytelingum et al., 2008), comparison shopping (called
Shopbot) agents (Greenwald et al., 1999; Kephart et al., 2000), supply chain manage-
ment (Pardoe and Stone, 2007) and market-based scheduling of computing services
(Wolski et al., 2001; Vulkan, 2003; Li and Yahyapour, 2006; Reeves et al., 2005; Vi-
lajosana et al., 2008). Wellman et al. (2007) give an overview of the various agents
and the strategies used in the trading agent competition. Phelps (2007) investigated
an evolutionary approach for learning the space of bidding strategies. Anthony and
Jennings (2003) present an agent framework that structures the design of bidding
strategies and introduce bidding algorithms that are able to bid in different market
mechanisms like the English, Dutch and Vickrey auctions.
In general, bidding strategies can be classified into non-adaptive and adaptive strate-
gies. In the non-adaptive strategies, the bid generation process does not take current
and past market information into consideration (e.g., bids from other participants,
clearing prices, market trends and news). Examples of such strategies are the Truth-
Telling and Zero Intelligence (ZI) strategies. In the adaptive strategies, the generated
bid takes the available market information into account. Examples of adaptive bid-
ding algorithms are the Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP) (Cliff and Bruten, 1997), and
Kaplan and Gjerstad-Dickhaut (Gjerstad, 2003) strategies. A comparison of state-
of-the-art bidding strategies for the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is evaluated
by Das et al. (2001). The authors of the Adaptive-Aggressiveness (AA) strategy
(Vytelingum et al., 2008) describe and evaluate a novel bidding strategy for financial
markets that implements short and long-term learning behavior that takes market
dynamics into account. Simulation results show that the AA strategy outperforms
the ZIP and GD strategies for the selected design type of the CDA.
12Risk seeking, risk-averse or risk-neutral human agent behavior (Parsons and Klein, 2009).
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To automate and optimize agent decisions in bidding processes, designers of bidding
strategies often apply machine learning techniques like supervised, reinforcement and
unsupervised learning (Weiss, 2000; Müller et al., 2001; Tesauro, 2007). The super-
vised learning (SL) approach is when both input and output data sets exist and
are labeled (structured description of the input and output data and dependencies).
The SL algorithm performs a classification or regression model of the input-output
relationship in order to exhibit and derive a better understanding of system behav-
ior. In the best case scenario, the SL algorithm will find novel correlations based
on the labeled input and output data. Deriving a regression model of the system
will enable learning to produce correct output data when new input is given. Unsu-
pervised learning (UL) refers to the type of algorithms that try to find correlations
in a data set that is not labeled, i.e., there is no explicit knowledge other than the
raw data. Example of UL techniques are data mining (e.g., pattern recognition)
and clustering of “similar” items based on given characteristics. Another type of
machine-learning is the reinforcement learning (RL) approach, “which is largely un-
studied for systems-management applications” (Tesauro, 2007). The RL approach
can be applied in highly dynamic systems with high uncertainty about information
and system behavior. An agent using the RL technique can explore a system’s be-
havior through “trial-and-error interactions,” i.e., by performing various actions and
adapting them based on their received payoff (Kaelbling et al., 1996). The general
RL approach describes an interactive approach rather than a concrete description
of the observed model. It does not say anything about the concrete space of input
data, the endogenous relationships, payoff functions or transfer states (generation of
a new unknown state or selection of an existing state with the highest commutative
payoff). As such, the algorithms that apply RL have to map the “domain-specific
initial knowledge” or the model of the environment in a way that enables actions to
be generated based on concrete policies and adapted from payoff functions.
A detailed explanation of existing and suitable bidding strategies in the context of this
work is presented in Chapter 3, which also includes a description of the Q-Strategy
(Section 3.4), which is one of the contributions of this thesis.
2.4 The Technical Environment
This section presents the technical requirements for two application scenarios for the
market-based purchasing of computing services from external providers. The techni-
cal challenges involved in developing an overall system for market-based scheduling
is also discussed. These challenges have been derived from the literature, as well as
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from the goals of the SORMA project. Its reference architecture, related compo-
nents, as well as the bidding scenario are presented in the subsequent sections. This
work does not aim to evaluate the SORMA system, but rather the developed bidding
tools and message protocols within the context of the project, as well as the scenarios
presented.
2.4.1 Application Scenarios
2.4.1.1 Batch Supply Chain Data Analysis
The first application scenario represents the class of batch jobs. Batch processing of
jobs (applications) is supported by any cluster, Grid or Cloud infrastructure system
(Foster et al., 2008). Batch applications consist of all required libraries, input data
and configuration files for an atomic execution on any computing system, which
fulfills their technical requirements. TXTDemand is a supply chain management
application, which performs sophisticated analysis and demand forecasting on historic
and current product sales (Sales and Replenishment Analysis) (Windsor et al., 2009).
The data from the different consumers is provided as input to the TXTDemand batch
applications. The batch applications are executed during the night, each of them with
a duration of between one and ten hours. The results of the TXTDemand analysis
are used by the related enterprises to make daily decisions regarding their sales and
replenishment strategies.
The consumers provide their sales data to the TXTDemand provider in a well-defined
format. The different TXTDemand batch jobs are then executed on the provider’s
local infrastructure or on externally purchased computing services. The Bid Gener-
ator tool executes the bidding processes to purchase the required computing service
configurations from the Computing Service Market. The result of a bidding process is
the allocation with the established service level agreement from the matched technical
and economic attributes of the consumer and provider.
The TXTDemand scenario defines the following requirements for its integration in
the SORMA system for market-based scheduling (Windsor et al., 2009):
1. A system for market-based scheduling has to provide the possibility of negoti-
ating service level agreements and instantiating related contracts. The negoti-
ation process should include technical parameters for raw resources like CPU,
memory, storage and bandwidth. A service level agreement has to include in-
formation about the duration of a job and the maximum reservation time for
the computing service provided.
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Figure 2.5: Scenario for supply chain data analysis with local and externally pur-
chased computing services (own representation, based on the SORMA project)
(Windsor et al., 2009; Nimis et al., 2008)
2. The negotiation protocol has to consider situations in which resource providers
are forced to break certain service level agreements because they cannot cope
with them. The economic impact of such events and their causes have to be
evaluated and appropriate mechanisms have to be developed to address them
(e.g., compensation payments, which are also called penalties).
3. To increase acceptance and trust in the system, providers of computing ser-
vices have to be evaluated according to well-defined indicators like reliability,
performance, etc. Furthermore, privacy, data protection and security has to be
ensured with well-defined policies that are enforced and easy to demonstrate
since the TXTDemand application handles private and sensitive customer sales
data.
4. The market-based scheduling system has to support different payment models
like pay-per-use, dynamic pricing, prepayments and post-payments.
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5. Flexibility has to be ensured in case consumers need more computing services
than initially agreed.
6. The bidding tool, Bid Generator, may be used by non-experts, so the API and
UI should be clear and simple enough to these kinds of adopters. The Bid
Generator should support consumers and providers in the preparation of bids,
and help them understand the economic impact of their actions.
7. The transfer of consumer data and the bidding processes need to be fast and
performed over a secured communication line, which is part of the system’s
communication protocol.
These requirements are used as a basis for the developed and realized models of this
work.
2.4.1.2 Interactive Sensor Data Analysis
The second scenario represents the class of interactive Web service-based applications.
Visage is a system for advanced video data analysis based on sensor data such as
from cameras (Figure 2.6). When a motion is detected, the camera (client) starts
transmitting the video data to the Visage system. The Motion Detection component
identifies the frames in which the activities are detected. The Object Recognition
component performs a pattern recognition analysis by identifying the moving objects
between a sequence of frames. The process finishes with the creation of a report,
which is sent back to the requesting client in terms of video and description data of
the objects identified (e.g., picture of a moving person and a car, Figure 2.6). Such
a system implements an online and on-demand software service for sensor-driven
video data analysis that can be applied to automate security issues in and around
buildings. As a software as a service approach, Visage offers a Web service interface,
in which camera sensors distributed around the world and in different enterprises can
connect and evaluate their video data. The allocation of a client to a Visage node is
performed by the Visage Service according to the reported consumer technical and
economic preferences. When an allocation is received, the client component (camera
application) starts submitting the video data.
The service provider maintains its own local computing infrastructure of cluster ma-
chines to run the Visage system. The demand for computation power depends on the
number of consumers and cameras that they have installed. In such a scenario, the
ratio of average demand to high demand depends on time and geographic factors, as
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Figure 2.6: Scenario for on-demand video data analysis with local and externally
purchased computing services (own representation, based on the SORMA project)
(Windsor et al., 2009; Nimis et al., 2008)
well as on consumer preferences (Windsor et al., 2009). The demand for additional
computing services (i.e., in addition to the locally existing services) is calculated by
the “PeakDemand” component, which is part of the Visage system. That component
purchases the required computing services from the Computing Service Market on
demand by invoking the Bid Generator component. Therefore, the Visage system
scales on demand based on the number of connected sensors and calculated demand
on the “PeakDemand” component.
In order to realize the described scenario, the following requirements have to be
fulfilled by the SORMA system (Windsor et al., 2009):
1. On-demand deployment of the Visage system on external computing infras-
tructures.
2. Automated purchasing and allocation of external computing services from the
market according to well-defined and implemented bidding strategies.
3. The Visage system should be deployed on as many computing services as
needed. Inefficient utilization of computing services (waste) should be prevented
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through maintenance of a limited local computing service infrastructure. Peak
demand is covered by external providers on the market.
4. Visage clients may request several resources simultaneously and the allocation
has to take all simultaneous requests into account.
5. The Visage system and clients communicate through secured interfaces and all
data is protected from unauthorized access.
6. The Visage system defines specific requirements for computing services, which
are to be expressed in the generated bids and considered in the matchmaking
process. Furthermore, the result of the market-based allocation is a service
level agreement, which has to be fulfilled by the external provider.
This work focuses on the trading of computing services and the related communication
protocols. In this context, only the relevant parts of the Visage scenario will be
considered – purchasing computing services through the Computing Service Market
and defining the required bidding language. The definition of (software) application
specific attributes is not part of this work.
2.4.2 Technical Challenges for the Market System
Systems for market-based scheduling of computing services can be compared to cur-
rent e-commerce systems like eBay, Amazon Web Services and Google AppEngine.
They offer interfaces that allow the automation of purchasing and offering processes
for goods and online services. Purchasing and offering computing services with mar-
ket mechanisms are complex tasks. Such processes require less human intervention
and can be automated by using intelligent software agents in order to achieve higher
efficiency in decision making processes (Kephart and Chess, 2003; Cheliotis et al.,
2005). Software agents can monitor and manage many more computing services and
applications simultaneously than human agents can. Furthermore, software agents
can process huge amounts of data in quasi real time (Foster et al., 2004; Wellman
et al., 2007; Feigenbaum et al., 2009).
Following is a list of the technical challenges that need to be addressed when designing
the components of a system for market-based scheduling.
Automated Bidding. Consumers and providers require configurable bidding agents,
which automate the processes for trading, provisioning and usage. In a realistic set-
ting, this involves designing bidding strategies that can trade in different auction
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types with heterogeneous and homogeneous agents, as well as with bounded infor-
mation about the actions of other agents in the market (Parsons and Klein, 2009).
Bidding Language. To express their technical and economic preferences, consumers
and providers need a well-defined, compact and concise term language. In the lit-
erature, bidding languages for auctions that trade single and combinatorial goods
(services) are analyzed. Matching multiple attributes and weights is an optimization
problem, which is NP-Hard.13 In order to specify their preferences, consumers need
to make decisions regarding the multiple attributes of a computing service configu-
rations for their applications. Similarly, providers have to decide, which computing
service configurations are likely to be demanded. Methods for preference elicitation
and statistical prediction of market information are used to derive decisions about
the supplied and demanded computing service configurations (van Ittersum et al.,
2007; Sandholm and Lai, 2007; Kiekintveld et al., 2009).
Automated SLA Creation & Enforcement. As a result of the matching process, a bind-
ing and legal contract between a consumer and a provider is created. Both providers
and consumers need guarantees in the matched terms in order to be incentivized to
offer high-quality services, as well as to execute applications in the Cloud without
concerns about security, trust or the quality of services (Wilkes, 2008; Becker et al.,
2008).
Trading Platform. Trading platforms should be able to run multiple (online) market
mechanisms in a scalable and secure way, as well as communicate and match multiple
bids and offers efficiently. The TAC14 and CAT15 tournaments encourage research in
the design of market mechanisms and bidding strategies that are able to automate
bidding and matching processes in a variety of auction mechanisms and commodities
in changing environmental conditions (Cai et al., 2009).
Security & Trust. Security and trust in IaaS should be provided through transparent
auditing, fair matching and enforcement of SLAs. Authentication for consumers
and providers is done through certificates and they communicate using standardized
security protocols and mechanisms. All messages submitted to the market must be
signed and validated before they are considered legal and binding (Nimis et al., 2008,
2009).
13Non-deterministic polynomial-time hard (Parsons and Klein, 2009).
14Trading Agent Competition: Focus on agent design strategies.
15CAT is the reverse of TAC and comes from CATallactics, the science of exchanges: Focus on
market design (Cai et al., 2009).
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Auditing Services. In order to support the billing processes and reproduce the sys-
tem outcome (e.g., fault-tolerance property), market messages (e.g., bids, offers and
matches) have to be logged and timestamped (Nimis et al., 2009).
Market Directory & Information Services. Information about available auction mech-
anisms and traded computing services has to be stored in registries (“green pages”)
and made findable through a query language, according to the technical specifica-
tion sought. Related market information services have to provide consumers and
providers with aggregated information of current and past prices, as well as the type
and number of supplied and demanded services (Brunner et al., 2008).
Resource Management. Provider’s resource managers perform the actual allocation
of the applications received to their computing infrastructures based on the match-
message received from the market. Therefore, providers design their own scheduling
policies for the allocated consumer applications with the aim of achieving economic
efficiency and consumer satisfaction (Maćıas et al., 2008). Moreover, providers fa-
cilitate consumers’ applications with the requested computing service descriptions
according to the service level agreement document (the SLOs are part of the match-
message), as well as to the specified payment and penalty conditions (Borissov et al.,
2009b; Becker et al., 2008).
Infrastructure Service Engineering. Providers of infrastructure services have to apply
the APIs that are for executing consumer applications and offer their free capacities
to the market. Internally, the profitability (higher margins of market prices and op-
eration costs) of their computing infrastructure not only depends on the economic
management of service level agreements, but also on the continuous improvement of
their hardware resources in order to reduce energy costs and gas emissions (Berl et al.,
2010; Brown and Reams, 2010). Projects like Facebook’s Open Compute Project16
work on energy efficient hardware technologies that reduce overall energy consump-
tion for computation, storage and communication tasks. Moreover, like the Top500
project, the Green50017 provides rankings of the most energy-efficient supercomput-
ers in the world.
Cloud Application Engineering. In order to utilize IaaS services, application devel-
opers have to apply the APIs and tools of the provider. In a market-based scheduling
scenario, the definition and application of common standards and tools is crucial for
16<http://opencompute.org>
17<http://www.green500.org>
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the practicability trust and acceptance of such a system. Open standards from or-
ganizations like the Open Grid Forum, Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF,
2010a), the Open Science Grid and the Open Cloud Manifesto offer transparent
adoption of IaaS services and reduce lock-in effects for consumers (Nelson, 2009).
The engineering of Cloud applications is not an aim of this work, however, it is an
important area for future research and its acceptance in computing service markets.
Licensing. Software licensing is often restricted to local deployment scenarios. Li-
censing models for commercial software has to be made compatible for a Cloud-based
application execution (Armbrust et al., 2009). An open issue of Cloud service pro-
visioning and usage is the transfer of licenses between applications and third-party
software, which is not part of this work, however, it is addressed in the SmartLM
project (Cacciari et al., 2010).
Technically, this work focuses on the design, development and realization of tools for
automated bidding and related message protocols in Chapters 4 and 5. The next
section presents the reference architecture of the SORMA project and the technical
challenges associated with it as the basis for the contributions of this thesis.
2.4.3 A Technical Architecture for Market-Based Scheduling
The design of market mechanisms and bidding strategies is essential in achieving a
system for the market-based allocation of computing services. There are challenges in
realizing such a system with respect to the clear separation of economic and technical
concepts in its architecture and components.
The results of this work have been explored and elaborated in the context of the
SORMA EU-Project 18 (Self-Organizing ICT Resource Management). Figure 2.7
depicts a simplified version of its logical architecture and the components contained
therein. The detailed structure of the components is broken down into four logical lay-
ers. The SORMA architecture is a technical view of a microeconomic system, where
the Open Market Middleware (Layers 1 and 2) represents the institution running the
market mechanism (e.g., Trading Management executes the CDA mechanism) and
defining the legal and communication rules (e.g., Contract and SLA Enforcement and
Billing), Layer 3 represents the agents and their strategies and Layer 4 represents
the transaction objects, i.e., computing services for IaaS applications. The following
sections give a brief overview of the SORMA layers and their components.
18<www.sorma-project.eu>
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Figure 2.7: SORMA architecture
2.4.3.1 Layer 1: Core Market Services
Layer 1 provides the core infrastructure services of the Open Market Middleware
(Chacin et al., 2008).
The Trusted Market Exchange provides an infrastructure for message exchange among
the components of the middleware, as well as the related parties that are part of the
auctioning process. It assures that the related messages are routed to the addressed
party in a secure and reliable way. This service allows asynchronous and state-free
communication among the connected middleware components.
The Logging service keeps a registry of the transactions executed on the market for
auditing purposes, e.g., for Contract Management. Furthermore, it maintains the
state of the active messages and thus allows renewal when a party is reconnecting
(Fault-tolerance).
TheMarket directory is a registry of available auctions for different computing service
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types (e.g., CSI-S-Auction, CSI-M-Auction, CSI-L-Auction, etc.). These services can
be compared to a UDDI’s “green pages,” where each commodity (e.g., CSI-S) is
associated with a technical description, as well as the endpoint reference of the target
auction (e.g., CSI-S-Auction). It provides the functionality to discover the computing
service commodities offered based on the technical preferences.
The Market Information Service provides aggregated price information and historical
statistics of market indicators (e.g., maximum, minimum or average price of a given
time interval) for selected commodities. Agents can subscribe to the service and
perform queries through the interfaces provided (Brunner et al., 2008). Bidding
strategies can use this information to optimize the timing and value of their bids
with respect to the type of application.
2.4.3.2 Layer 2: Open Market Middleware
Layer 2 contains the components, which execute the market mechanisms where bids
and offers are matched (Nimis et al., 2009, 2008). SLAs are the result of the match-
making processes. The execution of an SLA is monitored by the SLA Enforcement
and Billing component.
The Trading Management component is a framework for developing and running
market mechanisms (Sections 2.3.5). Market mechanisms implement the rules of how
bids and offers are matched, technically and economically, and the rules of when and
what to communicate within the exchanged messages (communication protocol). The
trustworthiness of the messages is certified by a Certificate Authority and monitored
and validated by the Security Management component.
Contract Management (CM) receives the result of the matchmaking process and
transforms the corresponding pairs of bids into mutually agreed contracts. As part
of the matchmaking process, the technical and economic preferences are transformed
into a Service Level Agreement (SLA) document, which defines the Service Level
Objectives (SLOs, also called Key Performance Indicators) of the agreement. The
CM component serves as a repository for contracts and initiates the enforcement
process for the SLAs.
The SLA Enforcement and Billing component receives, monitors and enforces the
contracts. It requests information for each SLA periodically and keeps track of the
specified SLOs. Based on the current states of SLOs of the applications, the resource
management component is responsible for the allocation of consumer applications in
a way that maximizes the utilities of the provider and consumer. If the provider fails
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to meet some or all of the agreed SLOs, the bill is discounted by a penalty payment
(Becker et al., 2008). Finally, when the contract is finished, the final payment is
calculated and executed through the Payment Component.
The Payment service provides a unified interface to an online payment service, which
supports recurring micropayments.
Security Management provides the agents with single sign-on entry to the market.
Consumers and providers register to a Certification Authority to get a valid certificate
in order to sign the submitted messages. The market is executed by a trustworthy
institution, and the components within the middleware are running behind a secured
infrastructure. Only messages from certified agents are accepted and routed between
the middleware components. In SORMA, the authorization and signature of bids
was realized with the Security Assertion Markup Language and related tools (Nimis
et al., 2009; Armando et al., 2008).
2.4.3.3 Layer 3: Consumer and Provider Bidding Tools
This layer contains components, which assist consumers and providers in automating
the bid generation processes.
The Preference Modeling component provides the format of the message protocols
that consumers and providers use to express their technical and economic preferences
through the transaction object (Borissov et al., 2009b). It is assumed that they
can estimate their preferences and value bounds by applying the methods of the
Preference Elicitation theory (see Section 2.3). A part of the economic preference
is the selected bidding strategy, which applies the implemented decision rules to
generate bids and offers. The bidding strategies are implemented and executed within
the Bid Generator component.
Bid Generator is the component that connects consumers and providers to the market
and trade on their behalf, based on their preferences and selected bidding strategies
(Borissov and Wirström, 2008; Borissov, 2009; Borissov et al., 2010). To do this,
Bid Generator is represented through an agent framework, which offers well-defined
interfaces for the API units – Learner, Bidding Strategy, Market Connection and
Security. Based on these API units, consumers and providers can already use the
implemented bidding strategies and policies or develop and test new ones.
The Resource Manager (RM) is a provider component that serves the management of
the provider’s local resources (e.g., machines, computing instances, storage, etc.). The
resource manager is designed for direct negotiations and for auctioning through the
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Bid Generator component. To perform direct negotiations with consumers, the RM
utilizes local policies for resource allocation and monitoring, application execution,
SLA enforcement, as well as price discrimination through client classification. To offer
resources on the SORMA market, the RM connects to the Bid Generator component
by reporting the description and reservation price of the computing services offered
(Püschel et al., 2007; Maćıas et al., 2008). The allocated applications are executed
according to the market match, i.e., the SLA. Furthermore, the RM can compensate
for higher local resource demands by buying computing services from the market.
2.4.3.4 Layer 4: Applications and Resources
Layer 4 refers to the type of transaction objects, which are tradable with the SORMA
system (Section 2.3.2) – computing service instances.
On the provider side, a business engineer specifies the type and configuration of a
computing service to be offered on the market according to the provider business plan.
To specify the technical and economic terms of the bid, the provider applies the tools
and message protocol from the Preference Modeling component. The computing
services are managed within the Resource Manager and offered on the market by the
Bid Generator component.
To execute their applications in the Cloud, consumers first have to prepare their
applications so that they can be easily transferred and executed on the allocated
computing service instance. Consumers use the same tools as providers – Preference
Modeling to initialize their technical and economic preferences for the application
and Bid Generator to execute the bidding processes.
2.4.4 Bidding Scenario for Computing Services
Figure 2.8 depicts a general overview of the Bid Generator integration in SORMA’s
market-based scheduling environment. The environment consists of three actor types
– Consumers, Providers and Institutions. Each consumer has applications (apps) to
execute, which are queued, executed, monitored and terminated by the Application
Orchestrator component. The Application Orchestrator component is a consumer
component that manages the deployment and execution of consumer applications
(Section 2.4.1) on local and external computing services. In the case of external
computing services, the Application Orchestrator invokes the BidGenerator by sub-
mitting the “request for bid,” Pj. Pj contains well-defined or estimated technical
requirements and valuations for the application j, which are reported to the BidGen-

























































Figure 2.8: Scenario for bidding on computing services
erator component (a description for Pj is provided in Section 5.3.1). The technical
requirements and objectives are manually initiated by the application owner and can
be automatically estimated using a regression analysis of the historic data of the
same application type and a similar amount of input data (Ali et al., 2004). The
BidGenerator component provides methods and realizations of state-of-the-art and
novel bidding strategies (Chapter 3) and bidding agents (Chapter 4). BidGenerator
interacts with the environment according to a well-defined communication protocol
(Chapter 5).
Providers of computing services (comps) maintain their own infrastructure and offer
free capacities on the market. Similar to the consumer case, the provider comput-
ing infrastructure is managed by a so-called Resource Orchestrator. The Resource
Orchestrator creates, prepares, monitors and terminates (virtualized) computing ser-
vices according to the provider’s local scheduling and business policies (Maćıas et al.,
2008; Püschel et al., 2007; Wilkes, 2008). For each of the free computing service
instances, the Resource Orchestrator sends a Pi (Section 5.3.1) to the Bid Generator
component with a detailed description of their technical descriptions, reserve prices
and selected bidding strategy implementations (Sections 3.3.4 and 3.4).
According to the selected market and bidding strategy, the consumer’s and provider’s
Bid Generators generate bids and submit them to the market in the form of Bj and Bi
messages (see Section 5.3.3 for details). The market mechanism performs a technical
and economic matchmaking (Section 5.4) of the consumer and provider bids and
creates a match-message, Xi,j (Section 5.3.4), which is sent back to the matched
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consumer j and provider i. The example on Figure 2.8 depicts a spot market for a
computing instance called c1.medium with a well-defined specification of technical
attributes, similar to the Amazon EC2 offering (Amazon, 2010a; TheCloudMarket,
2010). The market mechanisms are implemented and executed within the market
platform called Trading Management, which was developed, implemented and tested
within the SORMA project (Nimis et al., 2009).
2.5 Research Methods
Bidding strategies implement decision rules according to the information available
and state of the environment. The analysis of such systems becomes complex when
supply and demand, the number of participants and their applied bidding strategies
vary over time. Game theory offers tools to express agent decisions and their rela-
tionships for simplified games usually with few competing agents and an idealistic
set of assumptions about the environment’s rules and information. Game theoretic
models, however, quickly become unfeasible as the complexity of the system grows,
which is a reflection of the “strategies space, number of agents, degree of incomplete
and imperfect information, and dynamism.” (MacKie-Mason and Wellman, 2006).
Laboratory experiments are designed to study the behavior and decision making of
humans under certain conditions and experimental settings. In a laboratory setting
with human participants, the setting of a mechanism and strategy space is biased
and limited by the competencies, dependence on and sentiments of non-expert hu-
man participants. It is not only the normative science of an economic system that
matters, but also the context and implementation details of the computing service
markets and agents. An example of a complex economic system are the FCC19 spec-
trum auctions. Even though it was designed by some of the best auction theory and
agent strategy researchers, given the rules of the market, an analytical solution of the
game has not been proposed (MacKie-Mason and Wellman, 2006; Wellman, 2006).
The design of mechanisms and strategies for computing services has a comparable
complexity; thus there is less potential for analytical solutions to be proposed in
realistic settings.
This work aims to investigate the application of software agents and analyze the
outcome of sophisticated bidding strategies that automate bidding processes in a
distributed system for market-based scheduling. Such complex analysis is performed
19Federal Communications Commission.
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with methodologies proposed by Tesfatsion (2006) – Agent-based Computational Eco-
nomics (ACE) – and by MacKie-Mason and Wellman (2006) – Empirical Game-
Theoretic Analysis (EGTA). ACE studies economic processes, which are “modeled
as dynamic and distributed systems of interacting agents [..]” as “[..] part of a
computationally constructed world” (Tesfatsion, 2006). The application of ACE is
“an attempt to achieve a more transparent and realistic representation of real-world
systems involving multiple distributed entities with limited information and compu-
tational capabilities” (Tesfatsion, 2006). The EGTA of MacKie-Mason and Wellman
(2006) is a supplement to the ACE methodology that proposes systematic evaluation
of market mechanisms and trading strategies in computational experiments. This
approach postulates the construction of an agent-based world that models the key
assumptions and aspects of the economy investigated. This work adopts these two
approaches for the field of market-based scheduling in the following way:
1. Mechanism Design. The selected mechanism for market-based scheduling of
computing services is the Continuous Double Auction. Its Computational Mech-
anism Design properties – Budget-Balanced, Individual Rational, Computation-
ally Tractable and Communicationally Tractable – makes it well-suited for on-
line settings and the selected scenario. The bidding rules define the continuous
matching of arbitrary orders of consumer and provider bids without any time
restrictions or time segmentations. The matchmaking process is performed in
two phases – a price-based (plus additional economic parameters) phase and a
technical matchmaking phase. The market clearing rules are applied as soon as
a consumer and provider bids matches in terms of economic and technical pa-
rameters, where the clearing price is calculated with the k-pricing rule (Section
2.3.5).
2. Bidding Strategy Design. The market rules define the scope of the strategy
space. Bidding strategies are designed according to the parameter space of
the market mechanisms. Such strategies can implement simple decisions like
random bid generation or sophisticated decisions by utilizing available market
information and historic data. The bidding strategies are the logical part,
which implement the decision making steps according to the signals received
from the market or other agents. The bidding strategies are instantiated into
agents, which interact with the environment through the exchange of messages
– e.g., agent’s intentions (bids) and market messages (matches, and market
information like the bids and matches of other agents). The design desiderata
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of bidding strategies, an investigation of existing bidding strategies and the
presentation of the Q-Strategy is part of Chapter 3.
3. Agent Design. Consumers and providers require tools to implement agents
and bidding strategies in order to interact autonomously with the market. A
flexible framework for automated bidding aims to provide a methodology for
implementing agents and strategies in an effective and straightforward way.
Moreover, the framework should facilitate the simple and methodological eval-
uation of agents and strategies in various settings. Chapter 4 focuses on the
definition of bidding agents and their properties, the elaboration of existing
agent frameworks and agent design methodologies, as well as the presentation
of the BidGenerator framework.
4. Message Protocols Design. The definition and adoption of common protocols for
exchanging consumer requirements, provider offers, bids, matches and market
information is a crucial part of a system for market-based scheduling. Devel-
opers of agents and bidding strategies need to understand the semantics, type
of messages, and the market information in order to design and implement
successful bidding strategies according to their needs and design requirements.
Chapter 5 focuses on design desiderata for message protocols and presents the
specification of novel message protocols for market-based scheduling.
5. Experiment Design. To analyze the economic system, one needs to define the
settings of the market, the number of agents and their selected bidding strate-
gies. The strategy profiles of the agents can be homogeneous or heterogeneous
– all agents utilize the same bidding strategy or each agent applies a different
one. Another part of the experimental designs is the generation of artificial
and real-world input data. Historic real-world data for cluster job profiles can
be taken from web archives (Feitelson, 2010), where missing data like the pri-
vate valuations of consumers and providers can be artificially generated only
with well-applied statistical distributions like normal and uniform distributions
(Brooks et al., 2003; Sandholm et al., 2008). Section 6.1 presents the overall de-
sign of the agent-based experiments and Section 7.1 presents the methodology
for the technical and performance analysis.
6. Outcome Analysis. Successful (matched) bids for a computing services result
in an allocable and measurable outcome is called a reward. The overall out-
come of an experiment setting is measured according to the reported consumer
and provider rewards for each of the allocations in this setting. The reward
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(scoring) function for consumers and providers can be different and depends
on their private goals like minimizing makespan and payments or maximizing
profit (Heydenreich et al., 2010; Parsons and Klein, 2009). Concretely, the
overall outcome of each of the experiment settings is measured with aggregated
consumer scores, and aggregated provider scores metrics, and the sum of both,
also known as the welfare of the system. Section 6.2 presents the results and
analysis of the results according to the specified metrics.
Market and strategy design are challenging processes, which are dependent on each
other in the sense that the definition of market rules affects the selection and design
of bidding strategies, which will affect the outcome of the agents applying them.
The presented methodology aims to develop the theory and tools to perform realistic






Economic Design of Bidding Strategies for
Market-Based Scheduling
T
he landscape of today’s software services is highly heterogeneous. Consumer ap-
plications are realized in different programming languages and run on different
hardware and operating systems with respect to their usage scenarios and require-
ments (e-mail, banking, social apps, office apps, statistical apps, data analysis apps
and many other services). Providers maintain differentiated computing infrastruc-
tures (HPC computing centers, campus computing centers, and computing centers of
large, medium and small enterprises), which are composed of hardware from different
manufacturers, which is updated in different time periods. Therefore, in a market-
based scheduling scenario, consumers will have a different demand for computing
services for their applications and providers will aim for different business models
when offering their free capacities on the market. The heterogeneities of consumers
and providers will affect their decisions and behavior when bidding in markets for
computing services. Such decisions include the time of market entry, the time of
market exit, the number of submitted bids and how they are generated. Bapna
et al. (2004) analyzed the bidding strategies of consumers that buy goods on online
markets such as eBay. They identified five types of bidding strategies, in which ef-
ficiency (profit) was evaluated with observed real data over two consecutive years.
The results showed that consumers learned to improve their bidding strategies in
the second year. An important observation was that consumers, who used software
bidding agents, achieved the highest profits in comparison to other bidders.
The design and implementation of bidding strategies for specific auction mechanisms
automate bidding processes, but the algorithmic decisions implemented influence the
outcomes of the agent. In the literature, various bidding strategies are proposed,
which are designed and evaluated for specific domains and market mechanisms (Par-
sons and Klein, 2009). Moreover, it is often assumed that all agents are perfectly
informed about others’ actions, which is not the case in realistic settings.
This chapter presents a general framework for designing bidding strategies. As part
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of Research Question 1 (Design of Bidding Strategies) in Section 1.2, the framework
is applied in the design of a novel adaptive bidding strategy for the market-based
scheduling domain called Q-Strategy. Bidding strategies like the Q-Strategy are real-
ized to be instantiated into bidding agents in order to automate the bidding processes
for consumers and providers. Section 3.1 defines the term bidding strategy from the
classic and computational mechanism design perspectives. Section 3.2 derives design
desiderata for developing bidding strategies in the market-based scheduling domain.
Subsequently, Section 3.3 starts with the presentation of general frameworks for bid-
ding in games with perfect and imperfect information. The section proceeds with
the presentation of existing non-adaptive and adaptive bidding strategies, and per-
forms an analytical comparison of selected bidding strategies according to the derived
desiderata. Section 3.4 presents the Q-Strategy and Section 3.5 concludes with a sum-
mary of the chapter.
3.1 What is a Bidding Strategy?
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) provide one of the fundamental works that
initiated the study of games and economic behavior, which influenced and bundled
many research fields ranging from economics and artificial intelligence to biology.
In classic economics, it is often assumed that agents are rational utility maximizers
acting under the assumption of perfect information (i.e, all agents know the actions of
others at each stage of the game). The literature investigates several types of games.
Games with sequential actions (also called extensive or tree form games1), where each
agent’s possible actions and outcomes of the game are commonly represented in a
tree form and each agent chooses a sequential action (also called a pure strategy) of
the tree, based on the given stage of the game (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009).
In the case of perfect information, an agent knows all the actions of the others at
any stage of the game. A utility maximizing strategy is to choose the action, which
is the best response to actions of all other agents. The best response action can be
unique (pure strategy) or include more than one possible action (mixed strategy). In
the latter case, the agent among them is indifferent and makes a random selection
with a previously chosen probability distribution. If all agents play a best response
strategy, the resulting game is a Nash equilibrium.
1Extensive or tree form games are visualized through a tree with nodes, edges and leaves. A
node represents a choice of one of the agents, an edge represents a possible action and the leaves
represent the outcomes for each player.
73 3.1. WHAT IS A BIDDING STRATEGY?
Other types of games are the repeated and stochastic games. In the first case, the
same game is repeated over time, thus, agents learn from previous experience and
adapt the actions they have selected. In contrast to repeated games, stochastic games
allow the collection of normal form games to be executed repeatedly (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown, 2009). Such types of games allow agents to try varying their action
selection at each stage of the game in order to learn different action combinations of
the game.
In real scenarios (e.g., eBay, stock exchanges), the number of agents is large and the
agents have private information (e.g., valuation and reward functions), which is not
known to the others at each stage of the game (also known as games with imperfect
information). Bayesian games are such games with imperfect information, where
agents face uncertainty about the others’ valuation and reward functions and have
limited memory to store and reason the actions of past agents. A similar type of
game is called congestion games, which describes situations where agents compete
for scarce resources (e.g., bandwidth, computing instances). Such games can become
infinitely large and thus reasoning efforts become complex (NP-hard).
Game theory provides well applied and common mathematical frameworks to ex-
press various game settings, possible agent strategies, their relations and interactions.
Mathematical (game-theoretic) analysis of bidding strategies is often reasonable for
a small number of agents, simple utility functions, and that take place under certain,
often idealistic assumptions like perfect information and rational agents (Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, 1980). It can be assumed that the reason lies in the technical convenience
and simplicity of such (idealistic) scenarios in order to derive straightforward evidence
from the outcome of the game (Shoham et al., 2007, p. 13). With an increasing num-
ber of agents and strategy space, game-theoretic analysis and reasoning with respect
to the solution space is becoming complex.
Modern economics has become an interdisciplinary discipline, where more realistic
and complex scenarios can be efficiently implemented and evaluated in multi-agent ex-
periments by utilizing computing clusters, grids and clouds. As introduced in Section
2.3, Computational Mechanism Design focuses on more realistic and computation-
ally tractable mechanisms, which implies that some mechanism design desiderata are
sacrificed (cf. impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). This work
focuses on bidding agents and strategies for online market-based scheduling of com-
puting services. The resulting online allocations of consumer to provider requests is
not as optimal as an off-line optimization algorithm, cf. “Price of Anarchy” (Koutsou-
pias and Papadimitriou, 2009). Furthermore, this work investigates complex scenar-
ios where consumer and provider agents compete in homogeneous and heterogeneous
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scenarios of varying bidding strategies and different proportions thereof. In contrast
to the classic game-theoretic definition of a bidding strategy, this work examines the
term bidding strategy from an algorithmic perspective. In Computational Mechanism
Design, bidding strategies are elaborated as algorithms of multi-functional decision
steps, containing steps like information gathering (shared data of other agents’ bids
and clearing prices), data aggregation, prediction and optimization techniques, as
well as bid generation. Furthermore, adaptive bidding strategies include additional
steps like outcome analysis and learning from past experience at each stage of the
game.
Instantiated into software agents, such bidding strategies automate the bidding pro-
cesses for consumers and providers. In laboratory experiments, Das et al. (2001)
showed that bidding agents (software agents applying algorithmic bidding strategies)
outperform humans. The bidding agents have computational advantages over humans
since data can be found, parsed and aggregated in near real-time, e.g., transactions
are executed in milliseconds. Furthermore, bidding agents implement sophisticated
optimization algorithms with well-defined rules and decisions. Unlike humans, bid-
ding agents “don’t get distracted”, are not indifferent between decisions and do not
suffer from “auction fever” (Greenwald et al., 2003; Ku et al., 2005).
3.2 Design Desiderata
The design process of bidding strategies is a challenging task, which highly depends
on the environment in terms of the target domain (here computing services), the
type of market mechanism, constraints that should be considered and the actions
of the other participating agents (Lin and Kraus, 2010). The characteristics of the
environment define the scope for designing the bidding strategies. When designing
bidding strategies for realistic settings, a clear methodology is required. The following
desiderata focus on strategy design for the market-based scheduling domain.
Desideratum 1 ≺Automating Bidding Processes
Bidding strategies must allow the automation of decision making processes when bid-
ding for computing services (Windsor et al., 2009; Iyer and Huhns, 2009).
To achieve this, bidding strategies have to be designed according to the rules of the
target market protocol like market type (single-sided vs. double-sided auctions), the
timing of bids, offline vs. online matchmaking and information revelation (Wurman
et al., 2001). Consumers and providers follow well-defined goals for their applications
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and transaction objects (Iyer and Huhns, 2009; Paurobally et al., 2007). Therefore,
bidding strategies have to model the transaction objects explicitly, and the goals that
are to be maximized need to be configured.
Desideratum 2 ≺State Representation
Bidding strategies must model the environment in which they act and interact explic-
itly.
From the perspective of a consumer or provider, an environment consists of endoge-
nous and exogenous variables. Therefore, a bidding strategy designer has to decide
which variables the state model is to take, endogenous, exogenous, or a mixture of
both. The endogenous state of an agent expresses local states like an agent’s tasks,
goals, believes, desires or intentions. Examples of an endogenous state representa-
tion are those that express statements like “application X is ready for execution and
needs a computing service Y” or “computing service Y is idle and ready to be offered.”
Such intentions can be mapped to local actions and executed by an agent. Examples
of exogenous state variables are those for modeling shared information about other
agents’ bids and clearing prices, as well as information about the rules of the target
market mechanisms (Wurman et al., 2001). Furthermore, monitoring data of an ap-
plication execution on external computing services is also defined as exogenous state
information. The data of the exogenous state representation is used to improve the
decision making processes of the bidding strategy’s endogenous model.
Desideratum 3 ≺Action Representation
Bidding strategies must model the transition of states into actions, which are executed
from the agents in the environment and affect their outcome.
Designers of bidding strategies must specify a policy for how actions are to be gen-
erated, according to the given state of the environment. Such policies are expressed
through functions using the variables of the endogenous and exogenous states. Ac-
tions can be simple, like the generation of random numbers; they can also be complex
and composed of multiple sub-tasks like information gathering, technical demand es-
timation, valuation estimation and bid generation.
Desideratum 4 ≺Goal Representation
Bidding strategies must model the goals for trading transaction objects explicitly.
In order to automate bidding processes, the agents have to know their goals, and
these have to be explicitly defined in their bidding strategies. In economics, goods
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and services are compared ex-ante and selected according to a utility function (also
called expected utility function if some of the parameters are unknown and have to
be estimated). The same utility function is used for the ex-post evaluation of choice
satisfaction. Utility functions usually have positive values and express the degree of
satisfaction. In the market-based scheduling domain, consumer and provider goals
can became complex and expressed with multiple attributes, so values may have a
negative prefix, even if they express high satisfaction. Therefore, this work prefers to
use the term scoring function.
Desideratum 5 ≺Adaptive Bidding in Imperfect Markets
Bidding strategies must support the bid generation processes in markets with incom-
plete information and strategic heterogeneous agents.
In real settings, consumers and providers do not share their true valuations and bid-
ding strategies with each other. This is also the case in strategy-proof mechanisms
where truthful bidding is a dominant strategy (Rothkopf, 2007). Rothkopf (2007)
discusses budget constrains and varying business models as practical reasons that pre-
vent consumers and providers from revealing their true valuations (Rothkopf, 2007).
This means that consumer and provider agents will behave strategically in order to
achieve their goals under their budget and business model constraints. Moreover,
at the beginning, it is difficult for consumers to have a clear idea of their technical
requirements and economic preferences with regard to their applications. However,
they can improve and refine their setups iteratively after carrying out a detailed ex-
ploration of and measuring performance on the computing infrastructures of different
providers.
Furthermore, bidding strategies have to be able to deal with asymmetric market
information, considering the fluctuating supply and demand of prices, and the qual-
ity and number of traded services (Vytelingum et al., 2008). The application of
machine learning techniques can help aggregate past experiences to estimate the de-
cision values under conditions of uncertainty (Anthony and Jennings, 2003; Gomes
and Kowalczyk, 2007; Tesauro, 2007).
Desideratum 6 ≺Bidding in a Market-Based Scheduling Domain
Bidding strategies for market-based scheduling must model the endogenous and ex-
ogenous characteristics of the specific domain and allow the decision and description
variables to be mapped to the communication protocols of the system.
In contrast to financial markets, bidding languages for market-based scheduling in-
clude technical attributes for the description of required or provided computing ser-
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vices. Part of these technical attributes may be identified as key performance indi-
cators and included in the scoring function. Therefore, bidding strategies not only
automate bid generation processes, but also provide the opportunity to adjust and
“learn” the values of the identified key performance indicators. For example, a scor-
ing function may include the minimization of completion time as part of its definition.
The bidding strategy may increase the memory usage or number of CPUs if there is
a correlation between completion time and memory usage or the number of CPUs
(Smith et al., 1998; Ali et al., 2004).
3.3 Existing Bidding Strategies
The design of bidding strategies depends on the rules of the target market mechanism
and whether all agents are perfectly informed or not. In the case of perfect informa-
tion, all agents have the same data view of the system as other agents and at each
stage of the game, i.e., the market provides complete information to all agents about
the intentions of others – bids for the demanded and supplied computing services and
clearing prices. In the case of imperfectly informed agents, at least one agent of the
game is less informed than the others, i.e., the agent is not aware of something rele-
vant to the transaction, which other agents know. An example of such asymmetries
are the trading relations between suppliers and consumers when there is uncertainty
about the value of the traded computing service (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). This
section presents a summary of bidding strategies that are implied in markets with
perfect and imperfect information.
3.3.1 Bidding in Games with Perfect Information
A well-known result in game theory is that every (finite) perfect information game in
extensive form has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This result is due to the fact
that each agent knows the actions of all others and the agents choose actions that
are the best responses to all other agents’ actions at each stage of the game (Shoham
and Leyton-Brown, 2009).
Formally, suppose that s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) is the strategy profile of all
agents other than i and s−i does not contain the bidding strategy si. If other agents
commit to play s−i at a specific stage of the game, a utility maximizing action of
agent i is to determine the best response to s−i.
Definition 3.3.1 (Best Response Strategy). The best response strategy, si, of agent
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i with a scoring function ui, to the strategy profile s−i is the strategy s∗i ∈ Si such
that ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i).
Definition 3.3.2 (Nash Equilibrium). Strategy profile s = (si, ..., sn) is a Nash equi-
librium if, for all agents i, si is the best response to s−i.
The concept of Nash equilibrium provides a stable strategy profile, in which no agent
wants to deviate from the best response strategy s∗i , if other agents play s−i.
To calculate Nash equilibria, the literature proposes algorithms that are based on
backward induction. Backward induction calculates Nash equilibria for each sub-game
(tree) of the overall game tree using a depth-first traversal search. Such algorithms
run well for small numbers of agents and strategies, but become unfeasible in practical
settings because of the exponentially increasing space of the tree game in terms of
agents and their adopted strategies.
In contrast to extensive form games, perfect information repeated or stochastic games
may have more than one Nash equilibrium due to the learning processes of the various
playing agents and the resulting new action. For example, the classic Rock-Paper-
Scissors game is a zero-sum game, where the best response strategy of each player
is to uniformly select an action from three of the actions possible. In Rock-Paper-
Scissors tournaments, the winners are never Nash equilibrium players (Shoham et al.,
2007). The winner of one of the past tournaments said, “I read the minds of my
competitors and figure out what they are thinking. I don’t believe in planning your
throws before you meet your opponent” (Shoham et al., 2007). The strategy space
in a repeated game (or more generally a stochastic game) is immense because it
includes all the mappings from past history to mixed strategies in the stage game. In
such complex games it is not reasonable to expect that agents can explore the entire
strategy space, but learn to achieve their own goals. Therefore, in such games, formal
Nash equilibrium analysis plays a minor role, if any at all.
3.3.2 Bidding in Games with Imperfect Information
Games with perfect information assume that all agents know the actions of others at
each stage of the game, as well as the actions of others that led to the current stage.
In a more realistic and competitive market setting, there is asymmetric information
about other agents’ intentions and their rewards. An agent reward depends on its
own preferences, the actions of other agents and the quality of the traded transaction
objects. Such a setting, where indivisible objects are traded and there is uncertainty
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about other agents’ private values, is called the Independent Private Values Model
(IPV) (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). In this model, each agent is assumed to be risk
neutral and each agent has his own private value estimate for the traded transaction
object. Furthermore, it is assumed that agents compete among each other in a non-
cooperative game, with each of them maximizing his own utility.
The following theoretic model defines the class of imperfect information games, which
is based on the definition in (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, p. 165).
Definition 3.3.3 (Imperfect Information Game). An Imperfect Information Game
is represented through the tuple G = (N,Ω, A,R, ρ, S,M), where:
• N is the set of all consumer and provider agents;
• Ω = (Ω1,Ω2, . . .) is the set all agents’ states, where Ωi = (ωi,1, ωi,2, . . .) repre-
sents the set of states of agent i ∈ N ;
• A = (A1, A2, . . .) is the set of all agents’ actions, where Ai = (ai,1, ai,2, . . .)
represents the set of actions of agent i ∈ N ;
• R : Ωi × Ai → R is the scoring function for calculating the score (reward) for
each executed action ai,k ∈ Ai and each ωi,k ∈ Ωi of agent i ∈ N ;
• ρ : Ωi×Ai → Ai specifies the transition probability function of taking an action
ai,k ∈ Ai in state ωi,k ∈ Ωi;
• S = (s1, s2, . . .) is the set of all agents’ bidding strategies, where si is the selected
bidding strategy of agent i e.g., Q-Strategy, ZIP, GD etc;
• M = (M1,M2, . . .) is the set of all agents’ messages, where Mi = (mi,1,mi,2, . . .)
represents the set of messages of agent i ∈ N .
Definition 3.3.3 extends the definition in (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009, p. 165)
with the addition of the S concept, which explicitly models the set of different (al-
gorithmic) bidding strategies to the set of available agents N of the game setting
G.
An agent i in an imperfect information game can select a bidding strategy si, based
on her or his experience in past and similar games. Let Hi = (hi,1, hi,2, . . .) be the
agent i’s history with a memory length of T units of time.
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Definition 3.3.4 (Classic Markov Strategy). A Markov strategy si : Ωi ×Hi → Ai
of an agent i returns the action ak ∈ Ai with the highest probability of being successful
for the given state ωk ∈ Ωi and history Hi.
The utility (score) of an agent, given other agents’ strategies, is a common indicator
for games with incomplete information.
Definition 3.3.5 (Expected Utility). An agent i’s expected utility with a bidding











In an imperfect information game, the bidding strategies of other agents are now
known to agent i, thus, agent i calculates its expected utility based on the public
information of other agents’ actions A−i. Thus, in contrast to the classic definition,
other agents’ strategies s−i are not known and agent i calculates the expected utility











Definition 3.3.6 (Best Response Strategy). The set of agent i’s best responses to
other agents’ strategies s−i is defined as:
BRi(s−i) = argmaxs′i∈Si Ei(s
′
i, s−i) (3.3)
Definition 3.3.7 (Bayes-Nash Equilibrium). A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a strategy
profile s that for all i, si ∈ BRi(s−i)
The difference of the Bayes-Nash equilibrium to the Nash equilibrium in normal form
games is that in imperfect information games the agents do not know the independent
private values of other agents, thus they try maximize their expected utility based
on the public information available on other agents. In order to calculate the best
response in a imperfect information game, agent i must know the current actions A−i
of the others agents for the state Ωi.
In general, bidding strategies for imperfect information games can be classified as
non-adaptive when the generated bid does not depend on past and current market
information (e.g., bids, offers, clearing prices), and as adaptive when the generated
bid depends on the available market information. In the following sections the non-
adaptive and adaptive strategies that are usually applied are introduced.
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3.3.3 Non-Adaptive Bidding Strategies
Non-adaptive bidding strategies do not require any public information from the mar-
ket mechanism to generate the bids. Such bidding strategies are applied in markets
where either there is a well-known dominant strategy, and therefore no point of
adaption, or in markets with a “high degree of uncertainty”, where agents behave
randomly in some ways, c.f “random walk” in financial markets (Campbell et al.,
1997).
In this context, Truth-Telling is the simplest strategy, where the reported bid to
the market equals the independent private value of the agent. This strategy consti-
tutes the best response in a strategy-proof mechanism, where truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy, i.e., it is a utility maximizing strategy regardless of what other
agents bid. Market mechanisms, which are strategy proof reduce the strategy space
of agents that do not need to perform game-theoretic analysis or counter-speculation
of others. The existing literature often focuses on the investigation of strategy-proof
mechanisms in various application scenarios (Kalagnanam and Parkes, 2004). How-
ever, market mechanisms, such as bid generation, communication costs, and winner
determination, which are theoretically shown to be strategy proof, actually present
NP-hard problems in practice. Moreover, it is often assumed that the independent
private values of consumers and providers are not constrained by any budgets or
endogenous constraints (Rothkopf, 2007).
Another non-adaptive bidding strategy is the Zero-Intelligence (ZI), which is also
called the Zero-Intelligence Constraint (ZI-C). ZI or ZI-C is one of the first and
simplest algorithmic bidding strategies evaluated in laboratory experiments against
human agents (Gode and Sunder, 1993). The ZI-C strategy agents submit (uniformly
distributed) random bids based on the budget constraints of consumers and providers
– consumers do not buy above their independent private values and providers do not
sell below their operating costs.
The authors promote this strategy based on the assumption that the efficiency of
a double auction depends on market design rules rather than the learning effects of
agents. Furthermore, it postulates that it is not possible to predict the trading be-
havior of agents because of their heterogeneity in terms of expectations, preferences,
risks and endowments. The experiments showed that budget constraint is sufficient
to achieve efficient outcomes that are comparable to those of the human agents. The
ZI-C strategy is a simple strategy, which can be applied in computing service markets
where there is high uncertainty about the prices and technical requirements.
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3.3.4 Adaptive Bidding Strategies
Adaptive bidding strategies are designed to work with the public data available,
which is provided by the market mechanisms. The following sections will present two
commonly applied benchmark strategies for the Continuous Double Auction (CDA),
which is the target market model of this work. Furthermore, other adaptive bidding
strategies that are valuable for this research are discussed, but are designed for a
different ĈDA type than the online CDA type presented in Section 2.3.5.
Zero Intelligence Plus Strategy
Cliff and Bruten (1997) developed an adaptive bidding strategy called Zero Intelli-
gence Plus (ZIP). ZIP agents have been widely explored and constitute a popular
benchmark for agents trading on Continuous Double Auctions (Das et al., 2001).
Central to the ZIP agent’s performance is the rule for updating the profit margins of
providers (Algorithm 3.3.1) and consumers (Algorithm 3.3.2), which is the difference
between the agent’s independent private value and the bid. In the absence of any
information, the strategy is initialized with a low bid for the trading object in com-
parison to its true valuation. The profit margin is automatically updated according
to a rule, which is based on the market information received for the clearing prices
and bids of other agents. The most recent bid of another agent is denoted by q−i.
Increasing the profit margin μi, raises the agent i’s bid qi in the case of a seller and





Algorithm 3.3.1: ZIP: Provider’s Profit Margin Update Rule(q−i, μi, qi)
comment:Compute provider’s profit margin μi, based on
the last market information q−i and the provider’s bid qi












else if q−i was not a match
then
{









Algorithm 3.3.2: ZIP: Consumer’s Profit Margin Update Rule(q−i, μi, qi)
comment:Compute consumer’s profit margin μi, based on
the last market information q−i and the consumer’s bid qi












else if q−i was not a match
then
{




ZIP’s relationship to the generated bid, valuation and profit margin of an agent i for
a trading object ωi is represented with the following rule:
qi = vi(1 + μi)
with μi ∈ [0,∞] in the case of provider
with μi ∈ [−1, 0] in the case of consumer (3.4)
The rules for raising and lowering the profit margins of consumers and providers are
altered dynamically based on whether the last signal was a consumer or provider bid
and whether the bid was a successful match or if it is still unmatched. The profit





Δi is the Widrow-Hoff delta value, which is calculated with the individual agent’s i
learning rate βi and the target price τi:
Δi = βi(τi − qi) (3.6)
A ZIP bid is generated with the following stochastic function:
τi(t) = Riq−i + Ai (3.7)
Here, Ri is a randomly generated coefficient, which sets the target price relative to
the current bid q−i with ranges of R ∈ [1.0, 1.05] for price increases and R ∈ [0.95, 1.0]
for price decreases (Cliff and Bruten, 1997). Ai is a random value alteration variable,
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which is set to be uniformly distributed over Ai ∈ [0.0, 0.05] for price increases and
Ai ∈ [−0.05, 0.0] for price decreases. In Das et al. (2001), experiments show that ZIP
agents perform better than (non-expert) human traders on CDA markets. Numerical
experiments show that adopting a ZIP strategy in markets dominated by other kinds
of agents results in an increased profit when the dominating agents are ZI, Kaplan
or GD agents (Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998). The ZIP strategy performs well with
fluctuating demand and supply and converges quickly in CDA markets.
In summary, ZIP is an adaptive, dynamic and price competitive strategy, i.e., it adapts
quickly to changing market conditions in terms of bids and clearing prices with the
aim of maximize the agent’s profit. Such a strategy can be applied in computing
service markets where there is public information available about other agents’ bids
and market clearing prices. A drawback of the ZIP strategy is that it is not applicable
in markets with missing or sparse public information about the price signals of other
agents. Furthermore, it indirectly implements a fixed short-term objective of profit
maximization. Nevertheless, this bidding strategy is one of the benchmark strategies
for CDAs in the current literature (Schvartzman and Wellman, 2009; Vytelingum
et al., 2008; Tesauro and Das, 2001).
Gjerstad-Dickhaut Strategy
Another benchmark bidding strategy for CDA markets is the Gjerstad-Dickahaut
strategy, which is also called Heuristic Belief Learning (Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998;
Gjerstad, 2003). Similar to ZIP, GD also requires public information about successful
and unsuccessful consumer and provider bids in order to calculate competitive bids.
GD generates bids based on historic information and belief functions for consumers
and providers. The GD strategy is also designed to be price competitive. It has
a profit maximizing scoring function, as well as the ability to respond quickly to
changing market conditions of supply and demand.
Compared to ZIP, this mechanism is memory based, i.e., it maintains a history Hi
of the last T bids and clearing prices. The so-called “belief” function f(π) calculates
the probability for a bid or offer to be accepted at price π.
Let APB(π) be the set of provider bids that have been accepted at a price greater
than or equal to π and UPB(π) be the set of unaccepted provider bids at a price
greater than or equal to π. Let CBL(π) be the total set of consumer bids lower than
or equal to π. Then, the provider j belief function is defined as:
Definition 3.3.8 (Provider’s Belief). fj(π) =
|APB(π)|+|CBL(π)|
|APB(π)|+|CBL(π)|+|UPB(π)|
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The intuition of Definition 3.3.8 is that if a provider bid has been rejected at o
′
< o,
it will also be rejected at o and vice versa for the consumer case, Definition 3.3.9.
Analogous to the consumer case, let ACB(π) be the set of consumer bids b that have
been accepted at a price lower than or equal to π and UCB(π) be the set of unaccepted
consumer bids at a price lower than or equal to π. Let CBL(π) be the total set of
provider bids greater than or equal to π. Then, the consumer i belief function is
defined as in following:
Definition 3.3.9 (Consumer’s Belief). fi(π) =
|ACB(π)|+|CBL(π)|
|ACB(π)|+|CBL(π)|+|UCB(π)|
The timing of bids is another strategic variable in GD. Bids are randomly delayed over
time according to the exponential distribution and the distribution’s rate parameter
depends on the maximum expected reward of the bid and the length T of the trading
period. As such, the choice of exponential distribution is motivated by the fact that
GD is designed to be exploited in mechanisms where there is no common knowledge
about other agents’ rewards and independent private values.
Spline interpolation ensures that the belief functions are monotonically decreasing for
the provider case and monotonically increasing for the consumer case. The provider j
and consumer i bids are calculated according to the following optimization problems
of the expected reward:
max
(





E(vi, π) = (vi − π)fi(π)
)
(3.9)
In summary, the GD strategy implements an adaptive model for bid generation,
based on observed public market information, as well as agents’ independent private
value. The choice of an action (bid) depends on the agent’s belief function of past
and current successful and unsuccessful bids. As with ZIP, the GD strategy is also
designed to be price competitive.
A drawback of the GD strategy is that its bid generation process also requires public
information about other agents’ bids and clearing prices. Like the ZIP strategy, GD
is also designed to maximize profit.
General Learning Models
Learning algorithms have been applied in many fields for solving complex problems
in single or multi-agent environments such as autonomous bidding agents (TAC game
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family), machine perception and cognition, autonomic computing2, autonomous ve-
hicles, natural language processing, search engines and fraud detection (Kephart and
Chess, 2003; Tesauro, 2007; Vulkan, 2003; Stone, 2007a).
In general, learning algorithms are classified into supervised, unsupervised and re-
inforcement learning algorithms. Supervised learning (SL) algorithms are applied in
cases when the sources of input and output data are available to the agents. The
agents can perform statistical (regression) analysis of the existing data in order to
“train” their parameter sets or bidding strategies. The ATTac-20013 agent is a suc-
cessful agent of the Trading Agent Competition, which applied SL algorithms in or-
der to estimate the probability distributions of prices when competing against other
agents in the TAC game (Stone et al., 2003). Vorobeychik et al. (2007) applied SL
algorithms to learn reward functions and estimate successful strategies through re-
gression analysis of training sets. However, these strategies are applicable in scenarios
when the agents have access to the actions and responses of all other agents. Further-
more, the ATTac-2001 agent was trained ex-ante with the data of the previous TAC
games. In a real scenario for market-based scheduling, one needs bidding strategies,
which are able to maximize owners’ scoring functions online and are based on the
available (partial or aggregated) market information of other agents. Moreover, in
a real scenario, it is not expected that other agents will report their true valuations
and adopted algorithmic bidding strategies.
In contrast, unsupervised learning (UL) algorithms perform statistical analysis on
given (historic) input data, without given reference to any output data. UL algo-
rithms aim at discovering new structures (clusters, similarities), patterns or relation-
ships between variables in the input data, based on the objective function maximiza-
tion of similarity patterns. Target applications of UL algorithms are in the field of
data mining, in which closely related objects are clustered according to the similarity
of the given criteria (Tesauro, 2007). Kiselev and Alhajj (2009) proposed an online
unsupervised learning approach for the hierarchical clustering of messages exchanged
between agents in a decentralized and dynamic multi-agent environment, with the
aim of resource allocation problems through negotiations. Another application of UL
2“Self-*” tasks like dynamic allocation of bandwidth, memory, threads, and logical partitions;
online performance tuning of system control parameters for Web servers, operating system and
database parameters.
3ATTac-2001 assumes that public information exists with regard to other (software) bidding
agents and their strategies (actions) from past rounds in TAC games with many rounds. The
ATTac-2001 agent was “tuned” in each round based on the available input and output data from
past rounds and knowledge about the participating agents in the coming rounds (Stone et al., 2003).
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algorithms is to cluster technical requirements into similar classes and to calculate
expected rewards for “similar” future actions, that are based on past experience data.
Moreover, consumers do not have the expertise to determine technical requirements,
however, they may give estimated requirements for their applications on a more ab-
stract level. UL algorithms can be applied to reason the historic (public or private)
information available of “similar” applications and their rewards and to infer an ini-
tial detailed technical specification from the “abstract” consumer statements. Thus,
clustering algorithms can map such abstract benchmark concepts to more detailed
description of technical requirements.
Unlike supervised and unsupervised learning, where agents are taught with exam-
ples of input and output data in order to derive new actions, reinforcement learning
(RL) collects the data through interaction with the environment and thus it is more
suitable for online sequential decision making problems (Sutton and Barto, 1998;
Tesauro, 2007). The goal of RL is to learn state-action pairs from delayed rewards,
which are received from the environment from the execution of actions. The poten-
tial of RL is largely unstudied for systems management applications. A commonly
studied application of RL is learning about effective actions “in the absence of ex-
plicit system models, with little or no domain-specific initial knowledge” (Tesauro,
2007). The advantages of reinforcement learning over supervised learning are that
i) “there is no requirement for a skilled human to provide training examples;” ii)
“the exploration process allows the agent to become competent in areas of the state
space that are seldom visited by human experts and for which no training examples
may be available” (Dearden et al., 1998). Moreover, Dearden et al. (1998) stated
that “to ensure a more robust behavior across the state space, exploration is crucial
in allowing the agent to discover the reward structure of the environment and to
determine the optimal policy. Without sufficient incentive to explore, the agent may
quickly settle on a policy of low utility simply because it looks better than leaping
into the unknown.” “A good exploration method should balance the expected gains
from exploration against the cost of trying possibly suboptimal actions when better
ones are available to be exploited.” Good approximative solutions for problems in
reinforcement learning are generally hard to find and may only be found in specific
cases like in “the so-called bandit problems in which the environment has a single
state, several actions, and unknown rewards” (Dearden et al., 1998).
The major difference of reinforcement learning (RL) in comparison to supervised and
unsupervised learning is that RL has to explore the environment in order to learn
the “best” actions with a given state. The designer of an RL algorithm has to think
of good policies that achieve a good trade-off in exploring the environment and in
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exploiting the learned data in new state-action pairs. RL algorithms aim to mimic
human learning behavior, which is described by two of the main principles found
in the literature on psychological learning, the Law of Effect and the Power Law of
Practice (Sutton and Barto, 1998). The Law of Effect states that an action is more
likely to be selected from a set of actions that have achieved the highest cumulative
rewards in the past; in other words, successful actions are likely to be strengthened
over time and unsuccessful actions weakened. Power Law of Practice assumes that
the learning curve is steep at the beginning and flatten out over time. This principle
states that successful and similar actions will be employed more often than others,
and also postulates that recent experiences are weighted higher than past experiences
(Sutton and Barto, 1998).
In general, reinforcement learning algorithms can be broken down into Model-based
learning and Model-free learning mechanisms. Model-based learning focuses on poli-
cies to learn an opponent’s strategies in order to estimate an approximated “best
response” to others’ actions. It is applied in environments where there is information
available on other agents and their actions. However, learning opponents’ strategies
within a given time frame does not guarantee that the opponents will act the same
way in the future.
In the case of Model-free learning, the agent learns “optimal” actions that perform
well in a given environment and against diverse opponents based on its local states
(its own requirements, preferences and scoring functions). The model-free learners
do not try to estimate the opponent’s strategy explicitly, but to adapt their own
actions based on the observed outcome, i.e., the rewards received from the own ac-
tions (Kaelbling et al., 1996). Therefore, model-free learning mechanisms indirectly
incorporate the dynamics of other agents’ actions since the outcome is based on their
fluctuating supply and demand. Model-free learning is motivated by the fact that
the environment is not fully transparent to all agents, i.e., agents do not reveal their
private information in terms of independent private values and scoring functions.
Furthermore, a consumer agent will not always know its own preferences and may
report a fuzzy specification of its technical requirements. The technical requirements
can be manually adapted by the consumer or automatically adapted by the bidding
agent with the aim of maximizing a given scoring function. This work focuses on
Model-free learning approaches since the environment, participants and their actions
(bids) are changing dynamically over time and especially in the computing service
domain.
In order to foster the learning process and overcome complexity, Stone (2007a) sum-
marized the techniques of Learned Abstractions and Layered Learning. Learned Ab-
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stractions is a useful technique when classifying different objects according to common
attribute-value pairs and parameter bounds. This technique enables quicker learning
with a higher number of actions that belong to the abstract class of objects, rather
than single objects. This learning technique can be applied in scenarios with well-
known domain representations, where the human agent can manually determine the
conditions for classifying the objects.
Learning-Based Bidding Strategies
Roth and Erev (1995) and Erev and Roth (1998) specified a reinforcement learning
algorithm with one, three and four parameters, which are adapted in games with
multiple agents. The authors’ goal was to elaborate general reinforcement learning
approaches, which aim to mimic human strategic behavior in games with multiple
players. The three-parameter learning algorithm was later called the Roth-Erev or
RE strategy and was evaluated in a Clearing House market mechanism (also called
Call Market) against the Truth-Telling4 and GD strategies (Phelps et al., 2006).
The Roth-Erev learning algorithm “solves a myopic stimulus-response problem of
the following form: Given this profit outcome, what price should I next choose?”
(Nicolaisen et al., 2001). However, the RE strategy does not explicitly model the
preferences of the agents (Erev and Roth, 1998, p. 875).
Many of the bidding strategies in the literature have financial markets as a tar-
get scenario, such as the Adaptive-Aggressiveness (AA) of Vytelingum et al. (2008)
and the reinforcement learning-based strategy of Schvartzman and Wellman (2009).
Their bidding strategy design and evaluation methodology targets a specific vari-
ant of ĈDA, which is applied in financial markets and where the agents compete
in several rounds during several days and the start and end times of a round and
day is known to all agents (Friedman, 1993). Bidding strategies like GDX (enhanced
GD) and the strategy of Schvartzman and Wellman (2009) use the specific time in-
formation in their decision-making process, i.e., “the expected number of bidding
opportunities before the auction closes” (Tesauro and Bredin, 2002; Schvartzman
and Wellman, 2009). Moreover, with some strategies like the AA model in ĈDA
constraints such as the spread-improvement rule, consumer bids can be placed if they
are below the current minimum consumer bid and vice versa for the provider case;
with the no-order queuing rule as well, unsuccessful bids and offers are not queued
in the order book (Vytelingum et al., 2008). Cliff (2006) also proposes an enhanced
version of the ZIP strategy called “ZIP60,” which adapts 60 financial parameters with
4Note: Clearing-House is not a strategy-proof mechanism.
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genetic algorithms in ĈDA markets. Park et al. (1996, 1999, 2000, 2004) developed
the reinforcement learning-based bidding strategy called P-Strategy, which computes
probabilities for state and reward transitions based on stochastic modeling. He et al.
(2003) apply fuzzy rules and reasoning mechanisms into a heuristic bidding strategy
in order to find efficient actions for a given market state based on the information
available from other agents.
Reeves et al. (2005) explored bidding strategies for market-based scheduling in si-
multaneous ascending auctions for allocating CPU slots. They evaluated a baseline
bidding strategy called straightforward bidding, which is also known as a “myopic
best response.” Based on the current perceived bids for available slots, each agent
selects a best response and utility maximizing bid to purchase a given slot. However,
the authors showed that this strategy is not an efficient (dominant) strategy for as-
cending auctions. Moreover, the authors proposed a bidding strategy called “sunk
awareness,” which assumes that other agents share their mixed strategies (from a
game-theoretic perspective) with each other and each of the agents can perform evo-
lutionary searches (replicator dynamics) to find an “optimal” strategy. A similar
approach for evolutionary searches of bidding strategies is followed and proposed in
Phelps et al. (2010b,a).
Sandholm et al. (2006) discuss models to predict the prices of computing services, and
applied their methods in the Tycoon spot market (Lai et al., 2005). However, they
stated that it is hard to predict user demand and the accuracy of the “predictions
depends on the regularity of previous price snapshots and it is therefore crucial, for
the results to be good, to pick a time window to study that exhibits these patterns.”
In contrast to the works discussed above, this thesis selects a type of CDA, which does
not introduce time constraints for rounds. The CDA type of this work is assumed
to be “infinite” and running continuously every day of the year (Chevaleyre et al.,
2006, p. 11). This design choice is motivated by the fact that computing services
are not storable and their usage patterns are highly dynamic (Altmann et al., 2008).
Any restriction on their continuous allocation and usage will effect their economic
efficiency from both, a provider and consumer perspective.
3.3.5 Analytical Comparison to the Desiderata
The state-of-the-art bidding strategies investigated have heterogeneous designs of
their states, actions, goals, information requirements, target auction type and appli-
cation domains. Table 3.1 shows a mapping of the elaborated bidding strategies to
the common and domain-specific design desiderata derived. In addition to the design
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desiderata, the table compares the bidding strategies according to the information
required for generating their actions according to their goals, as well as their target
auction types and constraints for which the strategies are designed and evaluated.
Desiderata D1 to D5 are common for the design of bidding strategies. However, they
are evaluated further in the context of market-based scheduling, which is explicitly
required in desideratum D6.
Automating Bidding Processes
All of the bidding strategies discussed satisfy the general desideratum D1. Specifi-
cally, the information required as input, as well as the calculation procedure of their
bid generation processes are well-defined and implemented in their data aggregation
and decision models. All of these strategies are instantiated into bidding agents,
therefore the bidding processes of consumers and providers are automated.
State Representation
Truth-Telling and ZI-C are simple bidding strategies, which do not explicitly define
a specific state model. However, they generate bids for a given artifact, which is
traded on the market. These two models only require the valuation as information
in order to generate the true or random bids. The Straightforward Bidding5 (SB)
strategy requires a perfect knowledge of other agents’ actions like bids, offers and
prices in order to calculate the best response strategy (action) to them. This strategy
is designed and evaluated for the specific Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA)
(Reeves et al., 2005). The state model of SB is not explicitly defined, however, the
authors model stated that the calculation of the best response is based on the prices
perceived and free slots for the computing services traded. A similar, but complex
approach is taken in the Evolutionary search strategies. With an evolutionary search
genetic algorithms are applied to learn of other agents’ actions and rewards from a
stationary environment in order to calculate the best responses to them. Evolutionary
search does not explicitly model a state; it requires full knowledge of the environment
is required and having to deal with rising computation complexity with the number
of agents and their actions. Therefore, Straightforward Bidding and Evolutionary
search are more likely to be adopted in offline and perfect information settings (cf.
Call Market in Phelps et al. (2010b)), than in online imperfect markets.
5Myopic Best Response.
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As adaptive strategies, Roth-Erev (RE) and P Strategy are designed to predict prices
in financial markets based on other agents’ actions. Generally, the RE strategy applies
the Reinforcement Learning (RL) model directly, the “one parameter” RE specifies
the so-called propensity, which is actually the reward parameter in an RL model. The
“three parameter” RE also defines experimentation and recency, which represent the
epsilon-greedy exploration policy and discount factor of an RL model. Finally, the
“four parameter” RE model calculates an expected value for an action based on the
available (perfect) information of other agents’ actions in the environment (Erev and
Roth, 1998). The model of the RE state is not explicitly defined in terms of attributes
and a state transition function.
P Strategy is based on stochastic modeling and the first strategy in the table, which
explicitly defines a state model and a state transition function. The P Strategy state
model contains endogenous and exogenous variables. The endogenous model contains
local information about the bidder’s action history and the valuations of the trans-
action objects. The exogenous model contains shared market information like the
number of standing bids and prices, their probability distributions, the arrival rates
of bids and the status of the auction (Park et al., 1996). However, in later works,
only some of these variables are explicitly considered in the P Strategy model and
evaluation scenarios (Park et al., 1999, 2000, 2004). The P Strategy performs a form
of evolutionary search on the state information again and thus is computationally
intractable for settings of multiple agents and actions (Park et al., 2004).
The Gjerstad-Dickhaut-X (GDX) bidding strategy extends the original Gjerstad-
Dickhaut strategy with a dynamic programming technique (Tesauro and Bredin,
2002). The GDX model a state by an agents holdings, the holdings’ transition proba-
bilities and the remaining time until the end of a trading day. The holdings’ transition
probabilities are estimated based on the past actions of other agents and the “belief
function” from the original Gjerstad-Dickhaut strategy.
Moreover, the state transition function calculates a time forecast of when the agent
should bid by optimizing the long-term discounted profits. This is realized over a
dynamic programming model and based on the available market information about
the auction round and time of day.
The Adaptive-Aggressiveness (AA) strategy is a two-layer bidding strategy with short
and long-term learning components. The short-term learning component combines
ideas from the ZIP and GDX bidding strategies, where the long-term learning com-
ponent adapts a so-called intrinsic shape parameter, which is used to update the
so-called aggressiveness factor. The latter is used from the short-term learning com-
ponent to decide when and how much to bid (Vytelingum et al., 2008). The aim
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of the short-term learning component is to detect price fluctuations (market shocks)
based on the observed market information of other agents’ actions, bids and prices.
Like the GDX strategy, the AA strategy is designed to consider the time constraints
of a ĈDA mechanism in terms of end of round and end of day. Furthermore, the
ĈDA implements a spread-improvement rule.
Schvartzman and Wellman (2009) propose an evolutionary search model for finding
“optimal” bidding strategies through reinforcement learning. They suggest applying
empirical game-theoretic analysis to accumulate data about the performance of the
selected agents’ actions through Monte Carlo simulations. Their model applies re-
gression analysis techniques through pre-generated data and it is applicable in static
environments with less fluctuations in demand and supply. Like with the AA strat-
egy, the target auction type in Schvartzman and Wellman (2009) is ĈDA, where the
time constraints and learning effects are incorporated in the state of the evolutionary
search model. The state model is complex; it contains time-related data (total time
elapsed in the current trading period, and time elapsed since the last trade), trans-
action object-related data (number of units left to trade) and statistical (regression
analysis) data of agents’ actions. Statistical data include moving averages of recent
trades, profits, probability information about recent bids and prices, as well as the
valuation of the transaction object. However, the model in Schvartzman and Well-
man (2009) is not applicable in practical settings since in real settings the number of
agents and their actions is high, and the target environment is non-stationary with
dynamic supply and demand. Moreover, the effort to find “optimal” bids in station-
ary and fixed settings is huge and the authors “provide no recipe for this issue beyond
relying on domain knowledge, creativity, and plenty of patience” (Schvartzman and
Wellman, 2009).
Similar to GDX and RE, the ZIP and GD strategies do not model their states ex-
plicitly, but their in CDA and ĈDA settings. ZIP and GD are evaluated in both
auction types since they do not directly incorporate time constraints, but explicitly
define how the bids are generated without these constraints. Moreover, ZIP and GD
are commonly applied benchmarks in the literature and for the bidding strategies
discussed in the previous paragraph (Tesauro and Bredin, 2002; Vytelingum et al.,
2008; Schvartzman and Wellman, 2009).
Action Representation
Desideratum D3 is satisfied by all of the analyzed bidding strategies in Table 3.1. The
common action for all of these strategies is the generated bid, which is submitted to
the market. The representation of their actions differ in the data and decision models
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they apply to generate the bids. Most of them use perfect market information to
calibrate the decision parameters. Statistical techniques, evolutionary search and
dynamic programming are applied to predict when and what to bid.
The RE strategy applies the epsilon-greedy selection policy to switch between explo-
ration and exploitation modes when generating the bids. In the exploration mode,
the RE strategy chooses a random action as a bid, and in the exploitation mode
it selects an action, which was successful in the past since this action is also more
likely to be successful in the future. The RE strategy implements this in a propensity
matrix, which stores the explored actions and their propensity values (discounted re-
wards). For each executed action, the RE strategy updates its propensity value from
the received reward. In the exploitation phase, the RE strategy performs a lookup
to select the action with the highest propensity.
The P strategy uses shared public information and performs statistical analysis to
estimate an action, which maximizes the agent’s profit. The probabilities for suc-
cess and failure are reinforced in the model from other agents’ actions, i.e., bids
and prices. However, these computations are timely expensive with respect to the
number of agents and their actions, thus, this model is not practical in online set-
tings (Park et al., 2004). Straightforward Bidding and Evolutionary search perform
optimization searches of the available market information to find the best response
strategies. Like with ZIP and GD, GDX, AA and Schvartzman and Wellman (2009),
the decision variables are adapted from other agents’ actions (perfect information).
ZIP updates the profit margin on each bid or price received, which is used when bids
are generated. GD uses a “belief function,” which calculates the probability for each
candidate bid to be allocated and selects the bid with the highest probability. GDX
calculates state-transition probabilities for when and what to bid, which is based on
a dynamic programming model of the public information. AA updates an “aggres-
siveness” parameter, which is part of the decision function for when and what to
bid. The Schvartzman and Wellman (2009) strategy performs an evolutionary search
using agents’ actions to find an “optimal” bid.
Goal Representation
The non-adaptive bidding strategies, Truth-Telling and ZI-C, do not define a scoring
function (a goal) and do not adapt based on the rewards received from the actions
generated. All other bidding strategies implement a scoring function, which is used
to update the agent’s knowledge base from the rewards received and the time they
are received. Applied mostly in financial market settings, these strategies aim to
maximize the agent’s profits, which is the result of the agent’s valuations less the
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clearing prices. Evolutionary search and Straightforward Bidding do not aggregate
the rewards received from each action; their aim when calculating the best response
strategy is profit maximization. The RE bidding strategy reinforces the discounted
rewards receive from agent’ actions in its knowledge base (propensity value for each
of the actions), which is used in the bid generation phase to select the most successful
action. The P Strategy uses RL techniques to calibrate the probability transition pa-
rameters from the rewards received. Furthermore, the P Strategy computes the utility
values for each of the possible actions (bids) and selects the action with the highest
expected utility. The ZIP and GD strategies optimize immediate profits when gener-
ating their bids. The GDX strategy optimizes the cumulative long-term discounted
profits of the actions using dynamic programming. AA optimizes long-term profits
using ZIP-based (short-term) reactions for on changing market conditions. Agents in
the Schvartzman and Wellman (2009) model receive immediate rewards, which are
used in their RL model to update the state information.
Adaptive Bidding in Imperfect Markets
Almost all of the bidding strategies in Table 3.1 are designed to work in perfect
information markets (all agents’ bids and prices are common information). The
Truth-Telling and ZI-C strategies behave the same in perfect and imperfect infor-
mation markets. Straightforward Bidding can calculate a best response only when
information about the other bidders is available. The decision making functions of
the remaining strategies are designed to work with perfect information, however, each
of these algorithmic bidding strategies partially implement RL techniques in some of
their decision steps, e.g., when calibrating variables or updating cumulative rewards.
Such RL techniques can also work (in the long-term) with only partially available
information. Nevertheless, these bidding strategies are designed to work with perfect
information and evaluated in auction settings where all agents are informed about
other agents’ actions. Therefore, their properties and outcome efficiency in the im-
perfect information case might be completely different or difficult to explain.
Bidding in a Market-Based Scheduling Domain
In Table 3.1 only Straightforward Bidding is explicitly designed for a market-based
scheduling scenario. Straightforward Bidding is defined for a scenario for allocating
CPU slots in a simultaneous ascending auction with perfect information about other
agents’ actions. However, the auction mechanism and the bidding strategies dis-
cussed in Reeves et al. (2005) remain at a higher abstraction level by applying classic
economic assumptions, idealistic (perfect) information and strategic (best response)
models. All other bidding strategies are evaluated in financial market scenarios, i.e.,
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ĈDA with specific time constraints. In a market-based scheduling scenario, the mar-
ket mechanisms are assumed to run infinitely, i.e., non-constrained continuous and
autonomous allocation of applications to idle computing services with “intelligent”
agents and bidding strategies in CDA market types. Moreover, none of he strategies
of past and current research discussed here provide an explicit definition of communi-
cation protocols (see Chapter 5) for agent interactions in a market-based scheduling
domain, i.e., a well-defined procedure for mapping the endogenous and exogenous
variables (strategic and technical) of bidding strategies, such as state, action, infor-
mation, reward model and a well-defined message type. In real market-based schedul-
ing scenarios agents need to communicate according to well-defined and commonly
accepted communication protocols, which explicitly define the type of information
exchanged and rules of the market mechanism used. Moreover, the target domain of
this work requires a definition of bidding strategies that models economic and techni-
cal attributes in their state, action, information and reward representations. Another
important limitation of the current research on market-based scheduling domains is
the focus on profit maximization. However, according to their key performance indi-
cators, consumers and providers of computing services will adopt more complicated
scoring functions, e.g., min. completion time and payments, max. utilization, max.
reliability, min. penalty etc. (Wilkes, 2008; Auyoung et al., 2009; Brynjolfsson et al.,
2010).
3.4 Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Automated Provi-
sioning and Purchasing of Computing Services
3.4.1 Why Reinforcement Learning-Based Bidding?
Today’s software applications and computing services are highly heterogeneous. Own-
ers of software applications have different requirements on computing infrastructures
for deploying and executing their applications; and providers maintain computing
infrastructures based on hardware components from different manufacturers.6 There-
fore, the strategies that consumers and providers use have to be able to handle un-
certainties when computing services are purchased or provided through the market.
Unlike supervised and unsupervised learning, where agents learn from past input and
6Symantec (2008) reported that, on average, companies work with more than one thousand
applications; almost all of the computing centers on the Top500-List (<http://www.top500.org>)
are built with different hardware specifications.
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output data, reinforcement learning (RL) enables the learning from local and feed-
back data, which is received from the environment (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Tesauro,
2007). RL incorporates this feedback according to two intuitive effects from the psy-
chology and control theory – Law of Effect and Power Law of Practice. The Law
of Effect postulates that agents are more likely to select the action that achieved
the highest average performance in the past. The Power Law of Practice postulates
that learning curves tend to be steep at the beginning and flatten out over time.
Moreover, the feedback collected can be used immediately in the generation of new
actions. Therefore, RL-based mechanisms are applicable in interactive (online) set-
tings, where agents can explore the environment and adopt “better” actions in order
to improve their rewards over time.
In environments with imperfect information, amodel-free learning mechanism is more
suitable than a model-based learning mechanism since the endogenous variables are
actual and well known to the owners, whereas the exogenous variables might be
incomplete, incorrect or obsolete.
General Reinforcement Learning models, in particularly Q-Learning, define the gen-
eral framework of an interactive and adaptive environment of agents’ states, actions,
rewards and transition policies. Concrete specifications, realizations and evaluations
for (real-world) application scenarios are completely missing within the Q-Learning
framework. In the next section, the theory behind Q-Learning will be briefly pre-
sented. In the subsequent section, a specification, realization and complexity analysis
of a novel bidding strategy for the market-based scheduling domain, Q-Strategy, is
presented.
3.4.2 The General Q-Learning Framework
The theory of reinforcement learning was developed by Bellman in the 1950s, who
formulated the Bellman equation for solving the infinite horizon problems of control
theory (Sutton and Barto, 1998). The Bellman equation uses a dynamic programming
approach to accumulate discounted rewards for observed state-action pairs in order
to “learn” the optimal actions from recurring experiences in an infinite game. In
static environments of single-agent (self-play) learning with known states, actions
and rewards, it has been shown that Q-Learning converges to optimal values over
time when all actions are infinitely and repeatedly explored (Watkins and Dayan,
1992b; Tsitsiklis, 1994; Bowling, 2000). There is also research on the multi-agent
case, but there is no clear proof that Q-Learning converges in cases of cooperative
and perfect information or of what happens in non-cooperative imperfect information
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Figure 3.1: Standard reinforcement learning interaction loop (adopted from Kaelbling
et al. (1996))
The general interaction loop of the Q-Learning framework is depicted in Figure 3.1:
• Step 1: State Observation. An agent i receives as input an observation for a
state ωi,k of the environment;
• Step 2: Action Selection. Based on the transition probability function ρ, the
agent selects an action ai,k for state ωi,k , which is executed in the environment;
• Step 3: Reward Calculation. The agent receives a reward ri,k, which is calcu-
lated from a reward function R;
• Step 4: Value Update. The reward ri,k for the state-action pair < ωi,k, ai,k >
is aggregated according to the Q-Value update rule in order to reflect the new
observations;
• Step 5: State Transition. A state transition policy identifies the next state
ωi,k+1 to be observed, which moves the algorithm to Step 1.
For each observed state-action pairs, the Q-Value update rule cumulates the received
reward in a so-called Q-Value. The n + 1 experience (Q-Value) of the state-action
pair < ωi,k, ai,k > is updated according to the following rule:
Qn+1(ωi,k, ai,k) = Q
n(ωi,k, ai,k) + βωi,k [ri,k + γmaxa
Q(ωi,k, Ai)−Qn(ωi,k, ai,k)] (3.10)
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Qn(ωi,k, ai,k) is the current Q-Value of a state-action pair, which is updated into
Qn+1(ωi,k, ai,k) by discounting the received reward ri,k with the maximum expected
value for future rewards (with respect to the best action argmaxa(Ai), Ai are the
explored actions for state ωi,k) and the old Q-Value of the target state-action pair.
βωi,k ∈ [0, 1] is the learning rate, which determines how much weight is given to newly
observed rewards. A high value of βωi,k results in high importance being assigned to
the current observed reward, while a low value leads to the use of small steps to
update the Q-Value-function. βωi,k = 0 means that no learning will occur at all.
The discounting factor γ defines how much expected future rewards affect current
decisions. A low value (γ → 0) implies greater attention to immediate rewards. A
higher value (γ → 1) implies orientation towards future rewards, whereby agents may
be willing to trade short-term loss for long-term gain.
Typical values in the research for the learning rate βωi,k have the range [0.01, 0.3] and
for γ the range [0.1, 0.9]. The estimation of these parameters constitutes a trade-off
between the ability to consider the dynamics of the environment and thus the reaction
to changing conditions. Whiteson and Stone (2006) proposed an evolutionary search
of the Q-Learning parameters for the mountain car and server application scheduling
scenarios. Sun and Peterson (1999) varied the learning rate through a heuristic policy.
In Even-Dar et al. (2003) and Even-Dar and Mansour (2004) performed stochastic
searches for estimating the Q-Learning parameters in stationary settings.
Another trade-off is the choosing between exploration and exploitation mode, i.e.,
to explore new action values or to use the cumulated knowledge for selecting the
current “best” action for a given state ωi,k. The exploration and exploitation trade-
off, also called the epsilon-greedy policy (ε), has been theoretically studied in so-called
multi-armed bandit problems (MAB). MAB is part of reinforcement learning theory
and describes a solution for iterative calibration (trial and error) of states to actions
(control theory), i.e., for estimating variables for a given state through repeated
execution of the actions and incorporation of the received feedbacks. The literature
uses different values and value ranges for ε ∈ [0.01, 0.5] in order to balance exploring
new knowledge and exploiting already existing knowledge for the action selection. In
the evaluation part of this work, the βωi,k , γ and ε variables are estimated based on
the suggested value ranges and a sensitivity analysis, in which each of the parameter
is varied and the parameters combination with the highest performance (outcome) is
selected.
Q-Learning is a well-explored general framework in learning theory. However, as
such, it defines abstract concepts and their relations, but the definition of concrete
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learning models for specific environments (e.g., soccer robots, online human-machine
games like poker and chess, autonomous car driving), their concrete specification,
realization and evaluation is a design and research problem (Stone, 2007a). The next
section presents a novel bidding strategy for the market-based scheduling environment
called the Q-Strategy, which utilizes the Q-Learning concepts, and expands on them
with concrete and detailed specification and realization details. The Q-Strategy is
evaluated in Chapter 6.
3.4.3 The Q-Strategy Model
3.4.3.1 Automating the Bidding Processes
Most of the bidding strategies in Table 3.1 do not include detailed evidence of their
specification, implementation and complexity analysis. However, many of them apply
evolutionary search techniques for calculating best response actions based on market
information of other agents’ bids and clearing prices. Such techniques require expo-
nential efforts with respect to the number of agents and their actions.
The aim of the Q-Strategy model is the automation of consumers’ and providers’
bidding processes in markets for trading computing services (Section 2.3.2) and for
two real case studies for batch and interactive applications (Section 2.4.1). Con-
sumers and providers use the well-defined interfaces of the Q-Strategy to configure
their states, goals and dynamic parameters (exploration rate, learning rate and dis-
count factor). The Q-Strategy is initialized into bidding agents (Section 4), which
start the execution of the bidding processes and manage the communication with
the environment (Section 5). Therefore, the Q-Strategy contributes to the research
on autonomic computing by automating the decision making processes of consumers
and providers when participating in markets for computing services.
3.4.3.2 State Representation
Consumers use heterogenous applications with heterogeneous requirements on the
computing services (see scenarios in Section 2.4.1). Providers maintain heteroge-
neous computing infrastructures from different hardware manufacturers, which are
designed for various use cases and application scenarios. Therefore, the design deci-
sion of a Q-Strategy state definition should reflect this in supporting bidding processes
for heterogeneous applications and computing service descriptions. The innovative
approach of Q-Strategy’s state is its representation as a multi-armed state machine
with a multi-armed action learner. This approach not only allows the action space
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for a given state to be explored, but also the expression of policies to create new
states.
For example, a consumer (company) has a large log data of last month’s sales and
uses the TXTDemand application (Section 2.4.1.1) to analyze the sales and calcu-
late the replenishment strategy for the following month. The consumer estimates
that his technical requirements will be 2 CPUs with at least 2 GHz, 4 GB of dual-
channel memory and 30 GB disk space. Moreover, the log data should be analyzed
as quickly as possible (estimation max. of 8 hours) for not more than 5 monetary
units ($). The bidding processes are executed with the preferred bidding strategy and
the TXTDemand application is allocated for 3 monetary units on a machine, which
satisfies these requirements and needs 7 hours to complete the job. The next time, the
consumer decides to increase the number of CPUs to 4 and the memory requirements
to a three-channel 4GB memory. The reward was that the applications were finished
in 5 hours and within the 5 monetary units constraint.
Such manual optimizations can be automated through state transition policies, which
are supported per design in Q-Strategy ’s state definition. Moreover, the definition of
Q-Strategy ’s state does not capture application specific data like deployment, run-
time and termination instructions, but the technical requirements of the applications
(providers’ technical descriptions of their computing services) for the computing ser-
vices with the economic constraints – duration, valuation and goal. Therefore, the
same consumer may want to execute a ray-tracing application for her or his collection
of holiday pictures and with the same technical requirements and economic prefer-
ences for a computing service at a later time. Here, the Q-Strategy will exploit the
knowledge already collected from past bid generation processes with the same state
description. The applied technique is called Learned Abstractions, i.e., the grouping
of similar states according to a well-defined “similarity rule,” i.e., similar technical
descriptions (key performance indicators) and economic preferences.
The Q-Strategy state for an agent i is represented through the 6-tuple
Ωi = {Θi, ci, vi, Ui,Φi, ρω}:
• Technical Description. Θi defines technical attributes for the consumer’s re-
quirements and the provider’s technical description like CPU, memory, storage
and network bandwidth;
• Duration. ci is an (upper-bound) estimation in time units for the total time a
computing service is demanded or available on the market;
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• Valuation. vi is the maximum monetary unit a consumer is willing to pay per
unit of time for the application’s execution on a target computing service. For
providers, it is the minimum requested price for the computing service per unit
of time;
• Scoring Policy. Ui is the scoring function that consumers or providers adopt in
order to achieve their goals in the bidding process (see Goal Representation);
• State Abstraction Policy. Φi : Ωi × Ωj → Ωi is the policy, which is defined by
consumers and providers. It clusters their requests of similar states Ωi ≈ Ωj
with Θi = Θj, ci = cj, vi = vj and Ui = Uj to one single unique state description
Ωi;
• State Transition Policy. The state transition function ρω : Ωi × ξ → Ω̃i defines
the policy ξ, which adapts the attributes of the technical description in order
to explore new states for the specified goal.
The technique for clustering similar states, State Abstraction is especially applicable
to applications, which are repeatedly executed with technical requirements and input
data that does not change often.
3.4.3.3 Action Representation and Adaptive Bidding
Figure 3.2 shows an example of Q-Strategy’s concepts. On the left, it shows the
different states of the agent. In time t, an agent i receives a “request for bid,” and
based on the information in Pti, the state arm looks for the state,
ωi,2 = {{4CPU, 2GB Memory, 10GB Disk}, 5h, 30$, “minCompletionT imeAndPayment′′},








i ∈ Pti (see the definition of Pti in
Section 5.3.1).
For ωi,2, the agent has explored m actions so far. Based on the action selection policy,
the action arm returns the action, which is to be executed in the environment. Here,
the “best action” with the current highest Q-Value is ai,2 with Q(ωi,2, ai,2) = 67. This
example also shows the change of the Q-Value over time, based on the received reward
from the action execution. Here, ai,2 was executed twice with rewards of 64 and 67.
The Q-Value is the cumulative reward, which is calculated with the Q-Value update
rule. For example, the last Q-Value of ai,2 is calculated with Q
1(ωi,2, ai,2) = 64, a
current expected value of maxa Q(ωi,k, A
k
i ) = 64, βωi,2 = 0.1 and γ = 0.9:
Q2(ωi,2, ai,2) = 64 + 0.1(38 + 0.9 · 64− 64) = 67 (rounded) (3.11)





State Arm Action Arm 


















Q2 (ωi,2,ai,1) = 55
Q3(ωi,2,ai,1) = 59
Q1(ωi,2,ai,1) = 64
Q2 (ωi,2,ai,1) = 67
Q1(ωi,2,ai,1) = 60
Q2 (ωi,2,ai,1) = 63
Q3(ωi,2,ai,1) = 65
Q4 (ωi,2,ai,1) = 64
Request 
for bid Pti
Figure 3.2: Example of Q-Strategy’s multi-states with multi-action arms
The adaptive bidding processes in the Q-Strategy are executed in two main phases
– the Exploration and Exploitation phase, according to the ε-greedy action selection
policy (Kaelbling et al., 1996).
Exploration Phase. The exploration phase allows users to learn from and adapt
to their environment based on new or randomly selected actions and the rewards
associated with these actions. In this phase, for a given state ωi,k the Q-Strategy
uniformly generates an action ai,k with upper and lower bounds from the valuation
of the state vi ∈ ωi,k, U(zvi, vi) and factor z – for the consumer z ∈ [0, 1] and for
the provider z ∈ [1,∞]. The motivation of this phase is that market environments
are dynamic over time and agents will continuously experience different rewards from
each of their actions. However, the continuous accumulation of these experiences will
allow better decisions in the exploitation phase.
Exploitation Phase. The exploitation phase selects the action ai,k in a given state
ωi,k, which achieved the highest cumulative reward over time. The cumulative reward
Q(ωi,k, ai,k) implements the Law of Effect and Power Law of Practice policies and is
calculated with the Q-Value update rule for each executed action ai,k in ωi,k. The
information about the states, associated actions and their cumulative rewards are
stored in the agent’s knowledge base in a so-called Q-Table.
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argmaxa(Q(ωi,k, Ai)) with probability 1− ε
U(zvi, vi) with probability ε
(3.12)
With a probability of ε, the Q-Strategy selects an action within the Exploration Phase
and with a probability of 1− ε it selects an action within the Exploitation Phase, for
each incoming “request for bid.” In cases with missing information about a given
state, the ε ∈ [0, 1] value can be set to select the Exploration Phase with a higher
probability, e.g., ε = 0.7, and reduced with time to ε = 0.1 in order to exploit and
refine the initial knowledge through the Exploitation Phase. The z parameter is
predefined and set by the consumers and providers. It is also possible to adapt it
over time, however, this extension will be a part of future research.
In summary, the Action Representation model allows continuous adaption over time
and to the market conditions. Continuous adaption is implemented with the visit of
the Exploration Phase with the probability of ε, which remains constant over time.
3.4.3.4 Goal Representation and Q-Value Update
The Q-Strategy does not predefine the scoring function Ui for all states, but provides
a built-in flexibility of the State Representation to allow consumers and providers to
specify their own scoring functions, which are part of the matched state Ui ∈ ωi,k for
their “request for bid.” When there is no available state that matches the “request
for bid,” a new unique state is created in Q-Strategy ’s multi-armed state machine.
Therefore, the scoring functions are decoupled from the Q-Strategy implementation
and provided as external rules, which are called up from the Q-Strategy for the
reward calculation. The different scoring function identities are provided as a list to
the consumers and providers, from which they select their preferred scoring function
for the traded transaction object. The Q-Value is updated after each action execution
ai,k for the matched state ωi,k, according to the specified scoring function in Ui, which
is used as the reward calculation function, R ≡ Ui, in the Q-Value update rule.
For example, in an application case, consumers can select a “minimize completion
time” scoring function; in other application cases they would select “minimize pay-
ment” or both at the same time, “minimize completion time and payment.” Anal-
ogously, providers of computing services would select “maximize profit,” “maximize
utilization” or both, “maximize profit and utilization.” The evaluation of existing
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scoring functions is not a part of this research, but the application of existing ones
is part of it. In this work, two scoring functions are selected as relevant for the
evaluation: consumers of computing services that “minimize completion time and
payment” as stated in Heydenreich et al. (2010), and providers that are classically
defined as profit (the difference between valuation and clearing price) maximizers.
Selection of the profit maximizing scoring function allows the agent outcomes to be
compared with state-of-the-art works for evaluating bidding strategies. Selecting of
the “minimize completion time and payment” scoring function allows for a more re-
alistic analysis of bidding strategies in the market-based scheduling domain, which
are largely unexplored in the current related research.
3.4.3.5 Realization of the Q-Strategy for a Market-Based Scheduling Do-
main
Figure 3.3 presents the realization architecture of the Q-Strategy in the BidGenera-
tor framework (cf. Figure 4.2 in Section 4.4). States and actions are implemented as
inner classes of the Q-Strategy class.
The State class implements the mapping of “request for bids,” implemented as Pri-
vateMessages (Section 5.3.1), to the states of Q-Strategy ’smulti-armed state machine.
The Action class describes the mapping between an action and its cumulative reward.
The Q-Strategy class implements the generateBid method (Algorithm 3.4.1), which
generates a bid with respect to the decision of an exploration or exploitation phase.
The result of the generateBid is the created PublicMessage (Section 5.3.3), which is
submitted to the market. The Q-Strategy class method updateCalculateScore receives
status information, StateMessage (Section 5.3.2), on the transaction object (applica-
tion or computing service) execution and calculates the achieved reward based on the
selected scoring function U . Additional information like clearing price is extracted
from the market match-message (see MarketMessage in Section 5.3.4), which was
received from the market on successful allocation (Section 5.4) of the consumer and
provider bids. At the end, the updateCalculateScore invokes the newState method of
QLearner in order to accumulate the received reward from the action execution of
the target state with the Q-Value update rule.
The states to actions cumulative reward information is stored in the Q-Table. The Q-
Table is implemented in memory within the QLearning data management structure,
but can be made persistent in a database with little effort.
The QLearner class implements the maintenance of states to actions, the update of
the cumulative rewards (newState) and the retrieval of the bestAction. Originally, the
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+generateBid(message : PrivateMessage) : PublicMessage




+bestAction(state : State) : Action
+getActionsFor(state : State) : Map
+newState(state : State, action : Action, score : ScoringFunktion) : void
+addLastActionChosen(state : State, action : Action) : void
+setLearningRate(learningRate : double) : void















Figure 3.3: Q-Strategy’s implementation in BidGenerator
QLearner implementation was inspired by the JASA framework7, but in its current
version the BidGenerator ’s QLearner is a significant extension to JASA’s implemen-
tation since now it i) supports States and Actions as objects rather than integer arrays
and ii) implements computationally efficient management of Actions with a priority
queue technique. The UpdatablePriorityQueue interface specifies general methods of
managing Actions in an efficient and sorted Heap data structure.
Algorithm 3.4.1 describes the implementation of the generateBid method. generate-
Bid receives the “request for bid” message in the form of a PrivateMessage. It ini-
tializes the valuation, the provider’s or consumer’s z -factor and the state information
from the PrivateMessage. The selection between the Exploration and Exploitation
phase is determined by the ε parameter, which is compared to an automatically drawn
parameter from a uniform distribution. The Exploration phase generates a uniform
bid as specified, whose value is bound within the consumer’s or provider’s valuation
and their z -factor scaled valuation. In the Exploitation phase, the bid is the current
best action in the Q-Table for the target state. As a last state, the bid is incorporated
into the PublicMessage, which is a subset and transformed from the PrivateMessage.
7<http://sourceforge.net/projects/jasa>.





Algorithm 3.4.1: Q-Strategy: Bid Generation Rule(privateMessage)
comment:Generates a bid according to the current strategy phase:
* Exploration phase generates random bids
* Exploitation phase exploits the state-action-reward history
procedure generateBid(privateMessage)



























comment:Q-Table is empty for privateMessage def.
bid ← Stochastic.uniform(z · valuation, valuation)
return (bid)
3.4.3.6 Complexity Analysis
The bidding strategies discussed in Table 3.1 do not provide any detailed evidence
of the complexity of their implementations. Bidding strategies like Straightforward
Bidding, Evolutionary Search, P-Strategy and Schvartzman-Wellman perform evolu-
tionary search for best response strategies based on the available public information
of other agents’ actions – bids and clearing prices. Evolutionary search techniques
solve complex problems, but suffer from exponential computational complexity due
to the number of agents and their actions. Moreover, reinforcement learning research
focuses on theoretical concepts of learning, but does not discuss possible implemen-
tation solution concepts and their complexity.
Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (1987) proved that Markov Decision Processes are P-
complete and thus solvable in polynomial time:
Theorem 3.4.1 (Complexity of a Markov Decision Process). The Markov Decision
Process problem is P-complete in all three cases, finite horizon, discounted and average
cost.
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Therefore, the theoretical computational complexity of the Q-Strategy concept is P-
complete, and the complexity of practical implementation is discussed as follows.
Currently, the Q-Strategy is provided with an in memory implementation. The
multi-armed state machine for the management of Q-Strategy ’s states descriptions
is implemented with Hashtable, which includes a O(1) complexity for lookup, add,
update and delete states. Rare events like resizing the Hashtable add an additional
short-time complexity of O(n) with the number of n states that can be significantly
reduced in average when selecting an appropriate initial size of the table and a table
size improvement policy.
The actions of each state are organized in a max-Heap data structure, implemented
with the UpdatablePriorityQueue class. A max-Heap data structure is an efficient
implementation of a priority queue, where the top element has the highest value and
all other elements are ordered in a binary tree form, where the last element has the
lowest value (Sedgewick and Wayne, 2010). Moreover, the UpdatablePriorityQueue
implementation allows the cumulative reward values of the associated actions to
be updated dynamically. The dynamic update refers to the fact that the updated
cumulative rewards of the associated actions have to be reordered in cases where
consistency of the max-Heap data structure is violated. This implementation allows
a very efficient search for the best action since this action has the highest cumulative
reward, therefore it is the first element in the max-Heap and accessible in O(1).
Moreover, during the Exploitation Phase the UpdatablePriorityQueue will deliver and
update actions close to the top element with an average lookup and update complexity
of O(1). During the Exploration Phase, the lookup and update operations can have
O(logn) complexity in the worst case scenario.
3.4.3.7 Critical View
The aim of the Q-Strategy is to enable agents to perform quasi real-time decisions
on bid generation processes for their applications or computing services, which is
an important issue for the emerging markets in computing services (Amazon, 2010a;
TheCloudMarket, 2010). The Q-Strategy provides a theoretical and architectural
solution concept, which is applicable, but not limited to a market-based scheduling
domain. A further advantage of the Q-Strategy is that it can work without public
information, which is not the case for bidding strategies like ZIP and GD that only
work when public information of other agents’ actions is available. Therefore, Q-
Strategy is able to adapt to local information with regard to states, actions and their
received rewards. The application scenario of the Q-Strategy is motivated by the fact
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that the environment is not fully transparent and agents do not share their private
information with each other. Moreover, the Q-Strategy allows actions and their cu-
mulative rewards to be learned over time for different states and scoring functions.
The Q-Strategy is designed to be flexible and adaptable in dynamic environments, as
well as implemented to be computationally tractable with P-complete complexity.
However, in the worst case scenario, reinforcement learning techniques may produce
outcomes with higher opportunity costs (i.e., lower rewards) at the beginning, but
adapt to optimal decisions over time (Watkins and Dayan, 1992a; Tesauro, 2007).
The convergence of Q-Learning to optimal values over time is shown theoretically
only in stationary settings of one agent or in cooperative games (Bowling, 2000).
Reinforcement learning algorithms also have to implement efficient trade-offs between
exploration and exploitation in order to i) learn from and exploit the experience, but
also to ii) preserve the learning processes in changing environments. Therefore, Q-
Strategy might need to observe a high number of different state-action pairs in order to
derive the optimal states. Such a number could probably be estimated in stationary
environments, but not in dynamic ones. Moreover, the received reward values for
the actions may be noisy, due to the fluctuations in supply and demand over time
and bidding strategies of other agents. The current research shows little evidence of
more realistic and dynamic scenarios in settings with multiple heterogeneous agents,
in which different types of algorithmic bidding strategies are applied (Shoham et al.,
2007; Tesauro and Bredin, 2002).
3.5 Summary
This chapter introduced the general design desiderata for developing bidding strate-
gies, as well as existing bidding strategies for games with perfect and imperfect in-
formation. A set of bidding strategies has been extensively evaluated to determine if
they qualify as candidates for a market-based scheduling domain. There is no bidding
strategy available, which satisfies the design desiderata, in particular, for the target
domain of this work. Therefore, this chapter presents the design and realization of the
novel bidding strategy, Q-Strategy, for the automation of, but not limited to bidding
processes in markets for computing services.
Q-Learning is a generic learning framework, which defines the general relations of
states, actions, rewards and state transitions. In contrast, the Q-Strategy contributes
to state-of-the-art learning-based bidding strategies by i) specifying the state, actions,
goal representations and their transitions explicitly. Q-Strategy ’s state definition al-
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lows heterogeneous trading objects with different scoring functions to be represented,
which are maximized through the actions of the Q-Strategy. In summary, ii) the Q-
Strategy solves a multi-armed bandit problem for trading heterogeneous transaction
objects. Similar “requests for bids” are iii) clustered into unique states, which enable
faster collection of experiences for recurring executions of applications and computing
services. The realization part shows the iv) implementation of Q-Strategy concepts
within a framework for automated bidding called BidGenerator (Section 4.4). The
Q-Strategy is integrated in the communication protocol (Section 5.3) of the BidGen-
erator framework and a system for market-based scheduling for exchanging private,
public and market information (cf. bidding scenario in Section 2.4.4). Finally, v)
the Q-Strategy is designed to act on and fully adapt to local information and past
experiences in dynamic market environments of imperfect information. Steps i) to
v) are properties of the Q-Strategy model. None of the steps are part of the general
Q-Learning framework. Moreover, Q-Strategy is provided with a complexity analysis
of its realization, which confirms its practicability in real application scenarios and
for the investigated domain.
This chapter presented the economic design of an existing and novel bidding strategy.
The next chapter introduces the BidGenerator framework for realizing bidding strate-
gies together with software agents. The latter manages the communication processes
with applications, computing service managers and the target market mechanism
according to a well-defined communication protocol (Chapter 5).
Chapter 4
Architectural Design of a Framework for
Automated Bidding
T
he computing literature has mainly focused on the “brawn” – development of
technical infrastructures and related tools for managing and providing reliable,
secure and distributed computing resources – and less on the “brain” – for automating
their provisioning and purchasing processes efficiently (Foster et al., 2004). Moreover,
mechanisms for market-based scheduling of computing services have been developed,
but there has been less effort put into the development and evaluation of bidding
agents and strategies for the market-based scheduling domain (Broberg et al., 2008;
Chevaleyre et al., 2006; Lubin et al., 2009).
This chapter presents a novel framework for automated bidding called BidGenera-
tor, in which agents and bidding strategies are realized and coexist as independent,
configurable modules. BidGenerator is the solution concept, which aims to answer
Research Question 2 (Design of a Framework for Automated Bidding) in Section 1.2.
The chapter starts with a definition of what a bidding agent is (Section 4.1). Design
desiderata for developing bidding agents from a technical perspective are derived
(Section 4.2) and existing agent frameworks according to the desiderata evaluated
(Section 4.3). Section 4.4 presents the architecture of the BidGenerator framework
and discusses the fulfillment of the desiderata. Section 4.5 is a summary of the
chapter.
4.1 What is a Bidding Agent?
In contrast to the economic definition of a bidding strategy (Section 3.1), the bidding
agent is a software entity, which has a certain and well-defined functionality and is
able to act automatically on behalf of its owner. More formally, Jennings (2001)
defines an agent as:
Definition 4.1.1 (Agent). Agents are “clearly identifiable problem-solving enti-
ties with well-defined boundaries and interfaces; situated (embedded) in a
113 4.1. WHAT IS A BIDDING AGENT?
particular environment over which they have partial control and observability
– they receive inputs related to the state of their environment through sensors and
they act on the environment through effectors; designed to fulfill a specific role –
they have particular objectives to achieve; autonomous – they have control both
over their internal state and over their own behavior; capable of exhibiting flexible
problem-solving behavior in pursuit of their design objectives – being both reac-
tive (able to respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in their environment)
and proactive (able to opportunistically adopt goals and take the initiative).”
This definition gives a clear description of the spectrum of a software agent with
respect to the specific goals that they are designed to fulfill in a specific domain. The
differences between a software application and a software agent are their respective
properties (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995):
• Autonomy. Agents operate without the direct intervention of humans and have
control over their actions and internal state;
• Social Ability. Agents interact with other agents (including institutions, such as
running markets) in the environment via well-defined communication protocols;
• Reactivity. Agents perceive their environment and respond in a timely fashion
to changes that occur in it;
• Proactive. Agents do not simply react to their environment, they are able to
exhibit goal-directed behavior by initiating actions.
Both, Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) as well as Nwana (1996) give clear overview of
agent design, agent architectures and agent languages, which are principles that are
also relevant today, and more recent papers ascribe to the approaches and taxonomies
introduced by these authors. A more recent overview and comparison of existing
frameworks is provided in Section 4.3.
Nwana (1996) defined a taxonomy of agent types – Collaborative agents, Inter-
face agents, Mobile agents, Information/Internet agents, Reactive agents and Hybrid
agents. In the context of this work, the developed bidding agent framework can be
assigned to the type of Hybrid Agents containing interface, information gathering
and collaboration facilities. The Interface Agent (IA) type refers to software agents,
which act and learn autonomously on behalf of their owners. Based on the state of
the environment and given goals, the agents execute delegated tasks autonomously
4.2. DESIGN DESIDERATA 114
by taking appropriate actions in the environment. IAs assist their owners in reaching
a goal and are characterized by their iterative (proactive) and adaptive behavior.
Information (Gathering) Agents (IGA) implement algorithms for the periodic collec-
tion and aggregation of data. In contrast to Web Crawlers and within the context
of market-based scheduling, IGAs implement facilities to collect and aggregate mar-
ket information (volatility, offered computing service types, past and current prices,
market rules, etc.) from various sources and markets. Collaboration Agents (CA) fo-
cus on facilities for message exchange (negotiation or bidding) between other agents
in the environment for reaching a given goal with respect to other agents’ desires
and actions. CAs implement social facilities in terms of communication protocols for
negotiations or bidding, as well as adapt to other agents’ responses.
The aim of the Hybrid Agent type is to reduce complexity by introducing the mod-
ularization of specific types of agent facilities – automatic acting on behalf of the
owners based on their preferences, automatic information gathering and aggregation,
as well as proactive and collaborative facilities by negotiation and bidding.
In an environment for market-based scheduling, where institutions, consumers and
providers are independent and distributed entities, Hybrid Agents seem to offer the
correct type of characteristics to implement an autonomous system. In computing
service markets, Hybrid Agent architectures implement the “brain” and has the po-
tential for effective, flexible and decentralized decision making capabilities. Such
agents need “a robust distributed computing platform that allows them to discover,
acquire, federate, and manage the capabilities necessary to execute their decisions”
(Foster et al., 2004).
In the context of market-based scheduling, a bidding agent is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1.2 (Bidding Agent). A Bidding Agent is a software entity, which
provides well-defined interfaces for instantiating bidding strategies, inter-
faces for information gathering and aggregation, as well as interfaces for
proactive and reactive communication with target market mechanisms or other
agents. Based on the inputs received, the bidding agent maintains an internal state
of the owner’s tasks, and acts and reacts with the environment on the owner’s behalf
by performing decision making actions.
4.2 Design Desiderata
The following design desiderata for agent frameworks in a market-based scheduling
domain are derived from the technical challenges and application requirements pre-
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sented in Section 2.4, as well as from current research.
Desideratum 1 ≺Decoupling of the Market Platform and Bidding Agents
The market platform and BidGenerator must be separated into independent compo-
nents, the first, operated and maintained by an auctioneer, the second, by their owners
– consumers and providers.
A realistic system for market-based scheduling is a decentralized, multi-agent system,
where the market, consumers and providers are autonomous entities. The application
scenarios in Section 2.4 postulate that each of the consumers and providers aim to
use their own bidding agents locally by maintaining control of their realizations and
bidding strategy selections. The agents are decentralized and the communication is
performed asynchronously. Furthermore, there is no central entity, which controls
all the agents, i.e., agents can join and leave the system at any time. Therefore, the
market platform and bidding agent framework must be separated into independent
components, the first, operated and maintained by an auctioneer, the second, by their
owners (Sycara, 1998; Tesauro et al., 2004; Chevaleyre et al., 2006).
Desideratum 2 ≺Methodic Realization of Agents and Bidding Strategies
The BidGenerator must offer methods for realizing agents and bidding strategies.
In order to develop bidding strategies one needs to solve the economic design (Section
3) and technical design issues. The technical design of the bidding agent framework
requires that it provide well-defined implementation methods for both, the bidding
agents and bidding strategies. Based on such a method, consumers and providers
can setup and start their own agents and bidding strategies, reuse existing strategies
or implement new ones. The methods for developing bidding agents and bidding
strategies have to be compatible with existing agent framework standards like FIPA
and MASIF, i.e., share commonly accepted principles and interfaces (Milojicic et al.,
1998; FIPA, 2002b).
Desideratum 3 ≺Using Well-Defined Communication Protocols
The BidGenerator must integrate and use a well-defined communication protocol to
exchange private, public, contract and market information.
In order to communicate with the environment, bidding agents must implement and
utilize well-defined communication protocols. The exchanged messages may have
different formats, which depend on the message direction and communication context,
i.e., between certain components. Moreover, communication protocols set the rules
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for the interaction between bidding agents and the market – e.g., a bidding agent
cannot receive a match without submitting a bid, nor can they submit a bid without
receiving a bid request, etc. The content of a communication protocol (messages) has
to be defined as commonly agreed upon concepts and properties, i.e, in an ontology,
in order to improve the overall acceptance and its integration in the system (Fornara
et al., 2007). In a market-based scheduling context, communication protocols have
to include technical attributes like CPUs, memory, storage and bandwidth, as well
as economic attributes like bid and duration (Windsor et al., 2009; Chevaleyre et al.,
2006).
Desideratum 4 ≺Applicable in a Market-based Scheduling Domain
The BidGenerator must support the automation of purchasing and provisioning pro-
cesses of external computing services from the corresponding markets. Furthermore,
BidGenerator must support simultaneous bid requests for computing services from
consumers or providers (Windsor et al., 2009).
Desideratum 4 might also be valid in other domains. However, in a market-based
scheduling context, the API of the BidGenerator has to offer interfaces for secured
communication, the signing of bids and the processing of service contracts. In gen-
eral, the adopted security, signing and contract mechanisms are more specific for the
market-based scheduling domain than for other domains like mobile services, robotics
and e-commerce.
Desideratum 5 ≺Integrating Market Information Service
The BidGenerator must support the integration of a market information service,
which provides information about other agents’ bids and clearing prices.
Information about available auction mechanism and traded computing services has
to be stored in registries (“green pages”) and made findable through a query language
according to the technical specification required. The BidGenerator has to support
integration with a market information service to query aggregated information of
current, past bids and clearing prices for the required computing services (Brunner
et al., 2008; Borissov et al., 2009a).
Desideratum 6 ≺Supporting Secured and Trusted Communication
The BidGenerator must integrate appropriate security and trust mechanisms when
communicating with the market.
117 4.3. EXISTING AGENT FRAMEWORKS
Privacy, data protection and security has to be ensured with well-defined policies,
which are enforced by an institution since applications like TXTDemand handle
private and sensitive costumer sales data (Windsor et al., 2009). The transfer of
consumer data, as well as bidding processes need to be performed over a secured
communication line. Security in the SORMA system has to be provided through
a certified authentication process, which authorizes consumers and providers to in-
teract with the SORMA market. Moreover, to ensure the legality of all submitted
messages to the market, consumer and provider bids must be signed and validated
before they can be considered as binding and being matched on the market (SORMA,
2008; Nimis et al., 2008, 2009).
These six requirements are the basis for developing and realizing the bidding agent
framework (Section 4.4).
4.3 Existing Agent Frameworks
4.3.1 Selection of Existing Agent Frameworks
There are many agent frameworks in the existing literature and in practice. Some of
them are more general, while others are designed to conduct specific tasks in a specific
domain (mobile agents, agents for robots, e-commerce agents), but only few of them
define interfaces explicitly for implementing bidding strategies and bidding agents
that are applicable in a market-based scheduling domain. The relative straightfor-
ward number of existing surveys for agent frameworks often compare only specific
criteria, provide a comparison for a certain selection of frameworks or are outdated
(Nwana, 1996; Vrba, 2003; Bordini et al., 2006; Such et al., 2009). Vrba (2003)
compares selected agent frameworks for their FIPA compatibility in terms of soft-
ware interfaces and communication protocols, the application of security protocols,
the type of license provided and the programming language of their implementation.
Bordini et al. (2006) provides a brief description of selected agent frameworks without
a direct comparison based on well-defined criteria. Such et al. (2009) focuses on the
security capabilities of agent frameworks. The next two sections provide a detailed
comparison of promising existing agent frameworks with regard to their applicability
in a market-based scheduling domain according to the specified desiderata.
Table 4.1 presents an overview of existing agent frameworks pertaining to a stan-
dardized design method, a communication protocol and license type. Standardiza-
tion efforts like FIPA and MASIF give best practices and policies for developing
multi-agent systems and their interactions (FIPA, 2002b,a; Milojicic et al., 1998).
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Table 4.1: Standardization of agent frameworks. indicates that no explicit infor-
mation was found • indicates partial support of an agent framework property
Framework Standard Communication Protocol License
Compatible Support
FIPA-OS FIPA FIPA ACL Open Source
JADE FIPA FIPA ACL Open Source
Grasshopper FIPA, FIPA ACL, Free for
MASIF MASIF, Non-commercial
Custom Use
Cougaar • Custom Open Source
SHUFFLE FIPA FIPA ACL 
LEAP FIPA FIPA ACL, Open Source
Custom Protocols
CRUMPET FIPA FIPA ACL 
ADK FIPA FIPA ACL Commercial
Aglets MASIF Custom Open Source
JACK • Custom Commercial
MAGMA • Custom Negotiation, 
Auction Protocols
AuctionBot • Custom Auction Protocols 
e-Game • FIPA ACL 
JCAT (JASA) • Custom Auction Protocols Open Source
The FIPA community provides a general framework for developing agents and agent
communication; MASIF has a similar focus, but for the domain of mobile agents.
However, agent frameworks have to be in keeping with these best practices and ex-
tend them with the required additional functionalities.
The analysis excludes agent frameworks for which there is no available documenta-
tion, source code or anymore support, such as the Java Agent Services1 initiative and
1<http://jcp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=087>.
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many older agent platforms like Zeus2 and the Comtec Agent Platform.3
As shown in Table 4.1, many agent frameworks are compliant with the FIPA agent
architecture specification, some comply with MASIF and others do not explicitly
comply with any open standard. FIPA-OS 4 and JADE 5 are reference implementa-
tions of FIPA. For agents running on mobile devices, the LEAP (Bergenti and Poggi,
2002), SHUFFLE (Robles et al., 2001) and CRUMPET (Poslad et al., 2001) projects
offer agent frameworks based on a lightweight version of the FIPA specification and
its communication protocol. In addition, FIPA compatible frameworks often adopt
FIPA’s agent communication language (ACL), which defines a protocol for imple-
menting general agent communication procedures (FIPA, 2002a). Nearly half of the
frameworks analyzed define and implement their own (domain-specific) communica-
tion protocols and provide their source code to the community.
This literature review concentrates onOpen Source agent frameworks that offer public
documentation of their software architecture, components and interface description
in order to evaluate them for an application in a market-based scheduling domain.
4.3.2 Analytical Comparison to the Desiderata
Table 4.2 maps the specified desiderata to the agent frameworks analyzed. The
agent frameworks are evaluated analytically according to their specifications and the
specified desiderata for this work.
Decoupling of Market Platform and Bidding Agents
D1 requires that the market platform and agent frameworks be independent entities;
the first is executed by an institution, and the second by the providers and consumers.
The agent frameworks analyzed can be clustered into generic (e.g., FIPA-based) and
domain-specific frameworks (e.g., mobile services, production robots, e-commerce).
Agent frameworks like FIPA-OS, JADE, Grasshopper, Cougaar and Aglets offer in-
terfaces for implementing generic agents and interaction protocols that can be applied
and reused in different fields (Helsinger et al., 2004). These frameworks do not offer
any methods or interfaces for implementing bidding strategies. JACK offers a generic
agent framework for implementing lightweight and reusable agents, however, JACK
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Table 4.2: Comparison of the agent frameworks. D1 – Decoupling of Market Platform
and Bidding Agents. D2 – Methodic Realization of Agents and Bidding Strategies.
D3 – Communication Protocols. D4 – Market-based Scheduling Domain. D5 –
Integrating Market Information Service. D6 – Secured and Trusted Communication.
indicates explicit support indicates that no explicit information was found or
desideratum is not met. • indicates partial support.
Framework D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
FIPA-OS • •  • • •
JADE • •  • • •
Grasshopper • •  • • •
Cougaar • •  • • •
SHUFFLE • •  • • •
LEAP • •  • • •
CRUMPET • •  • • •
ADK •   •  •
Aglets • •  •  •
JACK • •  •  •
MAGMA  •  •  •
AuctionBot  • • •  •
e-Game  •  •  •
JCAT (JASA)   • •  •
This work      
2001). AuctionBot and e-Game focus on the realization of market platforms and the
implementation of flexible market mechanisms, and offer generic interfaces to connect
external agents (Wurman et al., 1998; Fasli and Michalakopoulos, 2008). The Agent
Development Kit, ADK, focuses on agent design, agent logic and specification of the
communication middleware, but not on interactions with market mechanisms (Xu
and Shatz, 2003).
Only few frameworks, MAGMA and JCAT 6, offer interfaces and methods to imple-
ment both market mechanisms and agents. MAGMA describes an overall infras-
tructure for building agent-based virtual marketplaces (Tsvetovatyy et al., 1997). It
6Used in the Trading Agent Competition (TAC), <http://jcat.sourceforge.net>.
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clearly separates the market from the agents and describes a framework for imple-
menting agents, however, the description remains on an abstract level and further
implementation and application details are missing. The main design goal of JCAT
is to provide a platform for the development and evaluation of market mechanisms
and agent strategies in different tournament scenarios,7 e.g., TAC Travel, CAT, TAC
SCM and TAC Ad Auctions (Cai et al., 2009). The JCAT agent framework provides
interfaces and methods to develop, test and evaluate market mechanisms and bidding
strategies.
Methodic Realization of Agents and Bidding Strategies
Most of the frameworks define interfaces for realizing agent logic, but few focus
on the design and realization of bidding strategies. FIPA-OS, JADE, Grasshopper,
Cougaar and Aglets offer interfaces to model and implement generic agents and their
interactions, but there are no specifications for the realization of bidding strategies.
MAGMA describes a process flow of bidding agents, but does not provide a specifica-
tion of implemented and evaluated bidding strategies and how they coexist with the
agents (Tsvetovatyy et al., 1997). The implementation of ADK agents is modular
and defines the Decision Making, Message Passing and Functional units. The agent’s
logic goals, action plan and knowledge base are part of the Decision Making unit; the
communication interfaces and interaction rules are part of the Message Passing, and
the related low-level functionality is part of the Functional unit. ADK describes the
general concepts of a Decision Making model and applies it in a case study for air
ticket trading, however, Xu and Shatz (2003) presented a proof-of-concept realization
of case study with the associated ADK agent interfaces, but an evaluation of bidding
strategies and decision rules was not a part of their work. e-Game and AuctionBot
focus on the design of market mechanisms and each of them provides platforms to
realize them, but not concrete interfaces or implementations of bidding strategies.
JCAT seems to be the only framework that provides well-defined interfaces to realize
both agents and bidding strategies in a modular way. Furthermore, JCAT imple-
ments state-of-the-art auctions and bidding strategies.
Using Well-Defined Communication Protocols
The most of the analyzed frameworks apply communication protocols, which are
based on FIPA ACL (D3). However, some frameworks define their own custom
communication protocols. The FIPA ACL is the candidate for describing general
agent interactions (FIPA, 2002a). An ACL message specifies a well-defined structure
7<http://tradingagents.org>.
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of concepts. ACL’s performatives specify the intentions of the agents like Propose,
Accept Proposal, Reject Proposal, Confirm, Inform, Query and others. Further con-
cepts model the type of communication between agents like sender, receiver and
conversation-id, the concept content enables the transfer of an encoded message in
a user-defined format. There is a concept called ontology, which is associated with
the content concept of the ACL message and expresses the meaning of the content ’s
data. Finally, the protocol concept defines the rules (semantics) of the interactions
with a specific set and order of ACL messages. However, the specifications for the
ACL concepts, content and protocol, are not finalized and marked as deprecated.8
ACL defines general performatives that support negotiation protocols, but there are
no concrete specifications for auctions, bidding concepts, service level agreements,
payment methods, penalties or support for market-based scheduling. Furthermore,
an ACL message defines many concepts, but with missing details and use cases for
their applications in real systems. For example, transferring an ontology in addition
to the content part decreases the communication tractability of the system since each
of the messages has to be interpreted and validated with an ontology reasoner before
using the actual data of the content.
As one of the novel frameworks, only e-Game supports ACL. Agents connect to the
e-Game platform through TCP and exchange messages using a subset of the ACL
language and its performatives (Fasli and Michalakopoulos, 2008). JCAT is platform
for evaluating bidding strategies and market mechanisms in tournament scenarios.
Communication of agents’ intentions is orchestrated with the CATP communica-
tion protocol (Niu et al., 2009). CATP consists of concepts to connect, send bids
and receive market information, but its overall focus is to model the interaction and
characteristics of tournaments with “performatives” like gamestarting, gamestarted,
gameover, dayopening, dayclosed, roundopened and roundclosed. Furthermore, it does
not provide concrete specification for the transaction objects, therefore, the market
performs only price-based matchmaking, but not matchmaking of technical descrip-
tions as required for computing services.
Applicable in a Market-Based Scheduling Domain
The presented agent platforms are well known and accepted in the agent research.
These frameworks are designed and implemented for a specific domain like mobile ser-
vices, e-commerce and tournaments, however, there is no agent framework available
that is designed and evaluated for a market-based scheduling domain. Theoretically,
8See <http://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00007>. and <http://www.fipa.org/specs/
fipa00025>.
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each agent framework can be extended with the required additional modules, how-
ever, the different frameworks are designed with their own philosophy and goals for
their specific domain, which also affect the design of their interfaces and interaction
protocols, e.g., for tournaments, mobile services or e-commerce. Thus, practically,
an “extension” with the required additional modules is usually required to change
the modules that are already available as well. Moreover, most of these frameworks
are mainly developed and evaluated as proof of concepts, but not realized in real
systems.
Integrating Market Information Service
In a market-based scheduling scenario, agents will need to query information about
available services and their technical specifications. Furthermore, agents will need to
request market information on available actions for these services, as well as current
and past bids in order to derive their bidding strategy for the automated purchasing
and provisioning of the required computing services.
The FIPA ACL specifies concepts for exchanging user-defined information between
agents. Therefore, agent frameworks which adopt an ACL are, in principle, able to
exchange market information, however, only few of the frameworks analyzed define
the exchange of market information explicitly. Therefore, the frameworks that im-
plement the ACL, but do not explicitly define market information, have been marked
as partial support.
ADK integrates the discovery, join, and lookup mechanisms of the Jini9 system, so
agents can find, register for and invoke services and service information. The reg-
istered agents receive market information (e.g., for negotiating airline tickets) from
other agents and can react to them according to the negotiation protocols imple-
mented. In MAGMA, the role of market information management is provided by the
Advertising Server. Agents in MAGMA send ads for what they offer or what they are
looking for. Thus, agents can query the Advertising Server about available ads, their
descriptions and prices. MAGMA discusses the concept of automatic negotiation by
using such market information to decide on the selection of a service based on the
ads that match the agent’s criteria.
As platforms for developing market mechanisms, the AuctionBot, e-Game and JCAT
frameworks explicitly define policies for exchanging market information between the
participating agents in the auctions.
9<http://www.jini.org>.
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Supporting Secured and Trusted Communication
According to D6, consumer data and bids need to be transferred over a secured
communication line, where the security mechanism is a part of the SORMA system.
Moreover, consumer and provider bids must be signed and validated in order to be
considered as binding when they arrive in the order book (Nimis et al., 2008, 2009).
All of the agent frameworks presented integrate security facilities implicitly when
using standard symmetric or asymmetric internet protocols of the ISO security layer
like IPsec, SSL, TLS and Kerberos (Such et al., 2009). These security protocols of-
fer features for the authentication, integrity and encryption of data. FIPA started
working on agent security10 at the end of the 1990s, but a final specification has not
been published yet. Navarro and Borrell (2006) and Demchenko et al. (2007) propose
the application of the OASIS standards eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) and Secure Assertion Markup Language (SAML) in distributed systems
like Grids. Moreover, SAML is adopted and well applied in the Cloud computing
domain (Jansen and Grance, 2011; Jensen et al., 2009). XACML focuses on the
specification of control policies for authorizing users and the enforcement of their ac-
cess rights (read/write) for objects. SAML provides authentication and authorization
mechanisms for users and secured data exchange. SAML is well applied in distributed
systems. One or several identity providers (IDP) are responsible for the management
of users and their access rights. In order to interact with the system, a user has to
authenticate and request an (timely limited) access token (called assertion) from an
IDP and a service provider. Each of the user messages and data is signed with the
user’s personal signature, which is part of the user access token. SAML is assigned
to the so-called single sign-on (SSO) mechanism (Armando et al., 2008).
SAML and XACM are well adopted in distributed systems and in securing the ex-
change of data, however, security and trust mechanisms are still unexplored in con-
junction with market mechanisms and bidding agents for a market-based scheduling
domain, especially for the automation of bidding processes. Moreover, the agent
frameworks investigated in Table 4.2 do not implement either XACML or SAML.
The ADK, e-Game and JCAT agent frameworks are good candidates that satisfy
at least three of the six desiderata specified. However, e-Game focuses entirely on
the design of market mechanisms and its source code implementation is not open.
None of these or the other agent frameworks are specifically modeled or evaluated
for a market-based scheduling domain and none of them implement common secu-
rity mechanisms for distributed systems like SAML and XACML. Moreover, ADK
10<http://www.fipa.org/specs/fipa00020/OC00020A.html>.
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focuses on agent design rather than market mechanisms and JCAT is designed to
be executed in tournament scenarios. Theoretically, each agent framework can be
extended with the missing modules required, however, the different frameworks are
motivated and designed according to the specific goals of their target domains, which
affect the definition and implementation of their interfaces and interaction paradigm.
In practice, extending a framework with additional modules usually requires chang-
ing the existing ones. This work requires an agent framework that is applicable in a
real system for market-based scheduling and that fully satisfies the specified desider-
ata according to the application scenarios in Section 2.4.1 and the SORMA project
(Nimis et al., 2008, 2009). The next section presents the BidGenerator, a novel agent
framework for automated bidding as one of the contributions of this work.
4.4 Architecture of the Bidding Agent Framework
This section presents the logical and dynamic design architecture of the BidGenerator
framework. The design and implementation details of BidGenerator are modeled
with UML, which is common in the agent community and offers various standardized
diagrams for displaying the components, their interdependencies, internal structure
and interactions (Bresciani et al., 2004; Zambonelli et al., 2003; Bauer and Odell,
2005; FIPA, 2007). The presentation of the different aspects of the BidGenerator
framework is organized according to the specified design desiderata by enhancing the
overall bidding scenario in Section 2.4.4.
4.4.1 Decoupling of Market Platform and Bidding Agents
As discussed in Section 2.4.4, the general role of the BidGenerator framework is to
be the binding element between the consumer’s Application Orchestrator and the
market platform or the provider’s Resource Orchestrator and the market platform.
In its role, the BidGenerator provides well-defined interfaces to implement and run
bidding agents. Figure 4.1 presents an integrated view of the BidGenerator and
its related components. This view clearly differentiates between components on the
client side that installed locally on the consumer and provider sides, and the market
platform component Communication Space (CSpace). The latter is executed by a
third-party institution together with the other related components, which are part of
the SORMA market middleware (Nimis et al., 2009). The interfaces, which realize
the communication between BidGenerator and CSpace are implemented within the
market connector component called CSpaceConnector.




















Figure 4.1: A bird’s-eye view of the interactions between BidGenerator and related
components
The clients – Application Orchestrator and the Resource Orchestrator – communicate
directly with BidGenerator by submitting “request for bid” (bidCall) messages with
the required or provided computing service descriptions and economic information
like their valuation, payment method and preferred bidding strategy implementation
that are all part of the preferences message (for more details see Section 5.3.1).
The “match/no-match” messages (from the MarketMessage type) are asynchronously
returned back from the market to the Application Orchestrator and the Resource
Orchestrator through the BidGenerator ’s invocation response web interface:
MarketMessage bidCall(credential:Credential, prefs:PrivateMessage)
Each client’s Web service invocation of bidCall is conducted with a username and
password, which is part of the credential object and validated from the security com-
ponent on each interaction with the SORMA system. The BidGenerator provides
interfaces and implementations for agents and bidding strategies, and generates and
exchanges messages with the market through secured communication line. The Bid-
Generator submits messages to the target market mechanism (e.g., CDA), as part of
the CSpace platform, by implementing the CDA’s InWords11 interface and receives
11messages send from the agents to the market mechanism
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messages with the CDA’s OutWords12 interface.CSpace is the market platform of the
SORMA project, which provides a method and interfaces to implement market pro-
tocols like English, Vickrey and CDA auctions (Nimis et al., 2009). CSpace enables
multiple bidding agents to connect and exchange messages according to the defined
rules of the implemented market mechanism. The concept Conversation of CSpace is
used to emphasize the general specification of the platform for implementing different
market protocols, and also any other protocol where agents are involved and need
to communicate. Security and trust in CSpace are parts of its design philosophy
and architecture. Secured communication is guaranteed by the SORMA system, so
CSpace runs in a secured environment. Trust is one of the main characteristics of the
CSpace platform. Each of the implemented market protocols is an autonomous unit,
which can be uploaded and downloaded in the CSpace platform. Each version of a
market mechanism has a checksum, which can be verified by any of the participants
and controlling institutions. Each of the “conversations” between the market partic-
ipants and market mechanisms are recorded and can be verified by a public notary
institution at any time or replayed in order to prove and validate the outcome of the
matchmaking process. The outcome of the matchmaking results in the creation of
signed and binding contracts between consumers and providers. The design philoso-
phy of the CSpace platform assumes that users will use market protocols that they
trust. CSpace does not explicitly control the types and implementation of the mar-
ket protocols, but it is assumed that in long-term “unfair, malicious and erroneous
protocols are rejected by the users in a similar way as such contracts are rejected in
real life” (Nimis et al., 2009).
4.4.2 Methodic Realization of Agents and Bidding Strategies
The overall architecture of the BidGenerator framework is depicted as a class diagram
in Figure 4.2. It specifies and implements interfaces for five main packages – agent,
strategy, learner, message and security.
The agent package provides core interfaces for implementing (bidding) agents, as well
as reference implementations of consumer and provider agents, which have been devel-
oped, integrated, tested and evaluated as part of the SORMA system. BidGenerator’s
strategy package provides well-defined interfaces for implementing bidding strategies
and a method for a dynamic assignment of a bidding strategy implementation to an
12messages send from the market mechanism to the agents
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agent according to the client’s preferences. The BidGenerator implements state-of-
the-art bidding strategies like ZIP and GD, as well as the Q-Strategy developed here
(Sections 3.3.4 and 3.4). The clients report the class name of the preferred bidding
strategy as part of their PrivateMessages. Each of the realized bidding strategies im-
plements an interface method for receiving and transforming clients’ PrivateMessages
into bid messages (PublicMessages):
PublicMessage generateBid(PrivateMessage request)
The well-defined interfaces of the strategy package allow a straightforward develop-
ment and application of novel user-defined bidding strategies. The learner package
of the BidGenerator framework specifies an interface for realizing well-known learn-
ing algorithms. The separation of the packages’ strategy and learner is motivated
by the fact that a bidding strategy may implement several decision steps of infor-
mation gathering (e.g., current prices, other agents’ bids and matches), information
aggregation and bid generation. Each of these steps may utilize different aggregation
algorithms (clustering, trend analysis, decision tree, reinforcement learning, transfer
learning and others) for estimating the decision parameters of the bid generation
function (Stone, 2007a). The method newState creates or updates state informa-
tion for the executed actions and the received reward, which is called score, and the
bestAction method retrieves the current best action with the highest aggregated13
score from the strategy’s knowledge base.
The message package of the BidGenerator framework offers interfaces and refer-
ence implementations for the exchanged messages in the system. The specifications
of the message types PrivateMessage, PublicMessage, MarketMessage, StateMessage
and MarketInformation are provided in Section 5.3. The MessageImpl class imple-
ments the management of the bidding-related messages for each of the consumer and
provider requests. The reward from each consumer’s or provider’s action is mea-
sured with their defined scoring functions (ConsumerScoringFunction and Provider-
ScoringFunction) and it is used to update the knowledge base of the BidGenerator
framework. The structure of the knowledge base is specific for each of the realized
bidding strategies and depends on the definition of their information model. Cur-
rently, BidGenerator implements an in memory knowledge base, but the information
models of the different bidding strategies can be mapped to persistent storage with
relatively low effort.
13The aggregation function is based on a pre-defined rule of the learning algorithm.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2: BidGenerator architecture
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The last package of the BidGenerator framework is security. This package offers
functionality for credentials management, authentication and the signature of bids,
which are required to communicate with the trusted SORMA middleware. The secu-
rity assertions are requested from a trusted identity provider, which generates proxy
certificates based on the requestor’s credentials.
loop










13: app execution finished
12: submit app for execution




Figure 4.3: BidGenerator’s dynamic view of bidding processes
Figure 4.3 presents a sequence diagram, a dynamic view of bid generation processes
from the consumer’s perspective. The provider case is analogous to the consumer
case. The Application Orchestrator has knowledge about the consumer’s applica-
tions, which require provider machines in order to be executed. The consumer’s
credentials in terms of user name and password, as well as the application’s technical
and economic preferences (privateMessage) are submitted in to the Bidding Agent in
step 1. The Bidding Agent registers the new request in accordance with the prefer-
ences, initializes the preferred Bidding Strategy (steps 2 and 3) and starts the bidding
process (steps 4 to 9). The bid, publicMessage, is generated in step 4 and the result
is sent back to the Bidding Agent in step 5. In step 6 the bid is signed with the
consumer’s signature, which is provided by the trusted identity provider and sent
to the target Auction. The Auction performs technical and economic matchmaking
and response with the successful match, marketMessage, back to the winning Bidding
Agents of the consumer and provider (steps 9, 10 and 11). The marketMessage is
signed by both the consumer and provider. The signatures are automatically verified
from the security component with the trusted identity provider. In the event that
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the consumer or provider bids do not match, they remain stored in the Auction’s
order book and are removed when their limit times expire (step 8). The Applica-
tion Orchestrator receives the allocation (marketMessage) and submits the consumer
application to the allocated machine assigned by the provider’s Service Orchestrator
(step 12). The Application Orchestrator monitors the execution and completion of
its application and at the end, it passes the final state of the application execution
(values of the monitored key performance indicators) to the Bidding Agent (steps
13 and 14). The Bidding Agent uses the state information to calculate the reward
(score) of the application execution (step 15). The score is calculated according to the
consumer’s scoring function. The score value updates the consumer’s knowledge base
according to the selected consumer preferences (step 16), e.g, application’s valuation,
selected bidding strategy, scoring function, etc.
4.4.3 Using Well-Defined Communication Protocols
The BidGenerator integrates a well-defined communication protocol for exchanging
preferences, bids and market messages of technical and economic attributes (Borissov
et al., 2009b). A detailed description of the communication protocol is presented in
Section 5.3.
The interaction with the Auction in CSpace is governed according to well-defined
rules, which define the type and content of the incoming messages to the market and
the outgoing messages from the market. These rules are specified within the Protocol-
InWords and ProtocolOutWords interfaces, which are part of the CSpaceConnector
component (Figure 4.4). These two interfaces are provided for each of the market
mechanisms implemented in CSpace. ProtocolInWords is implemented within the
market mechanism and used by the Bidding Agent to send messages like “bid” and
“info” to the target auction, e.g., CDA. The “bid” command places a binding bid in
the order book, and the “info” command queries market information about the last
N bids, offers and prices for the specified transaction object description, which are
part of the PublicMessage. The types of messages submitted from the market to the
Bidding Agent are specified within the ProtocolOutWords interface. Therefore, the
Bidding Agents implement the ProtocolOutWords interface in order to receive and
react to the market messages.







+register(platformURI : string, port : int) : void
+addNewRequest(message : PrivateMessage) : void
+submit(auctionId : string, command : string, message : PublicMessage) : void
+react(message : MarketMessage) : void
+info(query : string, message : PublicMessage) : void
+handleSubmissionException(messageId : string, exception : MarketException) : string
+finish(state) : void





+getConversation(protocol : Class, id : string) : Conversation
+create(protocol : Class, namespace : string) : Conversation
+setConversationListenerFactory(cfactory : ConversationListenerFactory) : void
<<Interface>>
CSpaceConnection





+create(agent : ProtocolOutWords) : OutWordListener
<<Interface>>
ConversationListenerFactory
+ConversationListener(address : string, port : int)











notifies agent on message arrival
creates
creates
Figure 4.4: BidGenerator communication components
4.4.4 Applicable in a Market-based Scheduling Domain
BidGenerator is a general framework for implementing agents, bidding strategies and
their interactions with market mechanisms. However, it integrates a communication
protocol and a security mechanism, which are specific to a market-based scheduling
domain. The message types of SORMA’s communication protocol contain technical
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attributes for describing computing service configurations, e.g., for CPU, memory
and storage. Borissov et al. (2009b) demonstrated a mechanism for creating service
level agreements of technical and economic attributes based on a specified commu-
nication protocol. Moreover, the BidGenerator was integrated, tested and evaluated
in the SORMA system according to the application scenarios presented in Section
2.4.1.
SAML is the integrated security protocol in SORMA. As a single-sign-on service,
SAML is applicable in any distributed system, which requires trusted authentication
and authorization.14 BidGenerator is especially designed for a market-based schedul-
ing domain by realizing interfaces for secured single sign-on authentication and the
exchange of signed bids and matches in that domain.
4.4.5 Integrating Market Information Service
Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) discuss the importance of market information to
deduce initial prices and optimal trading times for the demanded or offered transac-
tion objects in a market. Sophisticated bidding strategies can be designed to perform
common trend extrapolation methods for prices and submission times in order to op-
timize bidding processes (Borissov et al., 2009a). Well-known bidding strategies like
ZIP and GD generate their bids from algorithms, which aggregate market informa-
tion of current and past bids and prices (Vytelingum et al., 2008; Gjerstad, 2003;
Das et al., 2001). Therefore, the information provided by market mechanisms is im-
portant for the design of bidding agents and strategies. In the context of SORMA,
there are two types of market information – MarketMessage and MarketInforma-
tion. MarketMessage is the market message that is created when there is a match
between a consumer and provider bids. MarketMessage is private and available only
to the respective consumers and providers; other agents do not have access to it.
The MarketInformation message contains the id of the auction and lists of the last
N consumers’ and providers’ bids and prices for the target transaction object.
In order to submit a bid, the agent has to know the id of the auction mechanism
that trades the desired transaction object type (e.g., computing service with 1 CPU,
10GB memory and 64GB storage). The auction id is requested with the info method,
which queries the market platform (CSpace) for available auctions that match the
technical description in the attached PublicMessage. The response from this query
14SAML is also adopted in the Google’s AppEngine: <http://code.google.com/googleapps/
domain/sso/saml_reference_implementation.html>.
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is returned with the handleInfoResponse method as part of the MarketInformation
message.
void info(string query, PublicMessage message) : void
void handleInfoResponse(MarketInformation info)
Furthermore, market information of other agents’ bids and prices is also provided with
the info method for the specified technical description in PublicMessage and a query,
which requests the last N bids and prices for the target transaction object (Section
5.3.5). The MarketInformation returns empty lists in case there is not a running
auction for the requested transaction object type. The info and handleInfoResponse
methods are non-blocking, thus the bidding agent can perform further consumer or
provider requests until the response from the market is received.
void submit(string auctionId, string command, PublicMessage message)
void react(MarketMessage message)
Bidding agents in BidGenerator implement the submission of bids (PublicMessage)
and the reaction of matches (MarketMessage) with the submit and react methods of
the agent interface. Similar to the info method, these methods are executed asyn-
chronously so that the bidding agent can proceed with the bid generation processes
of the other requests.
4.4.6 Supporting Secured and Trusted Communication
SORMA’s security component provides a single sign-on mechanism for authenticating
consumers’ and providers’ bidding agents to communicate with the trusted SORMA
market middleware. The security component is designed to provide distributed iden-
tity management in order to prevent single points of failures and to be applied in
different geographic regions and their specific (legal) policies. The distributed single
sign-on identity management in SORMA was implemented with the SAML protocol
(SORMA, 2008; Nimis et al., 2009). The identities of the consumers and providers
are stored and managed by (distributed) identity providers (idP). Before a consumer
or provider can communicate with the SORMA market middleware it has to au-
thenticate with the idP service. The idP issues the requester a security token called
SAMLAssertion, which is unique and limited in time, and allows the requester to
identify and communicate with the SORMA market middleware. Moreover, the idP
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Figure 4.5: BidGenerator security integration
creates a unique signature for the requester, which is used to sign the submitted
messages to binding and legal bids, as well as contracts.
The overall security process in the SORMA system is depicted as a sequence diagram
in Figure 4.5 and complementary to Figure 4.3, but which focuses on the implemented
security and trust mechanism. In step 1, the Application Orchestrator invokes the
Bidding Agent with the submission of its PrivateMessage and credentials (user name
and password). In step 2, the Bidding Agent uses the credentials to authenticate the
requester with the idP and receives the required security token and signature to com-
municate with the SORMA market middleware. Based on the received samlAssertion
and signature for the requester, the Bidding Agent signs the generated bid. In step
5, the signed PublicMessage and samlAssertion are submitted to the Auction. The
Auction validates the bid submission with the bidder’s samlAssertion by invoking the
validate method of the idP (step 6). The provider returns true if the samlAssertion
is valid and false, if not (step 7). If false, the bidder’s PrivateMessage is canceled by
the Auction and not considered in the matchmaking process. The Auction performs
an economic and technical matchmaking of signed consumer and provider bids (step
8). When there is a match, the Contract Management creates a contract of the Mar-
ketMessage provided by the Auction and signs the MarketMessage with the target
consumer and provider signatures (step 9). The signed MarketMessage is returned
back to the Application Orchestrator and Service Orchestrator through their Bidding
Agents (steps 10, 11 and 12). The Application Orchestrator submits the target appli-
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cation to the provider’s Service Orchestrator together with the signed MarketMessage
and the consumer’s samlAssertion (step 13). The Service Orchestrator validates the
consumer’s samlAssertion with the idP and its own copy of the signed MarketMes-
sage (step 14). The Service Orchestrator deploys and executes the application when
the idP response is true (step 15). When the idP validation response is false, the
Service Orchestrator cancels the procedure of the consumer request.
4.5 Summary
This chapter presented the architecture of the BidGenerator framework, which en-
ables a coexisting design and realization of agents and bidding strategies. The Bid-
Generator framework integrates facilities for information gathering and aggregation,
as well as proactive and reactive communication with market mechanisms or other
agents (cf. Definition 4.1.2). The decision making processes for trading transaction
objects are executed with the selected bidding strategy, which is part of the Bid-
Generator ’s strategy pool. The chapter starts with the specification of the design
desiderata for developing bidding agents in a market-based scheduling domain. The
analysis of existing agent frameworks shows that there is no available framework,
which satisfies the desiderata.
The BidGenerator provides clear interfaces for implementing agents and bidding
strategies. The interfaces of the BidGenerator framework are consistent with FIPA’s
reference specifications for agent design and communication (FIPA, 2002b). Adequate
methods like register, submit, info and react ease the development of (bidding) agents
with the BidGenerator framework. The BidGenerator is executed as a stand-alone
component on the provider and consumer side, which is decoupled from the market
platform (D1). Together with D1, D2 allows consumers and providers to implement
and configure their own agents and bidding strategies, and execute them in their
private environments according to their preferences. Furthermore, the BidGenera-
tor provides a realization of the specified interfaces and implements state-of-the-art
bidding strategies and the Q-Strategy. The bidding agents of BidGenerator commu-
nicate with the market platform according to a well-defined communication protocol
(D3). The communication interface is implemented as part of the CSpaceConnector
component and the communication protocol is specified in Section 5.3. The Bid-
Generator ’s architecture is specifically constructed for application in a market-based
scheduling domain (D4). This consideration also affects the design, integration and
realization of the related market information service (D5), as well as the security
and trust mechanism (D6). Moreover, the BidGenerator framework was developed,
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integrated, tested and evaluated as part of the SORMA system. A detailed technical
analysis of the BidGenerator ’s role in SORMA, as well as a performance analysis of
the integrated components is presented in Chapter 7.
Chapter 5
Communication Protocols in Computing Service
Markets
T
he previous chapter presented the architecture of the BidGenerator framework.
This chapter focuses on the design and realization of the communication protocol
for agent interactions and messaging as part of Research Question 3 (Communication
Protocols) in Section 1.2.
Communication protocols are core design issues in computing systems. In a market
context, communication protocols define the interfaces for the message exchange,
the rules for timing, bidding, information revelation and clearing, which are passed
between the agents or related software components (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994;
Wurman, 2001). Examples of communication methods are bid, update-bid, match
and info; example rules are the bidding constraints in terms of value ranges, the
visibility of bids to other agents and the right of bid withdrawal. In a market-based
scheduling context, a communication protocol (also called bidding language here)
defines the content and format of the exchanged messages in terms of technical and
economic attributes. Moreover, in a multi-agent environment, such data formats
have to be syntactically and semantically well defined in order to reach a common
understanding, wide acceptance and standardization.
Section 5.1 derives design desiderata for communication protocols in a market-based
scheduling context. Section 5.2 presents existing communication protocols and com-
pares them with the introduced desiderata. Section 5.3 presents a novel message
protocol for market-based scheduling as one of the main contributions of this work.
Section 5.4 formalizes the adopted matchmaking mechanism for the bids. Matchmak-
ing mechanisms are not a part of the research of this work, however, they are part of
the SORMA market (Nimis et al., 2009). Section 5.6 discusses extensions to support
combinatorial bids for additional market-based scheduling scenarios and Section 5.7
summarizes the chapter.
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5.1 Design Desiderata
The efficiency of the communication process depends on the number of exchanges
required to reach an agreement between two parties (Endriss and Maudet, 2004). In
a negotiation scenario, the exchange processes include communication calls like pro-
pose, accept, reject and deal. Therefore, the effort for reaching an agreement would
require at least three communication calls between two parties (A sends a propose
call to B, B sends an accept call to A, A sends a deal call to B). The number of
required communication calls also depends on consumers’ and providers’ valuations,
their bidding strategies and technical descriptions of the demanded and provided com-
puting services. In a double auction mechanism, the number of communication calls
can be reduced to two – bid and match. In a distributed scenario for market-based
scheduling it is crucial to design a communication protocol which is Communication-
ally Tractable, i.e., efficient in the number of exchanged messages enabling efficient
matchmaking capabilities.
The following design desiderata are derived from the application scenarios in Section
2.4.1, the technical challenges in Section 2.4.2, the bidding scenario in Section 2.4
and from the respective literature.
Desideratum 1 ≺Expressing Economic and Technical Preferences
Bidding languages for market-based scheduling must allow for the expression of pref-
erences, which consists of both technical and economic attributes.
The expressiveness and simplicity of a bidding language in a market-based scheduling
context depends on the level of abstraction selected (e.g., ISO/OSI reference model;
IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) for the design of the specific language. For example, the number
of technical attributes can be significantly reduced by abstracting computing service
characteristics like CPU architecture, CPU frequency, cache, and memory through
performance benchmarks of test applications (Jain, 1991; Ostermann et al., 2010).
Furthermore, the expressiveness and simplicity of a bidding language depends on
whether the market mechanism supports atomic or combinatorial bids, where the
latter introduces additional logical primitives like XOR, OR, AND and combinations
thereof by way of preferences (Nisan, 2006). On the one hand, the expressiveness
of a bidding language determines the complexity for the bidding parties to specify
their preferences, on the other hand, it determines the complexity for matchmaking
bids, which is an NP-Hard problem in the combinatorial case (Parsons and Klein,
2009). The specified application scenarios in Section 2.4 demand a bidding language
for exchanging technical and economic attributes, which are combined in a common
message format.
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Desideratum 2 ≺Separation of Private, Public and Market Messages
Bidding languages for market-based scheduling must support the specification of dif-
ferent message types for exchanging private, public, contract and market information.
Economic theory distinguishes between goods with a common value to all agents like
a USB stick with 16 GB of storage space and those with private values, i.e., the
value of a good differs from agent to agent (Lomuscio et al., 2003; Collins et al.,
1998). Therefore, valuations for goods may be common or private knowledge. In
a market-based scheduling scenario, different providers offer computing services on
different hardware infrastructures that vary in the quality of service; and consumers
also have different applications and configuration requirements for computing ser-
vices.1 In the case of private valuations, agents specify their own scoring functions
and generate their bids according to their selected bidding strategy. The agent’s
outcome is measured according to the rewards received as a result of their actions
and scoring functions. The bids of the consumers and providers are functions of their
private valuations (Nisan, 2006). The bids are submitted to the market, therefore,
they are marked as public. Agents’ bid generation functions may also take current
market information about other agents’ bids and matches into account (Lomuscio
et al., 2003). Furthermore, the agents may also exploit their experiences in past in-
teractions with the bid generation function. Thus, markets for computing services
have to offer message formats for exchanging market information on current and past
bids, and clearing prices.
Desideratum 3 ≺Support the Creation of Service Contracts
Bidding languages for market-based scheduling must support the creation of legally
binding service contracts.
The result of a matchmaking process in a system for market-based scheduling is the
creation of the service contract (service level agreement) between a consumer and a
provider. A service level agreement has to include information about the duration of
an application, the duration of the computing service provided, the payment method
and information about compensation payments, also called penalties (Windsor et al.,
2009). The payment method specifies the rules and type of the payments payment,
such as prepayment, post-payment, pay per use and subscription (Windsor et al.,
1Symantec (2008) reported that, on average, companies work with more than one thousand
applications; almost all of the computing centers on the Top500 list (<www.top500.org>) are built
with different hardware specifications.
141 5.1. DESIGN DESIDERATA
2009; Weinhardt et al., 2009). The penalty part of a contract specifies the formalism
for calculating penalty payments if a contract is not fulfilled (Kephart and Chess,
2003; Becker et al., 2008). Contracts are legal entities and require the signature of
both the target consumer and target provider in order to be considered legally binding
(see also Desideratum 6 in Section 4.2).
Desideratum 4 ≺Providing Semantic Descriptions of Market Concepts
Bidding languages for market-based scheduling must provide a machine-readable se-
mantic description for each of the adopted domain concepts and relations as part of
their technical and economic attributes.
Desideratum 2 requires that information that is available only to owners (private),
submitted to the market (public), and the market’s response (a match or informa-
tion about other agents’ bids and matches) be clearly specified and separate. These
message types include concepts with different semantics like valuation (private), bid
(public) and clearing price (match). The different message types need to be well
defined not only in structured models for the exchange of data like in XML, but also
semantically in order to enable a common understanding of the machine-processable
data in distributed complex systems for market-based scheduling.
An ontology provides a structured description of the protocol’s concepts and relations
that can be read by machines and humans. A formal description of the semantics
of market concepts adopted in communication protocols is crucial to make sure that
they understand each other, as well as to ensure their interoperability, verification,
and integration in existing and new components. This is especially important for
interdisciplinary research in the area of multi-agent systems and market mechanisms.
The definition of domain ontologies in complex systems facilitates software engineer-
ing and integration processes in terms of a clear mapping between communication
protocols and components’ concepts in a complex distributed system, interoperabil-
ity support through clearly structured and shared knowledge, reusability of already
defined concepts, verification against existing concepts and their relations in other
ontologies (Gasević et al., 2009; Tran and Low, 2008; Tamma et al., 2005). A best
practice in ontology design is to map the ontology concepts of a market-based schedul-
ing domain to concepts of well-known upper ontologies like OpenCyc (Mascardi et al.,
2007). Modern semantic technologies like SAWSDL2 enable the coexistence of XML-
based data models and their explicit specification in ontologies (Lathem et al., 2007;
2Semantic Annotations for WSDL, <http://www.w3.org/TR/sawsdl>.
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Kopecky et al., 2007). On the one hand, this enables efficient data transfer with
commonly applied XML technologies; on the other hand, it enables reasoning and
efficient integration with other data models and their ontologies.
5.2 Existing Communication Protocols
Table 5.1 shows a selection of prominent communication protocols, which represent
the agent, negotiation and bidding domains. The communication protocols are ana-
lytically compared according to the derived design desiderata.
Table 5.1: Comparison of communication protocols. D1 – Economic and Technical
Preferences. D2 – Separation of Private, Public and Market Messages. D3 – Creation
of Service Contracts. D4 – Semantic Descriptions of Market Concepts. indicates
explicit support. indicates that no explicit information was found or desideratum
is not met. • indicates partial support.
Communication Protocol D1 D2 D3 D4
ACL •   •
CATP •  • 
ClassAds •   
JSDL/JDL/GLUE/RSL •   
CIM •   •
OVF/SDD •   
WS-Agreement    
Nisan (2006) •   
MACE   • 
Vilajosana et al. (2009)    
This work    
5.2.1 Selection of the Communication Protocols
FIPA’s Agent Communication Language (ACL) is a general reference specification
for designing and implementing the communication interfaces between agents in a
multi-agent system (Labrou et al., 1999). ACL defines the usage of performatives,
which rule the intentions of the agents. Built-in performatives like Propose, Accept
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Proposal, Reject Proposal and Confirm can be used in a negotiation scenario, but
they are not adequate for an auction scenario. However, it is a reference specification
from the agent community and thus included for the analytical evaluation.
The Market Design Tournament of the Trading Agent Competition, called CAT, de-
fines its own communication protocol, which is called CATP (Niu et al., 2009). CATP
allows the trading clients to be connected to the CAT server and trading data for the
defined tournament scenario to be exchanged. CATP is the communication protocol
that is currently applied in the CAT multi-agent system and therefore selected for
analysis.
ClassAds is a job description language for matching job requests to machine descrip-
tions used, used in the Condor’s3 cluster management system (Liu and Foster, 2004).
Languages like Job Submission Description Language (JSDL), GLUE Schema, Re-
source Specification Language, Job Definition Language and Resource Specification
Language have been widely adopted as a technical resource and job description lan-
guage in Grid projects like Globus Toolkit and EGEE (Andreetto et al., 2010; Laure
et al., 2006; Smirnova, 2009). The Common Information Model (CIM ) is a DMTF
standard, which offers a detailed technical description of the information concepts
and their relations in computing systems (DMTF, 2010b). The Open Virtualization
Format (OVF) is a DMTF initiative for configuring and describing virtual machines,
as well as the deployment procedure of the required applications. In contrast to
OVF, the OASIS Solution Deployment Descriptor only focuses on the deployment
and configuration procedure of software components (Galán et al., 2009). All of these
languages are currently used for expressing technical requirements and configurations.
TheWS-Agreement is a established “standard” in the Grid community for negotiating
and establishing service level agreements (Andrieux et al., 2007). The WS-Agreement
framework provides an abstract framework with core concepts for supporting the ne-
gotiations of key performance indicators, as well as price and penalty constraints,
rather than concrete specifications on how to realize them in a real world setting.
Moreover, the general framework of the WS-Agreement can be used as a wrapper to
any of the previously discussed job description languages. Other communication pro-
tocols for negotiating service level agreements are the Contract Net Protocol, WSLA,
SLAng and RBSLA (Smith, 1980; Paurobally et al., 2007; Paschke et al., 2005). How-
ever, WS-Agreement remains the current OGF proposal for service level agreements
and has been generally applied in past and current research projects (Kübert et al.,
2011).
3<http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor/description.html>.
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Nisan (2006) specifies a theoretical framework for bidding in combinatorial auctions.
Consumers and providers can express combinatorial bids by using OR, AND and
XOR operators on Atomic Bids. An Atomic Bid contains the number of items and
valuation of the transaction object provided or demand.
Schnizler (2008) specified the Multi-Attributive Combinatorial Exchange language,
which aims to define atomic bids not just for generic items, but also for a set of
quality of service (QoS) and time attributes. QoS attributes can represent technical
information like CPU, memory and storage. The time attributes specify the start
and end times for executing a job, which are used to solve problems that arise in
determining a winner for offline and combinatorial bids for a given set of consumer
and provider bids.
Vilajosana et al. (2009) aim to specify a communication protocol, which is designed
for a market-based scheduling domain and combinatorial auctions. However, the
protocol defines its own technical attributes rather than reusing commonly accepted
specifications like JSDL and GLUE. Furthermore, its specifications have not been
evaluated.
5.2.2 Analytical Comparison to the Desiderata
Expressing Economic and Technical Preferences
D1 is partially supported by most communication protocols. Partially means, the
protocol specifies either technical or economic attributes for the description of trans-
action objects (i.e., computing services), but not both of them. An ACL does not
provide concrete support for auctions or concrete specification for technical attributes,
but its general framework enables it to be applied as a wrapper to existing languages
like JSDL. However, it requires extensions and additional rule specifications in order
to be applied in auction scenarios. Communication protocols like CATP and Nisan
(2006) specify economic attributes for bidding in tournaments and in combinatorial
auctions. Therefore, CATP and Nisan (2006) cover only half of the desiderata and are
designed for other domain scenarios, not for the scenario investigated in this work.
ClassAds, JSDL, CIM, OVF and the other languages in the second cluster of Ta-
ble 5.1 specify only the technical attributes for describing technical requirements
of jobs or descriptions for the configuration and deployment of jobs to computing
services. These communication protocols are good candidates to be wrapped into
general frameworks with economic attributes with respect to the target adoption
scenario. Only WS-Agreement, MACE and Vilajosana et al. (2009) fully satisfy
D1. As a general framework for negotiations, a WS-Agreement can wrap any of the
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technical description languages. However, a WS-Agreement is designed mainly for
negotiations rather than for auctions. Moreover, as a general framework, the WS-
Agreement includes attributes for structuring economic information like valuation,
key performance indicators and penalties, however, it does not specify concrete in-
stances or evaluate real use cases of them.
MACE supports the specification of both technical and economic attributes for com-
puting services. As a framework, it can adopt technical attributes from technical
description languages like JSDL and GLUE. Vilajosana et al. (2009) specify a commu-
nication protocol for the market-based scheduling of computing services. However, it
is designed for combinatorial auctions and defines its own technical attributes, which
are different from the commonly applied JSDL and GLUE specifications.
Separation of Private, Public and Market Messages
None of the communication protocols analyzed provide a model, which clearly sep-
arate the private, public and market messages submitted between the applications,
computing services, agents and the market. Theoretically, each of the communica-
tion protocols can be extended to do this with the required additional attributes and
rules, however, the different communication protocols are designed with their own
philosophy and goals for their specific domain. Redesigning or modifying them with
extensions will affect the completeness of the already defined attributes and original
application model.
Support for the Creation of Service Contracts
Most communication protocols do not provide a well-defined support for the cre-
ation of service contracts as indicated in D3. The CATP protocol defines the notion
of transaction, which identifies a match between two bids through the creation of
a transaction id from the bids’ ids (e.g., Id: ask3, bid2 ), as well as with the price
statement (Value: 90 ). The CATP transaction is suitable for the CAT tournament
scenario, but limited for the creation of service contracts in a market-based scheduling
domain. MACE specifies a winner determination mechanism for combinatorial set-
tings, however, a method for the creation and exchange of service contracts is neither
suggested nor implemented. Only a WS-Agreement provides a well-defined support
for negotiation and creation of a contract. However, the WS-Agreement only defines
economic attributes with a negotiation-specific semantic. Auction-specific attributes
like bid, clearing price and limit time are missing. A WS-Agreement does not in-
clude attributes for expressing payment information like prepayment, post-payment
and account information. Moreover, a method for consumers and providers to sign
WS-Agreement contracts to establish a legally binding agreement is not proposed.
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Providing Clear Semantic Descriptions of Market Concepts
Most communication protocols do not provide explicit specification of an ontology,
i.e. a formal semantic model of the utilized information concepts and their relations,
as required in D4. Most of these protocols are modeled in an XML schema and
the information concepts are specified as technical documentation, which is not in a
machine-interpretable format unlike an ontology language like OWL4.
The ACL and CIM are the only communication protocols in Table 5.1, which ex-
plicitly support the definition of ontologies or are modeled as an ontology. The ACL
language consists of concepts for defining and exchanging ontologies, as well as con-
cepts for their logical validation. CIM is an extensive reference model for describing
the information concepts and their relations in the domain of computing systems, such
as their applications, devices, components and subsystems (DMTF, 2010b). Quirol-
gico et al. (2004) proposed a model to represent CIM as a formal ontology. However,
these ontologies partially support the domain of this work and do not explicitly define
the required market concepts, their relations and rules in a market-based scheduling
exchange.
5.3 MX/CS: Message Exchange in Computing Service Mar-
kets
Figure 5.1 presents the overall communication architecture of MX/CS (cf. bidding
scenario in Section 2.4.4).
Calls 1, 2 and 5 are invocation requests of the message types PrivateMessage (“request
for bid”) and PublicMessage (bid), where 3 and 4 are the returned result (MarketMes-
sage) of the invocation requests. A represents the invocation and response messages
of the Market Information Service, which provides market information of the last N
bids and clearing prices.
For instance, the Application Orchestrator instance invokes the interface method
bidCall(credential, privateMessage) of BidGenerator in order to submit an applica-
tion’s privateMessage together with the consumer’s credentials. The BidGenerator
instantiates the selected bidding strategy, invokes the security component to receive
a valid samlAssertion and a digital signature (cf. Section 4.4.6), generates a bid,
signs and submits it (privateMessage) to the market. When there is a match, the
4Web Ontology Language.


































































































































































































































Figure 5.1: Communication protocols for the automated provisioning and usage of
computing services
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signed market contracts (marketMessage) are sent back to the Application Orches-
trator through its BidGenerator. For each finished application, the Application Or-
chestrator sends the application’s final monitoring data (stateMessage) using the
BidGenerator ’s terminate interface method. The data in stateMessage updates the
knowledge base of BidGenerator, which is used by the implemented bidding strate-
gies. These processes are similar for the provider side. The following sections specify
the message types introduced in detail.
5.3.1 Private Message
According to Figure 5.1 (step 1), the consumer’s Application Orchestrator and provider’s
Service Orchestrator submit a PrivateMessage to their own BidGenerators. The Pri-
vateMessage models a scenario where consumers and providers do not reveal their true
valuations and bidding strategies for the demanded or supplied transaction object.
However, the consumers and providers trust their own BidGenerator, which imple-
ments agents and a pool of different bidding strategies. Therefore, a PrivateMessage
of type Pi for an Application Orchestrator or a Service Orchestrator i has the follow-
ing structure:
Pi = {vi, si, zi, ci,Λi,Πi,Δi,Ωi, Ui} (5.1)
vi represents the consumer or provider valuation per unit of time (hour) for the re-
quested or provided computing service. si is the identifier (class name) of the bidding
strategy that is implemented within the BidGenerator framework. The si identifier
allows the dynamic initialization of bidding strategies from the pool. zi describes
the expiration time of the bid in the order book. zi plays a strategic role in bidding
strategies for call markets where the market clearing is executed in time intervals,
which are known to the agents (Gjerstad, 2003; Vytelingum et al., 2008; Schvartzman
and Wellman, 2009). Therefore, zi is obligatory for consumers and providers. ci is
the estimated maximum time, which is required for the consumer application (Ali
et al., 2004). In the case of providers, ci is the time (in hours) that a computing ser-
vice is available on the market5. Λi specifies the type of computing service required,
5An initialization with infinite means that the computing service has no availability constraints
and can be matched with any consumer bid. A time constraint limits the availability of the com-
puting service. For example, a provider X knows that her/his cluster of 20 machines will be idle
during the next 10 hours, but needed thereafter; and X decides to supply the 20 idle machines to
the market for the next 10 hours. In this case, the provider bids are only matched to consumer
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“BATCH” or “WEBSERVICE”. In the first case, the application is deployed to the
computing service through a secured network connection (“Batch Supply Chain Data
Analysis” scenario in Section 2.4.1.1). In the second case, the application is a Web
service, which is deployed on an isolated web container environment like Tomcat or
Jetty that runs on a dedicated computing service (“Interactive Sensor Data Analysis
Scenario” in Section 2.4.1.2). The payment method Πi indicates whether the pay-
ment should be executed “BEFORE” deployment of the application (prepayment),
“AFTER” the execution of the application (post-payment) or “EITHER.” Πi is oblig-
atory for consumers and is set to “EITHER” as a default. Payment information is
required by SORMA’s Payment component and enforced by SLA Enforcement as
part of the Contract Management component (Nimis et al., 2009).
Δi specifies the name of the selected penalty function for calculating the compensa-
tion when a contract is not fulfilled. Becker et al. (2008) present a fair and incentive
compatible penalty function for computing markets. Even though penalty functions
are not part of this research, they are crucial for computing service markets since they
offer an additional mechanism for establishing trust, reliability and acceptability for
such types of markets.
Ωi contains the Technical Description of the required or provided computing service.
The specification of Technical Description is left open intentionally since the aim of
MX/CS is to specify a bidding language for computing service markets by reusing
common XML-based languages like JSDL, GLUE or OVF for technical descriptions,
deployments and configurations. Finally, Ui contains the unique identification of the
selected scoring function.
Valuation vi, bidding strategy si and Ui are private attributes, which are known
only to the owner’s BidGenerator. The remaining elements are transformed into a
PublicMessage, which is the bid submitted to the market. Since this work does not
include the research on penalty functions, the Δi element is optional, however, it was
an important requirement in the SORMA scenarios. The Ωi is implemented with
a commonly applied computing service description language like JSDL. The access
URI to the offered computing service is provided as part of the provider’s Ωi and
added to the contract on matches.
applications that do not violate the specified time constraint.
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5.3.2 State Message
A stateMessage transfers the final state information about an executed application
or finished computing service usage. This information is used as feedback for con-
sumers’ and providers’ knowledge bases and utilized by their bidding strategies. It is
composed of two main parts, theScoringFunction Ui and related Parameters :
Si = (Ui, {b1, · · · , bn}) (5.2)
In order to make scoring functions configurable, i.e., not hardcoded in the system,
they are encoded in a Lisp-like syntax and stored in the BidGenerator ’s knowledge
base with an associated unique name. Rule engines like JESS 6 or Drools7 are applied
for loading and processing the scoring function Ui on runtimes with its associated
attributes (b1 · · · bk) ∈ Bi, which are part of the overall attribute definition. The at-
tributes and values for the scoring function are transferred in the Parameters element
of the stateMessage.
minCompletionT imeAndPayment(va, Fs,a, πs,a, ca) = vaFs,a + πs,aca (5.3)
The Equation 5.3 presents an example of the scoring function called “Minimize
Weighted Completion Time and Payments” or minCompletionTimeAndPayment,
which is expressed below as a Lisp-like syntax:
1 ( d e f f un c t i on minCompletionTimeAndPayment (? va lua t i on ? completionTime ? c l e a r i n gP r i c e
? durat ion )
( re turn (+ (∗ ? va lua t i on ? completionTime ) (∗ ? c l e a r i n gP r i c e ? durat ion ) ) )
The following snipped XML is an example of a transferred stateMessage for an exe-
cuted batch application. The consumer’s aim is to minimize the completion time and
payments for her or his batch applications and therefore chooses the minCompletion-
TimeAndPayment scoring function to update BidGenerator ’s knowledge base. The
contract identifier is used to find the associated application and provider identifiers
in BidGenerator ’s knowledge base.
<StateMessage s t a t e I d= ' 456 '>
2 <Scor ingFunct ion>minCompletionTimeAndPayment</ Scor ingFunct ion>
<Parameters>
4 <va lua t i on sequenceNr= ' 1 '>35</ va lua t i on>
<timeToComplete sequenceNr= ' 2 '>3</timeToComplete>
6 < f i n a l P r i c e sequenceNr= ' 3 '>25</ f i n a l P r i c e>
6<http://www.jessrules.com>.
7<http://www.jboss.org/drools>.
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<durat ion sequenceNr= ' 4 '>5</ durat ion>
8 </Parameters>
</StateMessage>
The associated key performance indicators (b1 · · · bk) ∈ Bi are transferred with the
Parameters element of stateMessage and used by the scoring function to calculate
the reward of the application execution. The timeToComplete attribute indicates the
time needed to complete the application execution and the clearingPrice attribute
indicates the final price, which is probably different from the one in the contract
due to compensation payments. The updated rewards are used from BidGenerator ’s
bidding strategies to adapt their bids to the supply and demand.
5.3.3 Public Message
Based on the PrivateMessage received, the BidGenerator instantiates the selected
bidding strategy and generates a bid in the form of a PublicMessage Bi (step 2 of
Figure 5.1), which is submitted to the market. The PublicMessage is created from
the PrivateMessage and contains the following transformed and additional elements:
Bi = {qi, z̃i, ci,Λi,Πi,Δi,Υi,Ωi} (5.4)
Most of the PublicMessage elements are transformed from the PrivateMessage. In
PublicMessage, the PrivateMessage’s bidding strategy and valuation elements are re-
placed with qi, which stores the value of the generated bid according to the selected
bidding strategy. In PublicMessage, the expiration time z̃i = zi is a dynamic param-
eter, which is adapted by some of the bidding strategies. If zi was not specified in
PrivateMessage and the selected bidding strategy does not update the value in z̃i,
then z̃i is initialized with a default value (e.g., 24h). In addition to the PrivateMes-
sage, the PublicMessage specifies the Υi element, which is the signature added by
the security component in order to sign the bid and make it legally binding. The
signature element is used by SORMA’s Contract Management to sign the market
matches between consumers and providers in the form of legal electronic contracts.
5.3.4 Market Message
The submission of the MarketMessage is depicted as step 3 of Figure 5.1. A Mar-
ketMessage is created as the result of a successful match between a consumer i and
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a provider j bid. The MarketMessage has the following content:
Xi,j = {cIdi,j,Σi,j,Υi,j, πi,j, ci,j,Λi,j,Πi,j,Δi,j, Ω̃i,j} (5.5)
cIdi,j is the contract ID, which is uniquely created by the Contract Management
of the consumer and provider identities, which are part of the Σi,j element. The
Υi,j element contains the consumer’s and provider’s signatures, which are taken from
their PublicMessages. πi,j represents the calculated clearing price by the market
mechanism. ci,j and Λi,j are taken from the consumer’s PublicMessage. Πi,j and
Δi,j are taken from the provider’s PublicMessage since they are values added to the
provider’s business strategy. Ω̃i,j is the matched Technical Description with adjusted
upper and lower bounds as a result of the matchmaking process according to the
consumer’s technical requirements and the provider’s technical specification in their
respective PublicMessages.
The MarketMessage describes the core concepts of a digital contract for a market-
based scheduling domain. The MarketMessage is returned back to the Application
Orchestrator or Service Orchestrator through the BidGenerator components. Sub-
sequently, the Application Orchestrator deploys and executes the application on the
allocated computing service according to the legally binding agreements in the Mar-
ketMessage. The URI to the provider’s computing service is part of the MarketMes-
sage’s Ωi,j.
In the SORMA context, the created MarketMessage was transformed into a WS-
Agreement document since the WS-Agreement is an OGF specification for service
level agreements (Andrieux et al., 2007; Borissov et al., 2009b). However, a WS-
Agreement offers a reference framework for high-level service level agreement concepts
rather than a concrete and detailed method for implementing them. Furthermore,
a WS-Agreement was designed for negotiations rather than for auction scenarios.
Borissov et al. (2009b) describe a mapping procedure to transform a MarketMessage
into the existing concepts of the WS-Agreement specification. However, there are no
semantically corresponding WS-Agreement elements for the MarketMessage concepts
qi,j, ci,j, Λi,j, Πi,j and Υi,j, which haven been additionally modelled and extended in
the WS-Agreement framework (Borissov et al., 2009b). Furthermore, signatures Υi,j
are an integrated part of the latest PublicMessage and MarketMessage definitions,
however, the WS-Agreement specification does not contain an equivalent element.
However, as a general and composite framework for negotiations, the WS-Agreement
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integrates WS-Security elements to incorporate the signatures, but the link to WS-
Security remains on an abstract level with respect to the clear security and trust
methodology in the PublicMessage and MarketMessage.
5.3.5 Market Information Message
The BidGenerator has to know where to submit the bid generated, PublicMessage.
The market platform CSpace integrates a Market Information Service, which enables
queries for the set of available auctions and their market information (Nimis et al.,
2009). The info method, which is part of BidGenerator ’s agent interface, implements
the functionality to request market information about available markets:
void info(string query, PublicMessage bid)
void handleInfoResponse(MarketInformation marketInfo)
Each of the available auctions in CSpace defines the scope of the traded transaction
objects in terms of technical attributes for CPU, memory and storage with associated
ranges, e.g., CDA auction for “middle” service configurations of 4 to 8 CPUs or CPU
cores, 8 to 16 GB of memory and 500GB to 1TB storage. The following example
returns the auctions and respective identifiers that match the technical description
in PublicMessage:
1 <que r i e s>
<auc t i ons />
3 </ que r i e s>
The matchmaking algorithm is the same as the one used by the auction to match the
bids, but is only applied to the technical attributes.
The following example queries market information about the “CDA” auction identi-
fier. The query requests the last 3 consumer and provider bids, as well as the last 3
clearing prices from the market information service:
1 <que r i e s>
<auc t i ons>
3 <auct ion id= 'CDA '>
<market informat ion>
5 <lastNConsumerBids>3</ lastNConsumerBids>
<l a s tNProv iderBids>3</ las tNProv iderBids>
7 <l a s tNC l ea r i ngPr i c e s>3</ l a s tNC l ea r i ngPr i c e s>
</market informat ion>
9 </ auct ion>
</ auc t i ons>
11 </ que r i e s>
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The responses from the market information service are handled by the BidGenerator ’s
interface method handleInfoResponse. An example response of the previous query is
presented in the following code snippet:
1 <re sponse>
<auc t i ons>
3 <auct ion id= 'CDA '>
<market informat ion>
5 <consumerbids><value>17</ value><value>15</ value><value>16</ value></
consumerbids>
<prov ide rb id s><value>17</ value><value>16</ value><value>18</ value></
prov ide rb id s>
7 <c l e a r i n g p r i c e s><value>17</ value><value>16</ value><value>15</ value></
c l e a r i n g p r i c e s>
</market informat ion>
9 </ auct ion>
</ auc t i ons>
11 </ response>
5.4 Matchmaking of Public Messages
The allocation of a set of a priory known goods and services with varying char-
acteristics to an a priori number of known requestors with varying preferences is
called aWinner Determination Problem (WDP). WDPs are NP-complete since multi-
attributive requestors’ preferences are matched against multi-attributive service de-
scription characteristics (Nisan, 2006). Another characteristics of WDPs is that they
often solve allocations of a priory known information in offline settings. Therefore,
offline algorithms are not adequate candidates for a market-based scheduling context
since WDPs are not scalable for thousands of applications and computing services.
Online mechanisms like the Continuous Double Auction are efficient in matching sup-
ply and demand. In addition, they are scalable since consumer and provider bids are
continuously matched with the bids available in the order book as soon as they arrive.
In the context of market-based scheduling, the matchmaking process has to consider
both the technical and economic preferences of consumers and providers. Moreover,
in an online multi-agent scenario, the matchmaking processes should be automated,
efficient and fast (Sycara et al., 2002). A survey of mechanisms for matching tech-
nical attributes is presented by Liu and Foster (2004). Liu and Foster (2004) discuss
the Condor ClassAds language and matchmaking mechanism in more detail and
propose a novel matchmaking mechanism, called Redline. Redline allows the speci-
fication and matching of value ranges like “CPU tact frequency between 2 GHz and
3 GHz.” JSDL is also specified to support the value ranges for technical attributes
(Anjomshoaa et al., 2005). However, there is no known research that describes the
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automation of the matchmaking processes of both the technical and economic pref-
erences of consumers and providers.
Sycara et al. (2002) summarize three general types of matchmaking mechanisms called
Exact match, Plug-in match and Relaxed match. Exact match describes a situation
in which the requests of the demand and supply agents have equivalent variables
and values. The Plug-in match is less restrictive, but offers a greater likelihood of
finding a match rather than an exact match. The idea behind the Plug-in match is
that the provider and consumer messages can differ in the description details of their
respective technical attributes. For example, a provider’s technical description of the
offered computing service may be very detailed in terms of the number of technical
parameters. Conversely, a consumer’s technical description may utilize few technical
parameters. According to the Plug-in match, both descriptions can match if the few
technical attributes of the consumer description match part of the related provider’s
description. The additional technical attributes may complement the matched doc-
ument. A Relaxed match is the least restrictive matchmaking method. A Relaxed
match does not return a match or no-match value, but determines the value distances
of the different consumer and provider descriptions. A simple heuristic in this case
could be that a consumer and provider description match if the overall “distance
value is smaller than a preset threshold value” (Sycara et al., 2002).
In the context of SORMA, a kind of Plug-in match mechanism was implemented
(Nimis et al., 2009). The matchmaking process of PublicMessages is performed by
the implemented auction and matchmaking mechanisms in two steps – i) technical
matchmaking and ii) price-based matchmaking. The technical matchmaking mecha-
nism applies the characteristics of the selected technical description language, JSDL.
JSDL is a well-applied description language in Cluster and Grid schedulers, as well
as in many other related projects (McGough and Savva, 2008). As such, JSDL
supports value ranges for technical attributes. Thus, the technical matchmaking
mechanism is interfaced with the auction mechanism and implemented to support
value ranges for the technical attribute-value pairs. The price-based matchmaking
mechanism is performed by the auction mechanism itself. In the case of Continuous
Double Auction, the bids are matched on arrival according to the K-Pricing schema,
price = kqi+(1−k)qj with k = 0.5 (Satterthwaite and Williams, 1989). The technical
and economic matchmaking procedure is depicted in Algorithm 5.4.1 and described
as follows.
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deal ← createMatch(publicMessage, bid)
remove(bid)
break









Step 1 – Technical Matchmaking : As a consumer bid or provider offer arrives in the
form of a PublicMessage, the match procedure performs a technical matchmaking
against a list of provider offers or consumer bids. Bids are sorted in descending
order, and offers in ascending order. The technical description of the service is part
of the offer’s and bid’s PublicMessages. The isTechnicalMatch method checks to see if
the bid and offer messages are technically compatible. A consumer i’s PublicMessage
and a provider j’s PublicMessage pair are technically compatible if their key technical
attributes (Key Performance Indicators or KPI), which are part of the PublicMessage,
match into non-empty values:
for all kpii ∈ KPIi, kpij ∈ KPIj, kpii ∩ kpij = ∅ (5.6)
For example, the intersection of the consumer’s KPI CPUSpeedi = {2GHz, 3GHz}8,
and the intersection of the provider’s CPUSpeedj = {2.6GHz} amounts to {2.6GHz}.
8Here the CPUSpeed is defined for a range of 2 to 3 GHz.
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Step 2 – Economic Matchmaking : If a bid and an offer are technically compatible
(the method isTechnicalMatch returns true), then the match procedure performs a
price-based matchmaking. Since the bids and offers are ordered according to their
values, a full match can be immediately returned if the consumer’s bid is higher than
the provider’s bid, otherwise, the algorithm moves to Step 1 with the next possible
candidate (bid or offer) in the order book. If the consumer’s bid is less than the
provider’s offer, then the matchmaking process can be terminated and the consumer’s
bid remains in the order book until it is matched or the specified expiration time in
PublicMessage. When a match is identified, the auction creates aMarketMessage and
delivers it to SORMA’s Contract Management, which generates a binding contract
and returns it back to the related consumer and provider. The technical attribute-
value pairs of the MarketMessage are constructed from the intersection values of the
consumer’s and provider’s PublicMessages. The clearing price is the result of the
economic matchmaking and is calculated according to the K-Pricing schema.
5.5 The MX/CS Ontology
Software engineering and ontologies are complementary technologies to describe and
share domain knowledge, which is “stored” in (complex) software systems (Gasević
et al., 2009). The application of ontologies in the software engineering processes pro-
vides a common language for software engineers of the system concepts developed, as
well as a common understanding of system’s requirements, their solution concepts,
as well as the implementation details. Machine-processable system ontologies can
help software engineers establish links between the system knowledge and software
artifacts produced in order to automate the verification and integration processes
of existing and novel components. Gasević et al. (2009) propose the use of ontolo-
gies for software engineering processes. For example, their application starts in the
requirement analysis phase in the definition of a common lexicon for the targeted
system, which serves to establish a common and well-defined vocabulary of the con-
cepts, their properties and internal/external relationships for the people involved in
the project. In the design phase, ontologies can be applied by software engineers
to iteratively validate and reason their UML or software models. Furthermore, on-
tologies can facilitate the transformation and integration processes of third-party or
novel components. In the software implementation phase, ontologies can be applied
to document implementation decisions, i.e., selecting software patterns for a specific
domain problem (Gasević et al., 2009). A formal description of the semantics of
market concepts adopted in communication protocols is crucial to make sure that
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they understand each other, as well as to ensure their interoperability, verification,
and integration in existing and new components. This is especially important for
interdisciplinary research in the area of multi-agent systems and market mechanisms.
Therefore, this research proposes separating the data exchange model from the se-
mantic model. The data exchange model of MX/CS is specified as XML schema
(Appendix C.1), the semantic model is specified in OWL (version 2.0) and called
MX/CS Ontology (Appendix C.2). The MX/CS XML schema explicitly defines the
data model of the presented message types PrivateMessage, PublicMessage and Mar-
ketMessage. The StateMessage and MarketInformation are specific to the BidGener-
ator and not directly involved in the communication between the clients (Application
Orchestrator, Service Orchestrator) and the SORMA market components. Therefore,
StateMessage and MarketInformation are specified externally to SORMA’s market
communication protocol (Appendix C.3), but related to the MX/CS Ontology (Ap-
pendix C.2).
Following is a an example of an XML schema element definition. The defined element
strategy of the type string stores the class name of the preferred bidding strategy:
1 <xsd :e l ement name= ' s t r a t e gy ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#
s t r a t e gy ' />
SAWSDL enables annotating XML elements with a reference to an existing semantic
concept that is part of an (domain) ontology. In the above example, the SAWSDL
attribute sawsdl:modelReference provides a reference to the strategy concept in mxc-
sProtocol.owl (MX/CS Ontology).
In the following OWL snippet, the definition of the concept strategy is presented,
which is part of the MX/CS Ontology :
1 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
3 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PrivateMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
5 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
7 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; s t r i n g ”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
9 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
11 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
17 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
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<Constant>A bidding s t r a t e gy i s a complete plan o f a c t i on s f o r whatever
s i t u a t i o n might a r i s e ; t h i s f u l l y determines the agent behavior . A
bidding s t r a t e gy w i l l determine the ac t i on o f the agent w i l l take at
any s tage o f the bid gene ra t i on and market−based schedu l ing
proce s s e s , f o r every p o s s i b l e h i s t o r y and av a i l a b l e market




<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
23 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; s eeAl so ”>




<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
29 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; s eeAl so ”>




33 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
35 </Dec la ra t i on>
A concept is defined through its Domain space (here strategy is part of PrivateMes-
sage) and its Range space (here xsd:string). Furthermore, the definition of strategy
is associated with additional annotations like comments, see also links, as well as
relations. A best practice in the ontology design is to associate ontology concepts to
a well-known upper ontology, such as OpenCyc (Mascardi et al., 2007). The MX/CS
Ontology is associated with concepts of the OpenCyc upper ontology by using the
OWL type of relation annotation.
5.6 Extensions for Combinatorial Bids
Combinatorial markets and related combinatorial bidding languages have been ex-
tensively explored in the literature (Nisan, 2006; Schnizler, 2008; Lubin et al., 2008).
A combinatorial bid is a logical combination of atomic bids, expressed through
the logical operators XOR, AND and OR. Following example demonstrates an ex-
tension of the introduced message protocols (PrivateMessage and PublicMessage),
which allows the specification of combinatorial bids of a set of TechnicalDescriptions,






<Se rv i c e r e f= 'TD1 ' />
5 <Se rv i c e r e f= 'TD2 ' />
</AND>
7 <Se rv i c e r e f= 'TD3 ' />
</XOR>
9 </Combinations>
In the case of a PrivateMessage definition, consumers specify their valuation for a
service configuration or a set of alternatives (Borissov et al., 2008a). Suppose that the
deployment, application execution and monitoring interfaces for computing services
are standardized and adopted by all providers. Furthermore, suppose that TD1 is a
technical description of an Amazon EC2 service and TD2 is a technical description
of an Amazon S3 service. In contrast to TD1 and TD2, TD3 is a description of an
integrated Google AppEngine service, which offers both – computational and storage
facilities. In this example, a consumer specifies an exclusive-or combinatorial bid for
either the TD1 and TD2 or TD3 services.
5.7 Summary
This chapter presented the design and realization of the MX/CS communication pro-
tocol for a market-based scheduling domain. The derived design desiderata required
that communication protocols for market-based scheduling must allow the expression
of both technical and economic attributes; it must support different types of message
for private, public, contract and market information; it must enable the creation of
legally binding service contracts; and it must contain semantic descriptions of the
implemented domain concepts. The analysis of existing communication protocols
showed that there is no existing communication protocol, which satisfies the design
desiderata.
The MX/CS communication protocol specifies the economic attributes needed to im-
plement a market-based scheduling scenario. Furthermore, as a framework, MX/CS
is modeled to wrap any technical description language for computing services. There-
fore, desideratum D1 is fully satisfied.
Desideratum D2 is fully supported with the specification of the various message
types: PrivateMessage, PublicMessage, MarketMessage, StateMessage and Market-
Information. This specification is consistent with a realistic bidding scenario in which
consumers and providers have full control of their own bidding infrastructure and
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implemented bidding strategies. The PrivateMessage type models the exchange of
internal information within consumers’ and providers’ private environments. The
PublicMessage models the bid that is sent to the auction. MarketMessage is the
contract created when there is an auction match, which is returned from the auction
to the allocated consumer and provider. The StateMessage and MarketInformation
types are used from BidGenerator to update its knowledge base and request market
information.
The creation of electronic contracts between consumer and provider bids is supported
with the specified concepts in MarketMessage (D3). A contract (MarketMessage)
between a consumer and a provider bids (PublicMessages) is created if they match
technically and economically. The MarketMessage contains the digital signatures of
the participants and is sent back to them in the form of a WS-Agreement document,
which contains the auction-specific concepts from the MarketMessage. Moreover, the
XML data model of MX/CS is associated with the MX/CS ontology, which explicitly
defines the utilized concepts in human and machine-readable form (D4). The MX/CS
ontology captures a part of the SORMA system knowledge for the associated system
components and their interactions. With respect to the best practices in ontology
design, the MX/CS ontology concepts are linked to the well-known upper ontology
OpenCyc.
The MX/CS has been implemented as a proof-of-concept in the SORMA prototype.
In the Cloud context, the MX/CS communication protocol can be applied as a wrap-
per to any technical description language for infrastructure services (IaaS) in order to
support the exchange in a market-based scheduling scenario. A detailed description
of the MX/CS integration in three case studies, as well as in a Social Cloud scenario








his chapter presents an economic evaluation of Q-Strategy for consumers and
providers in competition settings against benchmark strategies in spot markets.
Section 6.1 depicts the evaluation methodology in detail followed by the setup of
an agent-based environment. Section 6.2 presents the results of the agent-based
experiments and Section 6.3 summarizes the chapter.
6.1 Evaluation Methodology
Evaluation of market mechanisms and bidding strategies for realistic settings is a
complex task dealing with the high heterogeneity of agents, varying preferences and
incomplete information. The performance of an agent depends not only on its own
preferences, but also on the strategies of other agents, and fluctuating supply and
demand. The resulting evaluation space becomes large with the number of possible
agent strategies, nevertheless it is necessary to verify agents’ performances under
these changing conditions (Sodomka et al., 2007).
The newly developed bidding strategy, Q-Strategy, is evaluated against benchmark
strategies in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings. The bidding strategies are
instantiated into bidding agents, according to the defined evaluation scenario. The
agents generate the bids automatically on demand – consumer agents upon receipt
of a new job; provider agents, each time a computing service becomes idle. In or-
der to reduce the technical bias through network communication and concentrate
on the economic outcome, all experiments are executed in a controlled multi-agent
environment with a market mechanism, and a corresponding configuration of con-
sumer and provider bidding agents running on a single machine instance. The design
of the experiments and the evaluation methodology is in keeping with the proposed
methodologies for multi-agent numerical experimentation postulated in Agent-based
Computational Economics and Empirical Game-theoretic Analysis (Tesfatsion, 2006;
MacKie-Mason and Wellman, 2006) (see also Section 2.5).
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Table 6.1: Design of the experiments and variables
Variables Values
Number of provider agents 50, 100
Provider settings Homogeneous agents of {ZIP, GD, Q-Strategy}
Number of consumer agents 10 in total
Consumer settings homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios
Q-Strategy vs. Benchmark∈{ZIP, GD}
in ratios of (0:10), (1:9), . . ., (10:0) agents
Number of Real job profiles (Feitelson, 2010):
consumer applications LLNL* with ca. 13000 job profiles
HPC2N* with ca. 110000 job profiles
Job duration cj cj ∈ [1, 24] hours
Consumer’s valuation vj per hour N(190, 25), vj ∈ [70, 300]
Provider’s valuation vi per hour N(75, 1.7), vi ∈ [70, 80]
Payment πi,j(vj , cj) = vjcj
Job’s j completion time Fj = tj,startBidding4App − tj,finishAppExec
Metrics Consumer’s scoring function:
max(Uj) with Uj = −vjFj − πi,j
(min. opportunity costs and payments)
Provider’s scoring function:
max(Ui) with Ui = πi,j − vicj
(maximize profit)






Table 6.1 presents the global specification of the variables, the combinations of which
define the overall scope of the experimental settings. The details are discussed in the
following sections.
6.1.1 Setup of the Market Mechanism and the Application Data Profiles
The target market mechanism for all experiments is a spot market by means of
the online Continuous Double Auction. For each experiment setting, the same two
real data profiles – LLNL and HPC2N – were executed separately and independently
from each other in the different settings. The LLNL and the HPC2N application data
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profiles1 i) offer stable characteristics with small fluctuations of the jobs’ technical
parameter values and ii) these workloads have also been applied in other research
works (Feitelson, 2010). Originally, the LPC EGEE was also selected as a third
candidate, but the experiments in Borissov et al. (2010) showed that the evidence
from the outcome with the HPC2N workload is similar to that of the LPC EGEE
workload. Therefore, the LPC EGEE workload was skipped from the evaluation
scenarios in order to save two months of computing time for additional 1200 jobs,
which did not result in a significant difference in the outcome other than of the
HPC2N workload.
The job profile characteristics in the LLNL and HPC2N workloads are in keeping
with the scenarios selected for this work (Section 2.4.1), where consumers execute
the same applications for demand forecasting and image processing, but with slight
variations in job duration (e.g., between 1 and 8 hours in the case of TXTDemand,
Section 2.4.1.1) based on the input data for the applications. Moreover, the log files
have been filtered to support application types with durations between one hour and
twenty-four hours. The lower bound is motivated by the fact that current Cloud
IaaS offerings are for at least one hour of usage; the upper bound is motivated by the
investigated application case studies in Section 2.4.1, which define short-time batch
applications (overnight execution with a maximum of 8 hours), as well as interactive
and quasi real-time applications for image processing with a minimum of one hour
usage time in total. It is assumed that usage time of less than one hour is performed
on internal (own) computing infrastructures. In times of high demand, however, it is
assumed that consumers purchase external computing services for at least one hour
(cf. Section 2.4.1.2).
Moreover, the providers’ minimum hour purchase is motivated by the fact that ap-
plications implicate time and bandwidth costs for reserving computing services, de-
ployment, runtime and monitoring; and these costs may vary with application size.
Therefore, it is not economically feasible to execute applications on outsourced com-
puting services runtimes that are less than one hour and for providers to receive
payment only for the net execution of the application without considering the total
costs.
1Feitelson’s workload archive homepage: <http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/parallel/
workload/logs.htm>.
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Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the job durations and the cumulative distribution
function of both data profiles. The job durations of the filtered job data profiles are
in keeping with the characteristics of both case studies in Section 2.4.1. The LLNL
data profile has a small differentiation of job duration types with the highest number
of jobs that are 4 and 16 hours long. The mean job duration in LLNL is 8.01h
and the standard deviation is 5.58h. The larger HPC2N data profile has a higher
differentiation of job durations with a mean of 7.50h and a standard deviation of
6.96h. In HPC2N the highest number of jobs have a duration of 2 and 4 hours.
6.1.2 Setup of Bidding Strategies
The evaluation of this work focused on the consumer side in settings with varying ho-
mogeneous and heterogeneous agents, by applying the Q-Strategy, as well as the ZIP
and GD strategies. In order to measure consumer outcome in a market-based schedul-
ing scenario, a more feasible scoring function is needed than just profit maximization
since application owners are not just interested in the price, but in the time-efficient
execution of their applications (Buyya et al., 2002). Therefore, the analysis of the
consumer outcomes was performed with the proposed scoring function in Heydenre-
ich et al. (2010), namely the “minimize completion time and payments”. In order
to reduce evaluation and outcome analysis complexity, the evaluation focused on the
consumer side, where the providers are typically assumed to be profit maximizing
agents. This focus solves two issues for the analysis.
Firstly, real-world providers of computing services apply more complex optimizations
than just profit maximization. Complex optimizations in this case mean more so-
phisticated scoring functions like “maximize computing service utilization and profit,”
“maximize consumer happiness, computing service utilization and profit” and many
others. These optimizations are reflected in the provider’s business models, such as
introducing price differentiations for different consumer types (e.g., “gold,” “silver”
and “bronze”), sophisticated service level agreements, scheduling and utilization poli-
cies (Püschel et al., 2007; Becker et al., 2008). The analysis of the provider side and
derivation of appropriate scoring function will deflect the focus of this work and it
is an important part of many future doctoral theses. Secondly, assuming providers
to be profit maximizers allows provider outcomes to be compared to the outcomes in
the state-of-the-art literature.
The analysis of existing bidding strategies for the Continuous Double Auction and its
variants showed that the GD and ZIP strategies are suitable and fair benchmark can-
didates for evaluation of the Q-Strategy and for the selected domain-specific market
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of this work (Section 3.3.5).
Similar to existing works in the literature for agent-based evaluation, the selected
total number of consumer agents amounts to 10 (Schvartzman and Wellman, 2009;
Vytelingum et al., 2008; Tesauro and Bredin, 2002). Moreover, Tesauro and Bredin
(2002) performed a kind of heterogeneous analysis of competing bidding strategies –
GDX vs. ZIP, as well as GDX vs. GD types of agents, with “typical agent populations
consisting of 10 buyer agents and 10 seller agents.” Table 6.1 shows the design of the
homogeneous and heterogeneous settings. A homogeneous setting is given when all
of the consumer and provider agents apply the same bidding strategy, otherwise the
setting is heterogeneous. In heterogeneous settings, the Q-Strategy competes against
one of the benchmark strategies, (Q − Strategy : Benchmark), in a ratio of (9 : 1)
to (1 : 9) different agents.
In the three workload data profiles – LLNL, HPC2N and LPC EGEE, the number of
computing nodes was around 50 and 100. Therefore, the number of provider agents
in the investigated setting was selected to be either 50 or 100. The scenarios with 50
and 100 providers allows the outcomes to be compared from both a competitive and
less competitive perspective. This differentiation allows the outcome to be evaluated
under a different competition strength. Each provider agent represents a machine
and executes an application exclusively in each time unit immediately after a market
allocation for the specified application duration. The representation of one agent
per machine is motivated by a competitive market-based scheduling scenario where
each provider aims to maximize its goal. For example, Amazon offers computing
services on a spot market, but it is the single provider for EC2 instances, rather than
the double-sided case assumed for multiple providers and multiple consumers. Given
that the focus is on the consumer, all of the provider agents apply only one type of
bidding strategy, either the Q-Strategy, ZIP strategy or GD strategy. Thus, in each
setting the provider agents are “homogeneous.”
The application data profiles do not contain information about the application or
computing service valuations. The distributions that are usually selected for valu-
ations are the uniform and normal distributions (Sandholm et al., 2008; Jiang and
Leyton-Brown, 2007; Robu and Poutre, 2009). The normal distribution is commonly
adopted for evaluating adaptive algorithms and thus selected for the generation of the
application’s valuations (Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2007). The selected distribution
and range for the job valuations N(190, 25) are consistent with those of prominent
authors on the subject of the agent-based evaluation domain for algorithmic bid-
ding strategies (Schvartzman and Wellman, 2009; Tesauro and Bredin, 2002). The
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generated job valuations (also called limit prices by some authors) are in the range
vj ∈ [70, 300] and do not vary during the experiments; only the bids vary according to
the selected bidding strategy. As with the providers, the computing service valuations
are also normally distributed N(75, 1.7). The application scenario defines the provi-
sioning of substitutable computing services with similar performance characteristics
through well-defined interfaces and different goal maximizing providers. Therefore,
the providers’ i valuations are closer to each other and generated within a tighter
range vi ∈ [70, 80] the valuations that of the consumers. The providers’ valuations
do not change during the experiments; they change according to their bids and the
selected bidding strategy.
6.1.3 Setup of the Multi-Agent System
The multi-agent environment for the experiments integrates the BidGenerator (Sec-
tion 4.4) and the market platform CSpace with a Discrete Event Simulation Engine
(DES) (Borissov et al., 2008b; Nimis et al., 2009). DES is an integral part of a multi-
agent experimental system since it controls the timing and distribution of events and
their correct execution in a controlled environment (Chevaleyre et al., 2006; Ross,
2006). The DES engine uniformly distributes the request events of arriving applica-
tions from the target workload profile (LLNL or HPC2N) to the consumer agents.
Each job from the workload profile is added as an event in DES, which is run and
executed with the respective duration (delay) as specified in the workload profile.
The experimental environment communicates with the market platform CSpace by
implementing the ProtocolInWords and ProtocolOutWords interfaces. In order to re-
duce unnecessary overhead (here the bidding strategies are evaluated; an evaluation
of the system integration and performance is part of Chapter 7), the communication
methods are directly invoked with the required attribute-value pairs for the experi-
ments, instead of creating, serializing and parsing XML messages like in a real system
(Section 5.3). The DES Engine runs the CDA protocol, which receives the messages
from the agents with the ProtocolInWords interface, performs the economic match-
making and responds to the agents with the ProtocolOutWords. The agent uses the
ProtocolInWords interface to register with the market and exchange consumer bids
and provider offers. The ProtocolOutWords interface is used by the CDA i) to send
the match messages to the allocated consumer and provider agents, as well as to ii)
info to broadcast (public information) other agents’ actions, such as bids and clearing
prices, to all registered agents.










+register(platformURI : string, port : int) : void
+addNewRequest(message : PrivateMessage) : void
+submit(auctionId : string, command : string, message : PublicMessage) : void
+react(message : MarketMessage) : void
+info(query : string, message : PublicMessage) : void
+handleSubmissionException(messageId : string, exception : MarketException) : string
+finish(state : StateMessage) : void
+handleInfoResponse(info : MarketInformation) : void
<<Interface>>
Agent
+generateBid(message : PrivateMessage) : PublicMessage







+getConversation(protocol : Class, id : string) : Conversation
+create(protocol : Class, namespace : string) : Conversation
+setConversationListenerFactory(cfactory : ConversationListenerFactory) : void
<<Interface>>
CSpaceConnection





+create(agent : ProtocolOutWords) : OutWordListener
<<Interface>>
ConversationListenerFactory
+ConversationListener(address : string, port : int)
+addListener(agent : ProtocolOutWords, cid : string)
ConversationListener +bid(label : string, price : long, update : boolean) : void








+match(label : string, opponent : string, hisLabel : string, price : long) : void











+addEvent(e : Event) : void
+scheduleStopEvent(time : long) : void















Figure 6.2: Architecture of an agent-based experimental environment with a Descrete
Event Service Engine
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The specified variables in Table 6.1 define the overall evaluation scenario, the com-
binations of which resulted in 240 unique experimental settings, where each one was
repeated 10 times. The 2400 numerical experiments have been executed on 88 com-
puting nodes over a period of four months on the HP XC3000 cluster system at the
Steinbuch Centre for Computing2.
6.1.4 Analyzing the Efficiency of Bidding Strategies
Common metrics in the economic literature to measure the efficiency of market mech-
anisms and bidding strategies are the overall score of consumers or providers and the
welfare, and combination of both. The literature on automated bidding agents in
CDA investigates the outcome of bidding strategies based on the classic assumption
of profit maximization. In the field of market-based scheduling, it is assumed that
consumers not only minimize payments (increase profit), but also to try minimize
opportunity costs. Heydenreich et al. (2010) proposed a consumer scoring function
for market-based scheduling, which aims to minimize both, the weighted completion
time vjFj and the payments πi,j. Although Heydenreich et al. (2010) propose this
scoring function for a strategy-proof decentralized mechanism in which consumers
can act strategically and providers offer their computing services for free, this scoring
function is a more appropriate metric outcome analysis and for the market-based
scheduling domain rather than just the profit maximization score.
In Heydenreich et al. (2010), the vj is defined as the costs for waiting for an additional
time unit in the machine queue for execution, where F is the time between the “ar-
rival” of the application from the consumer agent until the actual time of application
completion. Within the scope of this work, vj is simply defined as the valuation of
the jobs – a higher valuation of a job represents higher opportunity costs for waiting
for an additional time unit to be allocated on a machine. πi,j is the price per unit
of time that a consumer j has to be pay to the allocated provider i for the required
runtime cj of the job.
In contrast to the mechanism in Heydenreich et al. (2010), providers in the Con-
tinuous Double Auction also behave strategically. Within the scope of this work,
each of the providers are assumed to be traditional profit maximizing agents. With
the selection of this traditional scoring function, a straightforward comparison of the
providers’ outcome to the works of Tesauro and Bredin (2002) and Vytelingum et al.
(2008) is possible to some degree.
2<http://www.scc.kit.edu>.
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Finally, the aggregate consumer and provider scores represents the welfare (here
referred to as combined consumer and provider scores) of the outcome, which is
compared within the different settings.
6.1.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to initialize the variables of the parametrized bidding strategies – Q-Strategy,
ZIP and GD – a one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis was performed (Saltelli et al.,
2008). In a one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis, one parameter is varied in each of the
sensitivity analysis experiments. The variation scope of the parameters was spec-
ified according to the specifications in the literature and calibrated for all of the
strategies analyzed. For example, for calibration of the Q-Strategy, the learning rate
β ∈ [0.1, 0.3], the exploration rate ε ∈ [0.1, 0.3] and γ ∈ [0.1, 0.9] have been varied
for the applied value ranges in the literature. The selection of the Q-Strategy pa-
rameters constituted a trade-off between the ability to consider the dynamics of the
environment and the reaction to changing conditions. Whiteson and Stone (2006)
proposed an evolutionary search of Q-Learning parameters for the mountain car and
server application scheduling scenarios. Sun and Peterson (1999) varied the learning
rate through a heuristic policy. In Even-Dar et al. (2003) and Even-Dar and Man-
sour (2004) a stochastic stochastic search for estimating Q-Learning parameters in
stationary settings was performed.
A detailed overview of the sensitivity analysis outcomes and resulting initialization
of the parameters of the bidding strategies is presented in Appendix A. Based on the
results of a sensitivity analysis, the learning rate of the Q-Strategy was set to β = 0.1.
With an exploration rate of ε = 0.3, the Q-Strategy explores the strategy space of
different bids. During the experiments, the exploration rate ε does not change in order
to preserve the learning and adaption facility, and to react to the changing market
dynamics. The Q-Strategy discount factor γ = 0.9, which is also commonly used in
the literature, assigns a higher weight to long-term gains, and accepting short-term
losses. The parameters of the ZIP and GD bidding strategies have been set according
to the results of the sensitivity analysis and the ranges specified in Cliff and Bruten
(1997) and Gjerstad (2003).
6.1.6 Correlation Analysis
The results of the experimental settings are organized according to the criteria in
Table 6.1: The type of job profile applied (LLNL or HPC2N), the number of provider
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machine agents (50 or 100), as well as the provider’s bidding strategy (ZIP, GD
or Q-Strategy). In the case of consumers, the outcomes of the jobs executions are
calculated with the consumer’s scoring function in Table 6.1. The total outcome of
the three bidding strategies can be compared directly only for homogeneous settings.
In heterogeneous settings, however, the agents are assigned different proportions of
Q-Strategy and benchmark agents. Therefore, their performances can only be directly
compared with the average job score through the same types of agents since the 7
Q-Strategy agents execute more jobs than the 3 ZIP agents, assuming that the jobs
from the workload profiles are uniformly distributed to the agents. Therefore, the
Consumers’ Aggregated Average Scores or CAAS is the metric applied to compare
the outcomes of all consumers of the same strategy type in both homogeneous and
heterogeneous consumer settings. The Aggregation in the CAAS points to the fact
that the averages are calculated of one, two or more consumer agents of the same
type.
Analogous to the consumer outcomes, the provider outcomes are similarly averaged
and compared among the three bidding strategies with the Providers’ Aggregated
Average Score or PAAS metric according to the provider’s scoring function in Table
6.1. In contrast to consumers, however, all the providers apply the same type of
bidding strategy in each setting (“homogenous” providers). Therefore, the provider
outcomes can be directly compared for the three bidding strategies and different
settings. In contrast to CAAS, the Aggregation in PAAS points to the fact that the
averages are calculated of all provider agents in a given setting since they are all of
the same type.
The last metric of the comparative analysis is the combined consumer and provider
scores, called CCPAAS, which measures the overall welfare for each of the settings
(Table 6.1).
The setting outcomes in the correlation analysis is tested for normal distribution with
the Chi-square, Kolmogorow-Smirnow and Shapiro-Wilk tests. The tests showed that
most of the clustered outcomes are likely to be normally distributed with an alpha =
0.05. With respect to the failed tests for normal distribution, the correlation analysis
was performed with the nonparametric Spearman correlation coefficient, which does
not require knowledge of the probability distribution of the data. Furthermore, the
Spearman correlation coefficient provides a good approximation of the correlation
because, unlike the Pearson correlation coefficient, it is not affected by higher data
leaps.
A positive correlation in the case of consumers means that when the number of Q-
Strategy agents increases and the number of benchmark agents decreases, the average
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job outcome (CAAS) improves; a negative correlation means that the CAAS recede.
A positive correlation in the case of providers means that when the number of Q-
Strategy agents increases and the number of benchmark agents falls, the average
provider profit (PAAS) improves; a negative correlation means that the provider’s
average profit recedes. Finally, a positive correlation in the combined consumer
and provider scores (CCPAAS) means that when the number of Q-Strategy agents
increases and the number of benchmark agents decreases, the welfare in the system
improves; a negative correlation means that the welfare recedes.
6.2 Evaluation Results
6.2.1 Consumer Outcomes
The overall performance of the Q-Strategy against the benchmark strategies in all
settings is summarized in Table 6.2. The table shows the results from a consumers’
perspective. The consumer outcomes are ordered according to the executed data
profiles – LLNL and HPC2N, the number of providers – 50 and 100, and whether
they stem from the homogeneous strategy settings or heterogeneous ones. In general,
the Q-Strategy outperformed the benchmark strategies ZIP and GD in more than
70% of all settings.
The outcomes in the homogeneous lower supply settings of 50 providers, homoge-
neous LLNL–50 and HPC2N–50, identify a clear pattern in which Q-Strategy con-
sumer agents are 100% successful against the ZIP and GD consumers in cases where
providers also apply the Q-Strategy. However, in the same type of settings, but with
ZIP providers, the GD and ZIP consumers outperformed the Q-Strategy consumers.
In the cases with 50 GD providers, only the ZIP consumers succeeded in outper-
forming the Q-Strategy consumers; the GD consumers failed against the Q-Strategy
consumers. This was to be expected because ZIP and GD agents are designed to
adapt quickly to the public signals, bids and clearing prices of the other agents,
whereas, Q-Strategy is designed to adapt on a long-term basis, as well as to local
information and experience. Therefore, Q-Strategy would not be a good choice in
highly competitive settings (low supply and high demand) and perfect information
about about other agents’ actions.
In the heterogenous lower supply settings of 50 providers, the Q-Strategy consumer
agents almost outperformed the ZIP and GD consumers with the LLNL job profile,
but exhibited mixed performance results in the HPC2N case. In the latter case, the Q-
Strategy consumers failed against ZIP consumers in settings where the providers were
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Table 6.2: Winning performance of the Q-Strategy against the benchmark strategies,
ZIP and GD, in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings of consumers and providers
Data Profile Homogeneous Settings Heterogeneous Settings
LLNL – 50
Consumers Providers
(Q:ZIP ) ZIP 0% 48.34%
(Q:ZIP ) GD 0% 96.67%
(Q:ZIP ) Q 100% 100%
(Q:GD) ZIP 0% 52.67%
(Q:GD) GD 100% 99.23%
(Q:GD) Q 100% 87.78%
LLNL – 100
Consumers Providers
(Q:ZIP ) ZIP 100% 100%
(Q:ZIP ) GD 100% 97.89%
(Q:ZIP ) Q 100% 100%
(Q:GD) ZIP 100% 97.56%
(Q:GD) GD 100% 97.56%
(Q:GD) Q 100% 56.45%
HPC2N – 50
Consumers Providers
(Q:ZIP ) ZIP 0% 0%
(Q:ZIP ) GD 0% 61%
(Q:ZIP ) Q 100% 99.23%
(Q:GD) ZIP 0% 0%
(Q:GD) GD 100% 99.45%
(Q:GD) Q 100% 100%
HPC2N – 100
Consumers Providers
(Q:ZIP ) ZIP 100% 100%
(Q:ZIP ) GD 100% 98.67%
(Q:ZIP ) Q 100% 100%
(Q:GD) ZIP 0% 96.78%
(Q:GD) GD 100% 96.34%
(Q:GD) Q 100% 100%
also of the ZIP type. However, in the remaining settings, the Q-Strategy consumers
showed a higher rate of success against the benchmark bidding strategies.
The consumer outcomes in the higher supply settings of 100 providers show that the
Q-Strategy outperforms the benchmark bidding strategies in almost all settings and
on the highest level. The Q-Strategy consumers failed against the GD consumers only
in one setting, the one with the with the HPC2N job profile with providers of type
ZIP. In summary, Q-Strategy is the best choice in settings with moderate competition
in a scenario with 100 providers and both job profiles. In more competitive settings,
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Q-Strategy is almost always the best choice in cases where providers use either the
Q-Strategy or GD strategy. In higher competition settings with ZIP providers, the
price competitive ZIP and GD strategies are the best choice for consumers.
Table 6.3 is a Top 10 list of the combined (Q-Strategy and benchmark strategies)
consumer outcomes for the LLNL data profile, with 50 provider agents. The highest
CAAS scores were achieved in settings that are dominated by Q-Strategy consumer
(10Q) and provider agents of the Q-Strategy type. The settings [(10Q : 0GD) with Q-
Providers] and [(10Q : 0ZIP ) with Q-Providers] are equivalent since the the number
of GD and ZIP agents in these settings is zero. The best outcome was achieved
by the homogeneous settings of Q-Strategy agents; the subsequent highly-ranked
settings are dominated by a higher number of Q-Strategy agents on both the consumer
and provider side. Full lists of the consumer outcomes for all homogeneous and
heterogenous settings can be found in Appendix B.1.
Table 6.3: Top 10 consumer outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL
data profile. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 50 Providers Combined CAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -68551
(10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -69067
2 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -147806
3 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -149139
4 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -155348
5 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -155786
6 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -158339
7 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -158985
8 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -161261
9 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -161600
10 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -163205
Table 6.4 shows the outcomes with the same LLNL data profile, but with a higher
supply of computing services with 100 providers. Here again, the settings are domi-
nated by the Q-Strategy consumers and providers that achieved the highest scores.
Table 6.5 shows the outcomes for the configuration of 50 providers and the HPC2N
data profile. Similar to the LLNL data profile, in the 10 times larger HPC2N profile,
the Q-Strategy dominated settings achieved the highest outcomes. Again, the best
outcomes were achieved by the Q-Strategy dominated consumer and provider settings.
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Table 6.4: Top 10 consumer outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL
data profile. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 100 Providers Combined CAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -60184
(10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -60323
2 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -73155
(10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -73956
3 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -85604
4 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -95449
5 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -110368
(10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -110553
6 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -124026
7 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -129126
8 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -136576
9 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -141748
10 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -146821
Table 6.5: Top 10 consumer outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the HPC2N
data profile. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 50 Providers Combined CAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -1054218
(10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -1085099
2 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -1703405
3 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1945762
4 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -1945778
5 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -2200169
6 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -2535239
7 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -2632936
8 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -2725949
9 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -2855771
10 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -3120306
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Table 6.6: Top 10 consumer outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the HPC2N
data profile. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 100 Providers Combined CAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -576447
(10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -579618
2 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -734462
3 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -903385
4 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -974690
5 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -1028515
6 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1094188
7 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -1107360
8 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -1231504
9 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1392967
10 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -1471657
The outcomes in Table 6.6 with the higher supply and HPC2N data profile confirm
the effectiveness of Q-Strategy in the LLNL settings. In the 50 and 100 provider
cases with the HPC2N data profile, the settings dominated by the Q-Strategy agents
scored higher than those of the benchmark dominated settings.
Figure 6.3 shows the consumer outcomes in settings where all the providers’ agents
are of the GD type and the target job profile is LLNL. The sub-figures (a)–(b) dis-
play the results in higher competitive settings with 50 providers, sub-figures (c)–(d)
present results in settings with 100 providers. The x-axis displays the ten differ-
ent competing scenarios of 0-Q-Strategy and 10 Benchmark (ZIP or GD) consumers
to 10-Q-Strategy and 0-Benchmark -consumers in all consecutive combinations. The
y-axis displays consumers’ aggregated average job score for each of the competing sce-
narios. In contrast to the previously presented “Top 10” tables these figures directly
compare the averaged outcomes of the Q-Strategy agents to those of the Benchmark
agents in each of the competing scenarios. For example, in sub-figure (a), the av-
erage job score of the 1-Q-Strategy consumers is higher than the average scores of
all 9-GD agents. Moreover, in the higher competition setting of sub-figure (a) the
Q-Strategy consumers outperform (CAAS) the GDs in the homogeneous (in these
cases, a direct comparison of the 0:10 and 10:0 is performed) and heterogeneous
settings (between 0:10 and 10:0 ). The Spearman correlation coefficient rs for the
Q-Strategy consumers is somewhat positive, which means that when the number of
Q-Strategy agents increases, the CAAS score improves. From the perspective of the
181 6.2.1 Consumer Outcomes
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.3: Consumer outcomes in settings with GD-Providers and the LLNL data
profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 50-GD-Providers;
(b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 50-GD-Providers; (c)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 100-GD-Providers; and, (d)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 100-GD-Providers.
GD consumers, the correlation is somewhat negative, when the number of GD agents
decreases. Therefore, the CAAS score of the lesser becoming GD consumers decreases
somewhat as the number of Q-Strategy consumers increases.
In contrast, in sub-figure (b) opponents of the Q-Strategy consumer agents are ZIP
consumers. Here, the Q-Strategy consumer agents outperform the ZIP opponents in
almost all heterogeneous settings, but failed in the homogeneous settings. In this
setting and in settings against ZIP consumers, Q-Strategy consumers experienced
an almost negative correlation between their CAAS scores and an increase in the
number of consumers for the Q-Strategy. On the other hand, ZIP agents experienced
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.4: Consumer outcomes in settings with GD-Providers and the HPC2N data
profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 50-GD-Providers;
(b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 50-GD-Providers; (c)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 100-GD-Providers; and, (d)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 100-GD-Providers.
an almost positive correlation between the decreasing number of agents and CAAS
scores, e.g. the 1-ZIP consumer managed to achieve a higher CAAS score than the 9-
Q-Strategy consumers. Both correlations are significant with p < 0.001 and p < 0.05.
In the higher supply case with 100 providers, sub-figures (c)–(d), the Q-Strategy
agents outperform the benchmark strategies ZIP and GD in all heterogeneous and
homogeneous settings. In the higher supply setting, the CAAS correlation of the GD
consumers changed from somewhat negative to almost negative; in other words, GD
consumers achieve higher CAAS when their number increases in relation to the num-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.5: Consumer outcomes in settings with Q-Providers and the LLNL data pro-
file: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 50-ZIP-Providers;
(b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 50-ZIP-Providers; (c)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 100-ZIP-Providers; and, (d)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 100-ZIP-Providers.
ber of Q-Strategy consumers. Similar to the outcome in sub-figure (b), the increase
in the number of Q-Strategy consumers correlated negatively with their CAAS score,
whereas the decrease in the number of ZIP consumers improved their CAAS score.
Figure 6.4 shows the same setting configurations, but with the HPC2N job profile,
which is 10 times larger. In almost all heterogeneous and homogeneous settings, the
Q-Strategy agents achieved a higher CAAS than those with the benchmark strategies,
except for the setting in sub-figure (b), where the ZIP consumers scored higher, on
average, in settings with a higher number of Q-Strategy agents. As discussed before,
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.6: Consumer outcomes in settings with ZIP-Providers and the HPC2N
data profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 50-ZIP-
Providers; (b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 50-ZIP-
Providers; (c) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 100-ZIP-
Providers; and, (d) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 100-ZIP-
Providers.
the ZIP strategy adapts quickly in highly competitive settings, which results in higher
CAAS scores. Furthermore, the outcomes in sub-figures (b)–(d) were, on average,
almost negatively correlated for the Q-Strategy. The correlation of GD consumers
with a higher number of Q-Strategy agents is almost negative, but positive, vice versa.
In contrast, an almost positive correlation can be observed in ZIP consumer agents
as the number of Q-Strategy agents increases.
The competitive property of the ZIP and GD strategies becomes evident when the
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(c) (d)
Figure 6.7: Consumer outcomes in settings with Q-Providers and the LLNL data pro-
file: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 50-Q-Providers; (b)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 50-Q-Providers; (c) Com-
peting settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 100-Q-Providers; and, (d) Com-
peting settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 100-Q-Providers.
providers are also type ZIP (Figure 6.5). In the smaller supply settings with 50
providers, the Q-Strategy consumers outperform their benchmark opponents only in
the heterogeneous settings with a smaller number of Q-Strategy agents; in settings
with a higher number of Q-Strategy agents, the competitive benchmark agents ZIP
and GD achieved higher CAAS. However, in the higher supply settings with 100
providers, the Q-Strategy agents outperform the benchmarks in all homogeneous and
heterogeneous settings. In the case of ZIP providers, the increase in the number of
Q-Strategy agents almost had a negative impact on their CAAS outcome.
In the larger data profile in Figure 6.6 a lower supply of ZIP providers (high com-
6.2.1 Consumer Outcomes 186
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(c) (d)
Figure 6.8: Consumer outcomes in settings with Q-Providers and the HPC2N data
profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 50-Q-Providers;
(b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 50-Q-Providers; (c)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 100-Q-Providers; and, (d)
Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 100-Q-Providers.
petition for less computing services), the GD and ZIP benchmark strategies outper-
formed the Q-Strategy, whereas in the higher supply setting, the Q-Strategy con-
sumers performed better than the benchmark strategies. However, the rising number
of Q-Strategy agents is almost negatively correlated for the overall consumer scores
(CAAS); only the ZIP consumers in (d) achieved a somewhat positive correlation
with an increase in the number of Q-Strategy agents.
Figure 6.7 depicts a case, in which the providers are of the Q-Strategy type. As
stated earlier, the fully homogeneous settings of Q-Strategy consumers and Q-Strategy
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providers achieved the highest scores. Here, this result is confirmed; in sub-figures (a)–
(d) the Q-Strategy consumers achieved a higher CAAS score against the benchmark
bidding strategies in the low and high supply settings. In contrast to the settings
of ZIP and GD providers, here the consumer bidding strategies correlated positively
with an increase in the number of Q-Strategy agents. The GD consumers in the
high supply setting do not yield significant evidence (p = 0.86) for a correlation
(rs = −0.06 is very close to a correlation of 0).
Figure 6.8 also shows the positive results for the larger HPC2N data profile. In
the case of Q-Strategy providers, the Q-Strategy consumers outperformed the bench-
mark strategies GD and ZIP. Furthermore, the correlation is almost positive for the
consumers’ CAAS when the number of Q-Strategy agents increases, whereas the cor-
relation for ZIP consumers is almost positive when the Q-Strategy consumers are in
the majority.
6.2.2 Provider Outcomes
Table 6.7 presents the outcomes from the provider’s perspective with a supply of
50 machines and with the LLNL data profile. All providers are classic profit max-
imizers and Q-Strategy is configured with the profit maximizing scoring function
for the provider case. As shown in the “Top 10” outcomes, Table 6.7, the highest
providers’ aggregated average score (PAAS) was achieved by providers applying the
ZIP strategy. However, the higher PAAS scores are achieved in settings dominated
by Q-Strategy consumers. Therefore, Q-Strategy consumers paid higher prices, on
average, which resulted in higher profits for the providers. This can be explained
by the fact that Q-Strategy consumers optimize their job specific goals in terms of
completion time and payments, which resulted in higher payments than those of the
price competitive ZIP and GD consumers. Moreover, reinforcement-based strategies
optimize long-term rewards rather than short-term gains like in cases using the ZIP
and GD strategies (Note: GD and ZIP assume and use the public information of
all other agents’ bids and clearing prices in order to remain price competitive. In
markets with imperfect information, these strategies might not be the best choice).
Full lists of the providers’ outcomes of all homogeneous and heterogenous settings
can be found in Appendix B.2.
In the case with 100 providers and the LLNL data profile, Table 6.8, the highest profit
was achieved by providers applying the GD strategy, but again in settings dominated
by Q-Strategy consumer agents.
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Table 6.7: Top 10 provider outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL
data profile. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 50 Providers PAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 6180
(10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers 6135
2 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers 6088
3 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 6018
4 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers 5977
5 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers 5937
6 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers 5867
7 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers 5841
8 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 5779
9 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers 5712
10 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 5595
Table 6.8: Top 10 provider outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL
data profile. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 100 Providers PAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers 2095
(10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers 2079
2 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers 2029
3 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers 2023
4 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers 1953
5 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers 1934
6 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers 1887
7 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers 1833
8 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers 1804
9 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers 1734
10 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers 1732
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Table 6.9: Top 10 provider outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the HPC2N
data profile. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 50 Providers PAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers 53314
(10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 53066
2 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers 52757
3 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers 52172
4 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 51785
5 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers 51670
6 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers 50804
7 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 50281
8 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers 49697
9 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers 49222
10 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 48436
Table 6.10: Top 10 provider outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the HPC2N
data profile. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 100 Providers PAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers 17669
(10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers 17619
2 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers 17122
3 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers 17049
4 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers 16593
5 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers 16408
6 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers 16139
7 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers 15631
8 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers 15459
9 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers 14843
10 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers 14761
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Tables 6.9 and 6.10 display the results with 50 and 100 providers with the HPC2N
data profile. The outcomes of the LLNL and HPC2N data profiles are comparable,
but resulted in higher profits due to higher (10 times more) number of jobs. In the
50 provider HPC2N settings the ZIP providers again achieved higher profits than
the GD and Q-Strategy providers (see Appendix B for a full version of the table),
whereas the GD providers outperformed the GD and Q-Strategy providers in the 100
provider HPC2N settings. Like in the 50 provider settings, the profitable provider
settings also consisted of a dominant number of Q-Strategy consumers.
Figure 6.9 presents the provider outcomes for the LLNL data profile and the varying
types of consumer agents. Based on the design specification and focus on consumers,
all providers are modeled to be homogeneous. Therefore, their outcomes with ZIP,
GD and Q-Strategy provider agents can be directly compared. Unlike with con-
sumers, in the case with provider agents, the scoring function of Q-Strategy is to
maximize profit.
The first sub-figure (a) shows a setting with (Q : GD)-consumers, 50 providers in
total for all three strategy types – ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy – and the data profile
LLNL. The x-axis represents the (Q : GD)-consumers competition settings and the
y-axis is the providers’ aggregated average score. Here, the price competitive and
profit maximizing bidding strategies, ZIP and GD, outperformed Q-Strategy in all
consumer competition settings. However, all three strategies in all of the four sub-
figures correlate significantly and almost positively with an increasing number of
Q-Strategy consumer agents. In the case of sub-figure (b), the Q-Strategy provider
agents outperformed the ZIP and GD providers in the setting, fully dominated by ZIP
consumers outperforming ZIP providers in the (1Q : 9ZIP )-consumers setting. With
an increasing number of Q-Strategy consumers, the ZIP providers outperformed the
GD providers in the higher competition settings with 50 providers, but lost against
them in the moderate competition settings with 100 providers.
In the case of settings with a higher supply, sub-figures (c)–(d), the Q-Strategy
provider agents lost in most of the competitions against the benchmark agents, but
have been successful against the ZIP providers (also in a case against a GD provider,
sub-figure (d)) in settings with a smaller number of Q-Strategy consumers.
In the case of Figure 6.10 and the larger data profile HPC2N, the results are similar.
However, in sub-figure (d) the Q-Strategy providers achieved a higher PAAS against
the ZIP providers in most of the competition settings. Similar to the previous out-
come with the LLNL data profile, the Q-Strategy providers were successful in this
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Figure 6.9: Provider outcomes in settings with competing consumers and the LLNL
data profile: (a) Outcome comparison between the 50-Providers of types ZIP, GD
and Q-Strategy, and competing consumers of type (Q-Strategy:GD); (b) Outcome
comparison between the 50-Providers of types ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy, and com-
peting consumers of type (Q-Strategy:ZIP); (c) Outcome comparison between the
100-Providers of types ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy, and competing consumers of type
(Q-Strategy:GD); and, (d) Outcome comparison between the 100-Providers of types
ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy, and competing consumers of type (Q-Strategy:ZIP).
setting, which was dominated by ZIP consumers. However, this evidence is observ-
able only in the moderate competition settings of 100 providers; in the case of higher
competition (lower supply of 50 providers), the Q-Strategy providers have been suc-
cessful only in settings, which are fully dominated by ZIP consumers. As soon as the
number of Q-Strategy consumers increases in relation to the ZIP consumers, the Q-
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Figure 6.10: Provider outcomes in settings with competing consumers and the
HPC2N data profile: (a) Outcome comparison between the 50-Providers of types
ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy, and competing consumers of type (Q-Strategy:GD); (b)
Outcome comparison between the 50-Providers of types ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy,
and competing consumers of type (Q-Strategy:ZIP); (c) Outcome comparison be-
tween the 100-Providers of types ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy, and competing consumers
of type (Q-Strategy:GD); and, (d) Outcome comparison between the 100-Providers of
types ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy, and competing consumers of type (Q-Strategy:ZIP).
Strategy providers tend to be outperformed by the ZIP and GD providers. Moreover,
in all settings the rising number of learning Q-Strategy consumers strongly correlated
with the PAAS scores of all provider types (ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy). Therefore,
in all cases, the providers will prefer to have consumers of type Q-Strategy, which
maximize their goals in the long term.
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The outcomes of this section confirm and enhance the findings of Gjerstad (2003),
Tesauro and Bredin (2002), and Das et al. (2001) that the ZIP and GD strategies are
good candidates in price competitive markets, in which public information of other
agents’ actions is available. In addition, these analyses shows that the ZIP providers
outperform the GD providers in the highly competitive settings with 50 providers
and in both workload profiles, LLNL and HPC2N. However, in the moderately com-
petitive settings with 100 providers, the GD providers received the highest PAAS
scores on average. Moreover, an important result of this section is that all types of
the elaborated provider agents (ZIP, GD, Q-Strategy) benefit with the an increas-
ing number of Q-Strategy consumers that aim to maximize their complex long term
goals (“minimum completion time and payments”). In settings, dominated by profit
maximizing ZIP and GD agents, agents, however, the PAAS score for providers was
significantly (p < 0.001) lower.
6.2.3 Combined Outcomes
The combination of the consumers’ and providers’ aggregated average scores (CC-
PAAS) provides a general view of the total CAAS score of both the Q-Strategy CAAS
and Benchmark CAAS, as well as the total PAAS of the providers. Since the con-
sumers’ CAAS has a higher value than the PAAS, with an exponential factor differ-
ence of at least 102, the “Top 10 Lists” would look similar to those of the consumer
outcomes. However, the combined analysis shows the total outcome for each set-
ting, which is summarized for all consumer and provider agents into one value, the
CCPAAS score. Therefore, the CCPAAS analysis allows the derivation of evidence
regarding the general effects of the Q-Strategy agents when competing against bench-
mark agents in homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios.
Figure 6.11 depicts the combined outcomes in the settings with competing [Q:GD]
and [Q:ZIP] consumers, 50 and 100 providers of type GD, and with the LLNL work-
load profile. The combined outcomes in sub-figure (a) do not significantly (p = 0.92)
correlate with an increasing number of Q-Strategy consumers against a decreasing
number of GD consumers and in the more competitive setting with 50 providers. In
the same setting, but with ZIP Benchmark consumers (sub-figure (b)), the CCPAAS
correlate significantly and almost negatively with an increasing number of Q-Strategy
consumers. In the moderately competitive setting with 100 providers, sub-figures (c)
and (d), the correlation relationships reverse: sub-figure (c) shows a negative cor-
relation with the increasing number of Q-Strategy consumers in relation to the GD
consumers and the CCPAAS score, whereas sub-figure (d) does not show any sig-
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Figure 6.11: Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with GD-
Providers and the LLNL data profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-
Consumers and 50-GD-Providers; (b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-
Consumers and 50-GD-Providers; (c) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-
Consumers and 100-GD-Providers; and, (d) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-
Consumers and 100-GD-Providers.
nificant change of direction of the CCPAAS scores with an increasing number of
Q-Strategy consumers in relation to ZIP consumers.
In similar settings, but with the larger HPC2N data profile, an increasing number of
Q-Strategy agents does not correlate with the CCPAAS (Figure 6.12). Moreover, the
sub-figures (a) to (d) do not show any significant correlation of the CCPAAS with an
increasing number of Q-Strategy agents, however, in the more competitive settings
with 50 providers, the CCPAAS tend to correlate negatively.
Figure 6.13 shows the similar cases with the LLNL workload profile and with type ZIP
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Figure 6.12: Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with GD-
Providers and the HPC2N data profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-
Consumers and 50-GD-Providers; (b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-
Consumers and 50-GD-Providers; (c) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-
Consumers and 100-GD-Providers; and, (d) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-
Consumers and 100-GD-Providers.
providers. Sub-figures (a) and (b) show that the CCPAAS correlate significantly and
negatively with an increasing number of Q-Strategy consumers. As observed in the
consumer outcomes, the ZIP and GD consumers outperformed the Q-Strategy when
all providers applied the ZIP strategy. Therefore, sub-figures (a) and (b) confirm this
relationship since the CCPAAS scores improved when the number of ZIP consumers
increase in relation to the Q-Strategy consumers in settings with ZIP providers. In
he moderately competitive settings with 100 providers, sub-figures (c) and (d), there
is no observable or significant correlation between the CCPAAS and the increasing
number of Q-Strategy consumers.
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Figure 6.13: Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with ZIP-
Providers and the LLNL data profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-
Consumers and 50-ZIP-Providers; (b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-
Consumers and 50-ZIP-Providers; (c) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-
Consumers and 100-ZIP-Providers; and, (d) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-
Consumers and 100-ZIP-Providers.
Figure 6.14 shows the same settings, but with the HPC2N job profile. Only sub-
figure (b) shows a significant and negative correlation of the CCPAAS and the in-
creasing number of Q-Strategy consumers in relation to ZIP consumers. The sub-
figures (a), (c) and (d) show a tendency to negative correlations of the CCPAAS and
the competing consumer settings since the correlations are not significant (p > 0.05).
Figure 6.15 shows the case, in which all providers apply the Q-Strategy and the con-
sumers are executed with the LLNL workload. The outcomes in the high competitive
settings, sub-figures (a) and (b), show a significant (p < 0.05) and positive correlation
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Figure 6.14: Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with ZIP-
Providers and the HPC2N data profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-
Consumers and 50-ZIP-Providers; (b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-
Consumers and 50-ZIP-Providers; (c) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-
Consumers and 100-ZIP-Providers; and, (d) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-
Consumers and 100-ZIP-Providers.
between the CCPAAS and increasing number of Q-Strategy consumers in relation to
the Benchmark consumers GD and ZIP. In the moderately competitive settings with
100 providers, only sub-figure 6.15d shows a significant and positive correlation of the
CCPAAS and the number of Q-Strategy consumers, sub-figure 6.15c does not show
any correlation at all.
Figure 6.16 displays the cases with the larger HPC2N job profile. The outcomes
in subfigures (a) and (b) confirm the findings of their LLNL equivalences and show
significant and positive correlations between the CCPAAS and the number of Q-
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Figure 6.15: Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with Q-Providers
and the LLNL data profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers
and 50-Q-Providers; (b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and
50-Q-Providers; (c) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 100-Q-
Providers; and, (d) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 100-Q-
Providers.
Strategy consumer agents. Sub-figure (d) shows a tendency to positive correlations of
the CCPAAS and the number of Q-Strategy consumer agents, whereas, sub-figure (c)
does not show any correlation at all.
The evaluation results show that although the Q-Strategy only adapts from local
experience, it was able to outperform the benchmark strategies in most homoge-
neous and heterogeneous agent settings, from a consumer and combined perspective.
Therefore, Q-Strategy offers a promising approach for automating bidding processes
in markets with complete and incomplete information. In markets with incomplete
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Figure 6.16: Combined consumer and provider outcomes in settings with Q-Providers
and the HPC2N data profile: (a) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers
and 50-Q-Providers; (b) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and
50-Q-Providers; (c) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:GD)-Consumers and 100-Q-
Providers; and, (d) Competing settings of (Q-Strategy:ZIP)-Consumers and 100-Q-
Providers.
information, strategies like ZIP and GD may become infeasible with respect to the
public information available, where the Q-Strategy offers a good approximation for
the exploration and exploitation processes in uncertain environments. However, in
the more competitive settings with providers of type ZIP, the price competitive con-
sumer benchmarks ZIP and GD outperformed the Q-Strategy consumers.
From a provider’s perspective, the price competitive provider strategies ZIP and GD
outperformed the Q-Strategy providers. However, an interesting result from their
outcomes is that all types of providers (ZIP, GD and Q-Strategy) profit with an
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increasing number of Q-Strategy consumers.
Moreover, the evaluation results showed the adaptive and stable behavior of the Q-
Strategy in the various settings and for both job profiles, LLNL and HPC2N. The
combined results of consumer and provider scores confirmed the effectiveness of the Q-
Strategy. The highest consumer scores and combined scores were achieved in settings
with solely Q-Strategy providers and Q-Strategy consumers as well as in settings,
dominated by Q-Strategy consumer agents.
6.3 Summary
This chapter presented the economic evaluation of the Q-Strategy against the selected
(Section 3.3.5) benchmark bidding strategies, ZIP and GD (Section 3.3.4), for the
target market scenario of this work: Spot market, implemented with the Continuous
Double Auction with no time constraints regarding closing times of rounds or days.
The applied evaluation methodology is in keeping with existing methodologies of
agent-based computational economics and empirical game theoretic analysis. In ad-
dition to these methodologies, detailed scenarios with homogenous and heterogeneous
settings of bidding strategies for consumers and homogeneous settings for providers
have been designed for this work. A detailed description of the evaluation methodol-
ogy, homogeneous and heterogeneous settings, selected job profiles, the consumer and
provider scoring functions, the applied statistical methods and the technical archi-
tecture of the agent-based experimental system are presented in Section 6.1. Section
6.2 presented the evidence from the experiments’ outcomes from consumer, provider
and combined perspectives.
Chapter 7
Technical Analysis and Application
T
his chapter presents the integration of the presented models of this work in three
case studies: Two application case studies for batch and interactive jobs and a
case study for generating service level agreements. The case studies, Batch Supply
Chain Data Analysis, Interactive Sensor Data Analysis and e-Service Level Agree-
ments are part of the SORMA project and realistic candidates for using computing
(infrastructure) services on demand. Moreover, the MX/CS communication protocol
was applied in another application scenario called Social Cloud for sharing storage
services in social communities.
7.1 Technical Analysis as Methodology
Technical analysis of software artifacts is a commonly applied methodology in design
science (Hevner et al., 2004). Hevner et al. (2004) provide guidelines and describe
methods for the specification and evaluation of software artifacts. In this context,
software artifacts can be semantic constructs (vocabulary and symbols), software
engineering models, algorithms and prototypes. The Information Systems Research
Framework presents the general concepts Environment, IS Research and Knowledge
Base for describing and evaluating theories and software artifacts (Hevner et al.,
2004). The Environment contains a description of the People roles, the Organization
structure, as well as the applied Technology in terms of infrastructure and appli-
cations. The IS Research concept describes the development processes of theories
and artifacts and their justification/evaluation through analytical comparison, case
studies, experiments, field studies and simulation. The Knowledge Base provides the
fundamental information for building the theories and artifacts in terms of analyses of
existing and commonly applied theories, best practices, existing (formal) frameworks,
models and methodologies. This chapter applies the design science methodology by
describing the application of the developed models for market-based scheduling in
three case studies and in a third-party project. Moreover, a performance analysis
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of the integrated SORMA system is performed, which shows the tractability and
efficient resource usage of the integrated system components.
7.2 Case Study 1: Batch Supply Chain Data Analysis
7.2.1 TXTDemand and Its Market Scenario
The first application scenario addresses the automated submission and execution
of batch jobs on outsourced computing services, which are automatically allocated
through a marketplace and according to the supply and demand. Each batch appli-
cation consists of all required libraries, legal agreements (licenses), input data and
configuration files in order to be automatically deployed and executed on the com-
puting services of the allocated external provider.
Figure 7.1: TXTDemand: An application for supply chain management and data
analysis (screenshot provided by the SORMA project)
TXTDemand is a software application for supply chain management and data analy-
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sis, which performs sophisticated calculations using historic data for demand forecast-
ing of future product sales and derivation of replenishment strategies (Windsor et al.,
2009; Nimis et al., 2008; Neumann et al., 2007). Figure 7.1 shows the user interface
of the TXTDemand application. The TXTDemand application provider configures
and executes the log data of its customers on its local infrastructure. The data logs of
the different customers are executed with TXTDemand as batch applications during
the night since the results often have to be available by the next morning. However,
the TXTDemand application provider needs a flexible and economically efficient way
of acquiring additional computing services on demand to be able to meet customer
demand and deal with the changing preferences of customers. Economic efficiency
with regard to the TXTDemand application provider refers to the platforms, mech-
anisms, methods, and tools needed to enable a rapid, automatic and market-based
allocation of external computing services on demand. The TXTDemand provider ex-
pects to achieve cost reductions through better utilization of its local infrastructure
with acceptable fixed costs by covering its higher demand peaks through the acqui-
sition of computing services from external providers. Moreover, the TXTDemand
provider expects greater flexibility with regard to license costs and greater customer
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Figure 7.2: Integrated view of TXTDemand SaaS, TXTOrchestrator, BidGenerator,
MX/CS and the SORMA Market for Computing Services (own representation)
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The prototypical integration of TXTDemand with the SORMA market is presented
in Figure 7.2. According to this representation, all of the TXTDemand customers
use the TXTDemand client in order to view the results of their sales data analysis.
In order to receive their results, the customers upload their data to the TXTDemand
Software as a Service, SaaS application. The TXTDemand SaaS performs the steps
Sales Analysis, Replenishment Analysis and Reporting according to the customers’
preferences and on the TXTDemand provider’s local infrastructure. If the customer
demand exceeds the capacity of the TXTDemand provider infrastructure, the TX-
TOrchestrator is activated to acquire external computing services from the market.
The TXTOrchestrator submits a PrivateMessage to the owned BidGenerator, which
starts to execute the bidding processes with the market until an allocation is returned
(cf. Figure 4.3 in Section 4.4.2). Based on the received allocation, the TXTOrches-
trator deploys the TXTDemand SaaS on the external computing service and starts
to execute the customers’ sales data analysis.
7.2.2 TXTDemand Requirements
The following TXTDemand requirements are summarized from Section 2.4.1.1 and
selected according to the models presented for this work:
1. The BidGenerator should provide clear APIs in order to be adopted by non-
experts as well. The BidGenerator should support consumers and providers in
preparing their bids, and help them understand the economic impact of their
actions.
2. Flexibility has to be ensured in case the consumers need more computing ser-
vices than initially agreed.
3. The transfer of consumer data and bidding processes needs to be fast and
performed over a secured communication line, which is part of the SORMA
system’s communication protocol.
4. Privacy, data protection and security has to be ensured with well-defined poli-
cies that are enforced and easy to demonstrate since the TXTDemand applica-
tion handles private and sensitive customer sales data.
5. Negotiations need to be automated and supported according to a clear method-
ology and service level contracts need to be established for technical parameters
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like CPU, memory, storage and bandwidth, as well as for economic parameters
like duration and payment.
6. The market-based scheduling system has to support different payment models
like pay-per-use, dynamic pricing, prepayments and post-payments.
7.2.3 Integration of BidGenerator and MX/CS Protocol
The actual integration of TXTDemand with the SORMA market is realized with the
TXTOrchestrator and its integration with the BidGenerator. The TXTOrchestrator
orchestrates customer batch jobs to computing services allocated from the SORMA
market. Figure 7.3 shows the web user interface of the TXTOrchestrator. It provides
facilities for creating new batch job descriptions, importing batch job descriptions,
calculating technical requirements for the batch jobs based on past experience and ini-
tialization of bid requests to the BidGenerator. The TXTOrchestrator web interface
shows a list of the uploaded ids for the batch jobs with general technical parameters,
time constraints and their values. Based on these parameters, the TXTOrchestrator
creates a PrivateMessage (see Section 5.3.1) with a detailed description of the batch
job, the technical requirements and economic preferences.
Figure 7.3: TXTOrchestrator: General view (screenshot provided by the SORMA
project)
Figure 7.4 shows a detailed view of the utilized technical and economic attributes like
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time constraints, duration, maximum price (valuation), bidding strategy, payment
type and others, which are all part of the PrivateMessage. The TXTOrchestrator uses
the non-blocking Web service interface of BidGenerator to submit the PrivateMessage
for the target batch job. The BidGenerator starts the bidding process as specified
in the PrivateMessage and with the selected bidding strategy. When the bidding
process succeeds, the TXTOrchestrator receives the MarketMessage (Section 5.3.4)
back from BidGenerator and uses it to deploy and execute the batch job on the target
computing service from the allocated external provider.
Figure 7.4: TXTOrchestrator: Job details (screenshot provided by the SORMA
project)
As part of the project SORMA, TXTDemand with TXTOrchestrator was integrated,
tested and evaluated with BidGenerator and the MX/CS communication protocol
(Figure 7.2). The integrated SORMA prototype was installed on several sites in
different countries and continents and its integration was proofed and evaluated by
running test jobs using the TXTDemand settings. The tests proved end-to-end func-
tionality of the running prototype with distributed, heterogeneous network, hardware
and software environments. The TXTDemand application evaluation proved the Bid-
Generator and MX/CS concepts, but could not give clear evidence on the outcome of
the selected bidding strategies because of the heterogeneity of the installed testbeds
with different network, hardware and software characteristics, as well as because of
the TXTDemand -specific design settings for the number of jobs, the number of con-
sumers and the number of providers. Therefore, this work evaluated the bidding
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strategies that were part of BidGenerator, in a controlled experimental environment
with well-defined settings and homogeneous computing nodes of hardware and soft-
ware configurations, as part of a computing cluster (Chapter 6).
7.2.4 Summary of Case Study Contributions
Requirement 1 of the TXTDemand application is addressed in both the architecture
and APIs of the BidGenerator (Section 4.4), as well as the communication proto-
col MX/CS (Section 5.3). Non-experts can use the TXTOrchestrator web interface
to specify their technical and economic preferences, which are transformed into a
PrivateMessage, which is part of the MX/CS protocol. The BidGenerator uses the
values in PrivateMessage to initialize the agents with the selected bidding strategy
in order to start and execute the bidding processes. Moreover, BidGenerator offers
clear and simple APIs for experts, who can implement their own agents and bidding
strategies, as well as integrate tools for further analysis of the market data. Require-
ment 2 is satisfied by the fact that BidGenerator can perform multiple negotiations
for multiple requests in parallel according to the specified consumer requirements and
system resources on which the BidGenerator is running. Furthermore, consumers are
able to predict and specify their requirements in the PrivateMessage and ensure that
the executed TXTDemand service performs a checkpoint of the actual state and be-
fore the requested execution time (job duration) is exceeded. If the job is still not
finished, the TXTOrchestrator can request a new allocation from the BidGenerator
and start the already checkpointed job on the new computing service.
Requirement 3 is satisfied by the integrated security mechanism in the BidGenerator
framework. Each bid generated and submitted to the SORMA system is signed and
validated by a trusted identity provider with the SAML protocol. Requirement 4
addresses security and privacy issues as well. Security and trust in the SORMA sys-
tem are handled according to the SAML protocol. The security and data protection
policies between the application owner and the target computing service provider
are also handled with the SAML protocol, but enforced through additional legal and
data protection policies by SORMA’s Contract Management. However, the legal and
data privacy aspects have been not investigated in detail in SORMA. However, they
will be dealt with in future research.
The automated bidding part of Requirement 5 is fully supported by BidGenerator.
The establishment of service level contracts of technical and economic parameters is
supported by the MX/CS communication protocol and discussed in Section 7.4. Re-
quirement 6 is addressed in the specification of the MX/CS communication protocol,
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which incorporates attributes for bids and payment methods like prepayments and
post-payments.
7.3 Case Study 2: Interactive Sensor Data Analysis
7.3.1 Visage and Its Market Scenario
The second case study represents the class of interactive web-based applications.
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Figure 7.5: Integrated view of TXTDemand SaaS, TXTOrchestrator, BidGenerator,
MX/CS and the SORMA Market for Computing Services (own representation)
The data analysis is performed in three logical steps (Figure 7.5). The Motion Detec-
tion compares a sequence of two or more pictures in order to detect a motion. The
Object Recognition component performs a pattern recognition to identify the type of
moving object. At the end, a Report is created and submitted back to the client.
Visage is provided as an SaaS and invoked by the client. Similar to the previous sce-
nario, the Visage provider owns a limited computing infrastructure and aims to cover
peak times by acquiring computing services on the market. Visage clients invoke the
Visage Service to get service instances for analyzing the video streams. The Visage
Service returns instances of the Visage provider’s infrastructure or if there are no free
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capacities, Visage invokes BidGenerator in order to acquire computing services from
the market (cf. Figure 4.3 in Section 4.4.2). On successful allocation, the Visage
SaaS is deployed on the target computing services of the external providers and the
new instances are returned back to the Visage client.
7.3.2 Visage Requirements
The following Visage requirements are summarized from Section 2.4.1.2 and selected
according to the models presented in this work:
1. Automated purchasing and allocation of external computing services from the
market according to well-defined and implemented bidding strategies.
2. Efficient deployment of Visage on external computing services.
3. Visage clients may request several resources simultaneously and the allocations
have to take all simultaneous requests into account.
4. The Visage system and clients communicate over secured interfaces and all data
is protected from unauthorized access.
5. The Visage system defines defines the specific requirements for computing ser-
vices that have to be taken into account for the bidding processes and fulfilled
by the external provider.
The Visage requirements are similar to these of TXTDemand, however, the interac-
tive applications have different characteristics from the batch applications in terms
of technical and economic attributes, security, service level agreement creation and
enforcement, as well as the management of contracts and licenses.
7.3.3 Integration of the BidGenerator and MX/CS Protocol
Figure 7.6 presents the integration of the BidGenerator and MX/CS protocol from
the perspective of the Visage client. The second part of the Visage client shows
economic data like Bidding Strategy (part of PrivateMessage), Bid (part of Pub-
licMessage), and Generated Price (i.e., the Clearing Price as part of the returned
MarketMessage), as part of the MX/CS protocol. Moreover, the MarketMessage
contains the endpoint reference of the target Visage service, which is displayed in the
Server url. In this example, the video data is streamed from a directory and the path
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is displayed in the Video Source element. The first part of the Visage client shows
the result of the video data analysis. In the example below, the detected object, the
car, is highlighted.
Figure 7.6: Visage client invoked BidGenerator with the Q-Strategy, received an
allocation of Visage with an endpoint reference and started an analysis of video data
sequences (screenshot provided by the SORMA project)
Figure 7.71 shows a real demonstration of the SORMA system with Visage client, Bid-
Generator, MX/CS and the SORMA Resource Manager called EERM (Maćıas et al.,
2008). The adapted version of both Visage clients in this case utilize the Truth-Telling
bidding strategy when invoking the BidGenerator and show aggregated statistics of
the already processed images on the different Visage service nodes, which have been
allocated through BidGenerator. The aggregated values are similar because of the
1Demonstration at IES 2009, Internet of Services 2009, ICT Challenge 1.2 Service and Software
Architectures, Infrastructures and Engineering Collaboration meeting for FP6 & FP7 projects.
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Figure 7.7: Visage integration (Garry Smith, demonstration at IES 2009, project
SORMA)
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similar economic preferences of the bidding strategy and valuation. The SORMA
Resource Manager shows monitoring information about the Visage service execution
(first part of the EERM’s web interface), as well as economic information like the
bidding strategy and valuation (second part of the EERM’s web interface).
Like in Case Study 1, the Visage service was integrated, tested and evaluated with
BidGenerator and the MX/CS communication protocol as part of the SORMA
project and according to the specific settings of the Visage scenario.
7.3.4 Summary of Case Study Contributions
Requirement 1 of Visage is fully satisfied by BidGenerator since it enables automation
of the bidding processes. The efficient deployment of Visage on external computing
services, Requirement 2, is enabled by the information provided in MX/CS protocol,
the contract between the Visage owner and the computing service provider. The
contract contains the endpoint reference of the target machine, on which the Visage
SaaS is automatically deployed as a web application in Tomcat or Jetty through their
standard deployment interfaces. Requirement 3, simultaneous requests for multiple
computing services, is fully supported by the non-blocking interface and scalable.2
BidGenerator satisfies the part of Requirement 4, which addresses its security con-
cept of signing and validating the MX/CS messages that are exchanged within the
SORMA system. The mechanisms for secured communication between the Visage
client and deployed Visage system are performed outside the SORMA system and
BidGenerator and are defined and realized by the owner of the Visage system.
Requirement 5 is partially satisfied with the MX/CS protocol, which provides at-
tributes to specify technical requirements (e.g., by wrapping JSDL) for the system
resource configurations like CPU, memory, storage and bandwidth, the endpoint
reference for deploying the Visage service, as well as the economic preferences for au-
tomating bidding processes. However, electronic contracts of software services have
to contain application-specific attributes for monitoring and enforcing application-
specific key performance indicators. The definition of application-specific attributes
was not part of this work, however, it will be a subject area of future research.
2Scalability is limited by the system resources on which BidGenerator is running.
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7.4 Case Study 3: Application of MX/CS for e-Service Level
Agreements
7.4.1 Service Level Agreements in SORMA and Requirements
The result of a matchmaking process in the SORMA system is the creation of a
service contract, or a service level agreement (SLA) between the allocated consumer
and provider. The SLA includes technical and economic information from the Pub-
licMessages of the consumer and provider, which is aggregated according to the
matchmaking policy applied (Section 5.4).
The TXTDemand and Visage scenarios define the following requirements with re-
spect to SLAs (Section 2.4.1):
1. A system for market-based scheduling has to provide the possibility of nego-
tiating negotiate service level agreements and instantiating related contracts.
The negotiation process should include technical parameters for raw resources
like CPU, memory, storage and bandwidth. A service level agreement has to
include information about the duration of a job and the maximum reservation
time of the computing service provided.
2. The negotiation protocol has to take into account situations in which resource
providers cannot meet the requirements of certain service level agreements and
are therefore forced to break them. The economic impact of such events and
their causes have to be evaluated and appropriate mechanisms have to be de-
veloped to address them (e.g., compensation payments, which are also called
penalties).
3. To increase acceptance and trust in the system, providers of computing ser-
vices have to be evaluated according to well-defined indicators like reliability,
performance, etc.
4. A market-based scheduling system has to support different payment models like
pay-per-use, dynamic pricing, prepayments and post-payments.
5. The Visage system defines specific requirements for computing services, which
have to be taken into consideration for the purchasing (bidding) processes.
Furthermore, the result of a market-based allocation is a service level agreement,
which has to be fulfilled by the external provider.
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A WS-Agreement is a commonly applied protocol in the Grid community for nego-
tiating service contracts. A WS-Agreement defines the general negotiation concepts,
a detailed definition of these concepts and their instantiation is left up to the ap-
plication designer. Moreover, a WS-Agreement allows the incorporation of other
commonly applied languages like the Job Submission and Description Language. In
the SORMA context, a WS-Agreement is created from the MarketMessage, which is
the result of the matchmaking process of the consumer’s and provider’s PublicMes-
sages. The MarketMessage is transformed into a WS-Agreement document, which
is also called MarketMessage since it incorporates the same data after the syntax-
based transformation has taken place. Moreover, a WS-Agreement is designed for
negotiations and has been adapted through extensions for an auction scenario. The
following section describes the creation procedure of a WS-Agreement document in
SORMA.
7.4.2 Application of the MX/CS Protocol
Figure 7.8 illustrates the mapping of theMarketMessage3 concepts into aWS-Agreement
document. A WS-Agreement document is created from a MarketMessage in six steps.
In the first step, a globally unique contract identification is generated. In the example
below, the ids of the consumer and provider are concatenated with a timestamp. In
the second step, the consumer and provider ids, together with their bid and offer ids
are taken into the WS-Agreement context. The validity period, which is part of the
context, specifies the end time of the contract. The third step includes the creation
of the WS-Agreement ’s service properties – references to the key performance indi-
cators, which are extracted from the technical resource description, which are part
of the MarketMessage. The endpoint reference to the provider’s computing service
is added in step four. In step five, the technical description of a MarketMessage is
taken into the resource description concept of the WS-Agreement document. The
last and sixth step concludes the creation process by extracting the Guarantee Terms
from the technical description (JSDL) and integrating them into the target concept
of the WS-Agreement document.
The transformation process of a MarketMessage into a WS-Agreement document
required a definition of the extensions for the latter. For example, concepts like pay-
ment type, bid, signature and clearing price are missing in the general WS-Agreement
3EJSDLMarket is the name of the MarketMessage, which uses the JSDL description language
for expressing the technical requirements.
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SLA: WS-Agreement
ID
Consumer Id + Provider Id + Time stamp
Context
Agreement Initiator: [Consumer Id, Bid Id]
Agreement Responder: [Provider Id, Offer Id]

























































KPI: JSDL Resource Description or Reservation
Scope - which service(s) this term relates to
Term Name: Resource Type or Reservation
Reward: [% Clearing Price, Payment Type]
Penalty: EJSDL* Penalty Type
Service Properties
Summary of the Observable Metrics, which 
constitute the Guarantee Terms
Service Reference
Provider Endpoint Reference
Figure 7.8: Transformation of the MarketMessage concepts into a WS-Agreement
(Borissov et al., 2009b).
framework. Moreover, the WS-Agreement concepts Agreement Initiator and Agree-
ment Responder do not fit with the semantics of the mappedMarketMessage concepts
– Provider and Consumer. Furthermore, a WS-Agreement does not explicitly define
the attributes for adding the consumer and provider signatures. These missing at-
tributes have been included as extensions to the WS-Agreement Guarantee Terms
concept.
Finally, theWS-Agreement allows multiple reward and penalty functions with respect
to the Guarantee Terms to be defined. However, the WS-Agreement specifications
do not offer any practical suggestions for describing and setting penalty and reward
policies, or for mapping and enforcing them. In this context, an incentive compatible
penalty function based on k-pricing for the market-based scheduling domain was
developed by Becker et al. (2008).
7.4.3 Summary of Case Study Contributions
Requirement 1 is addressed in SORMA with the MX/CS protocol and the transfor-
mation procedure of MarketMessage into a WS-Agreement document. Requirement
2 was not fully addressed in the SORMA system, but supported by the concepts
defined for the MX/CS protocol and the research performed in this area (Becker
et al., 2008). However, the calculation of penalties and automatic enforcement of
service level agreements are emerging subject areas for future research. Require-
ment 3 is addressed through the transformation of the MarketMessage concepts into
WS-Agreement key performance indicators, however, more research and evaluation is
required in this area. Requirement 4 is supported by the incorporation of different
7.5. FURTHER APPLICATION SCENARIOS OF MX/CS 216
payment models and pricing concepts in the definition of an MX/CS protocol. More-
over, these concepts are mapped into the extensions of the WS-Agreement document.
Requirement 5 is partially supported by the MX/CS protocol since application ser-
vices like Visage require application-specific attributes, key performance indicators
and penalty functions. The Web service URL to the Visage SaaS is part of the
endpoint reference element of the MX/CS and WS-Agreement documents.
7.5 Further Application Scenarios of MX/CS: Social Cloud
The research project Social Cloud elaborates market mechanisms for incentivizing
members of social network communities to “share resources amongst each other for
little to no gain” (Chard et al., 2011). The computing services can be shared based
on monetary, barter or voluntary agreements. In Chard et al. (2011), the MX/CS
(former EJSDL) communication protocol was applied for the creation of service level
agreements in two market mechanisms, a Posted Price and Reverse Sealed Bid Second
Price auction. Furthermore, the MX/CS was also extended by the parameters avail-
ability and error rate, which are used as key performance indicators in the proposed
mechanisms. The Social Cloud project shows the applicability and extensibility of
the MX/CS communication protocol with two mechanisms (other than the selected
mechanism for this work) for the market-based sharing of storage services through
social networks.
7.6 Performance Analysis
7.6.1 Monitoring of Distributed Services
In order to evaluate the performance of a distributed system, access to system and
application level information is needed. The target programming language of the
SORMA system was Java. Therefore, the components are executed in Java Virtual
Machines (JVM). In order to monitor system level or virtual machine level data, the
Java Management Extensions (JMX) technology can be applied. JMX provides the
implementation of managed objects, which is also called MBeans, as well as the tools
for managing and monitoring system-level data like CPU utilization, memory usage,
storage, threads, devices (e.g., printers) and networks. The JMX provides standard
(Web service) interfaces that enable remote access to the monitored target system
(JVM).
Figure 7.9 shows system-level information of the monitored BidGenerator service
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Figure 7.9: Performance Monitor: System specific data with Java’s VisualVM (own
screenshot)
with Java’s VisualVM tool. Here, the BidGenerator shows that it performs ade-
quately for the duration of all the experiments, as well as a gentle utilization of the
software and hardware resources for the defined settings. However, in settings with a
higher number of agents #agents >= 60 and a high number of parallel bid submis-
sions, over-utilization of the system’s resources occurred, which blocked execution of
the system. However, achieving scalable systems through decentralization, caching
and pre-aggregation techniques is a question of having the hardware resources and
respective software configurations.
Monitoring application level data in (distributed) systems can be realized by im-
plementing so-called System Dashboards. System Dashboards collect and aggregate
monitoring information from the distributed system’s services. Each of the applica-
tions implements a logging mechanism for the internal processes and reports its state
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to the remote interface of the System Dashboard, as well as according to the specified
monitoring data format.
Figure 7.10: Distributed service process monitoring: SORMA Dashboard (screenshot
provided by the SORMA project)
Figure 7.10 shows the web user interface of the SORMA Dashboard. The SORMA
Dashboard uses log4j technology for receiving and aggregating application logs through
its remote-access socket appender. In this example, the SORMA Dashboard shows
logs received from the providers’ Resource Managers. The registered provider ma-
chines are displayed in the panel Resources. Moreover, the Bidding panel displays the
logs received from BidGenerator and the SORMA market (CSpace), i.e., consumer
bids, provider offers, market matches, as well as lists of bids and offers with exceeded
time limits that have not been matched.
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7.6.2 Technical Performance Experiments
The technical performance of the integrated components is evaluated in several ex-
periments with 10 consumer and 10 provider clients (20 in total), as well as with 20
consumer and 20 provider clients (40 in total). Each of the experiments was exe-
cuted in several settings – 10 bids per agent up to 500 bids per agent. The metric
makespan is defined as the time between the submission of the “request for bid”
from the application orchestrator, followed by the bid generation processes, until a
match is returned back to the application orchestrator. The makespan includes the
whole chain of i) PrivateMessage creation and submission to BidGenerator ; ii) the
instantiation of the selected bidding strategy in BidGenerator followed by the bid
generation and creation of a PublicMessage, which is submitted to the target mar-
ket; iii) the matchmaking of the bids in CSpace, iv) resulting in the creation of a
MarketMessage, which is submitted back to the application orchestrator. The se-
lected bidding strategies for the experiments are Truth-Telling (simple candidate)
and Q-Strategy (complex candidate) and the consumer valuations drawn are higher
than the provider valuations in order to produce matches for the evaluated number of
bids. The experiments have been executed on a 4-core Intel Xeon 3.00GHz processor,
the SORMA market machine with the installed market components. The SORMA
market and related components (e.g., Trusted Market Exchange, Section 2.4.3) are
deployed on individual Tomcat servers running within SORMA market machine with
certain configurations with respect to the number of threads allowed and memory us-
age. There was a BidGenerator for all consumer clients and a BidGenerator for all
providers’ clients. The test consumers’ and test providers’ clients with their Bid-
Generators are running on two external machines in addition to the SORMA market
machine, however, in the same network. The aim of this simple experiment was to
test the technical scalability and time performance of the integrated SORMA system
of test clients (simple Job Orchestrators and Resource Orchestrators), BidGenera-
tor, MX/CS and CSpace in settings with 20 and 40 Truth-Telling agents, as well as
Q-Strategy agents.
With respect to the hardware and software characteristics in terms of number of
the possible open connections (constraining the number of running threads), CPU
utilization and memory constraints, an artificial time delay between each bid sub-
mission per agent was added, which is composed from a constant of 500 milliseconds
and additional random milliseconds, which are introduced with the bash’s random
number generator $RANDOM ∈ [0, 32767]. Each of the experiments was repeated 10
times and the results represent the average values. The artificially introduced time
delays are selected from a one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis and all the experiments
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Figure 7.11: Time performance chart of the integrated system in settings with 20
and 40 Truth-Telling agents, as well as Q-Strategy agents
were allowed to be executed without a system block, which typically occurs when a
system’s capacities are overused and when choosing an artificial delay of below 1000
milliseconds for the largest setting.
Figure 7.11 shows the measured total time (makespan) of the four agent scenarios of
20 and 40 gents that apply either the Truth-Telling strategy or Q-Strategy. The x-axis
represents the number of bids per agents and the y-axis is the total time in seconds
needed by all to execute and match their bids. As shown, the makespan increases
linearly in relation to the number of bids in all four Truth-Telling and Q-Strategy
agent settings.
Table 7.1 presents the performance results in more detail. The 20 and 40 agents
needed an approximate similar makespan (sec) for executing their bids; the linear
relation describes the number of executed bids per agent. The largest setting has
40 agents, with each of them submitting 500 bids (i.e., 20000 bids in total), which
was executed for an average of 4.45 hours. The smallest setting of 20 agents with 10
bids per agent (i.e., 200 bids in total) was executed for 4.81 minutes. These settings
show the linear computational and communication efforts of the proof-of-concept
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Table 7.1: Detailed time performance analysis of the integrated system in settings
with 20 and 40 Truth-Telling agents, as well as Q-Strategy agents
Truth-Telling Q-Strategy
#agents (makespan) #agents (makespan)
#bids 20 40 Δ (%) Δ (sec) 20 40 Δ (%) Δ (sec)
10 286 318 11 33 289 320 11 31
30 898 929 3 30 917 964 5 47
50 1524 1581 4 57 1539 1599 4 60
100 3011 3262 8 250 3113 3241 4 127
300 9093 9698 7 605 9408 9593 2 185
500 15511 15937 3 427 15353 15848 3 496
implementation of the components tested, which were constrained by the selected
hardware- and software configurations. The Δ parameter shows the time difference
between the experiments with 40 and 20 agents expressed in percentage and seconds.
These differences increase slowly in the settings with bids of between 10 and 50
and steeper in the remaining ones. The standard deviations of both differences in
the Truth-Telling strategy settings are 3% and 240 seconds, whereas the the standard
deviations for theQ-Strategy settings are 3% and 175 seconds, respectively. According
to the Wilcoxon rank sum test,4 the differences in milliseconds between the Truth-
Telling ’s Δ and Q-Strategy ’s Δ are not significant (p.value = 0.59) for the alternative
hypothesis H1: ΔQ−Strategy > ΔTruth−Telling.
7.7 Summary
This chapter presented the technical analysis performed on the models used in this
work, BidGenerator, Q-Strategy and MX/CS, for three case studies. The first case
study represents the class of batch applications with specific time requirements of
customers for the execution and outcome delivery of their data (Section 7.2). In this
case, the number and type of batch applications is usually known to the TXTDemand
application provider a priori, so their executions can be planned ahead. The class of
interactive applications represented in the second case study are application services
that are executed ad hoc by the consumers without an a priori plan (Section 7.3). The
first two case studies show the application of both BidGenerator and MX/CS. The
4A non-parametric statistical hypothesis test used when comparing two related samples or re-
peated measurements on a single sample to assess whether their population means differ, <http:
//stat.ethz.ch/R-manual/R-patched/library/stats/html/wilcox.test.html>.
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third case study shows the application of MX/CS for creating e-Service Level Agree-
ments with the WS-Agreement specification (Section 7.4). A third-party project,
Social Cloud, showed the applicability and extensibility of the MX/CS communica-
tion protocol for two more market mechanisms and in a social networking scenario
(Section 7.5). The performance analysis in Section 7.6 showed that the integrated
system of BidGenerator, MX/CS and CSpace uses computing services efficiently. In
addition, the bidding and communication efforts scale linearly with the number of





Summary of This Work and Future Research
T
his chapter summarizes the key contributions of this work with respect to the
research questions introduced in Chapter 1. The final section concludes this
thesis with the outlook for future and complementary research.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
The aim of this work was to elaborate, design, develop and realize models for schedul-
ing computing services with market mechanisms. The literature mainly explored the
definition and application of market mechanisms in this domain, however, research
with regard to the automation of bidding processes in such markets is still largely
unexplored. One possible reason is that researchers design market mechanisms that
aim to satisfy most of the well-known design desiderata (Myerson and Satterthwaite,
1983). A common solution for incentive compatibility in market design is the ap-
plication of Vickrey payments. The results of these works and their mathematical
models are impressive, however, they are based on idealistic assumptions about the
strategic behavior of market participants, e.g., rational bidders that bid truthfully in
strategy-proof mechanisms, and informed bidders (all bidders share the same infor-
mation about the market and other agent’s actions). However, such market models
are not practical, or computationally and communicationally tractable in real online
settings since bidders and their objectives, transaction objects, bidding behavior and
timing for bid submission are heterogeneous (Rothkopf, 2007; Wellman et al., 2007).
This thesis aims to relax these classic and idealistic assumptions and provide eco-
nomic models and practical tools to realize adaptive and flexible bidding agents in a
pragmatic way. The contributions of this work can be summarized as following:
Q-Strategy. Section 3.4 presented a novel bidding strategy as a model for automated
decision making in imperfect market mechanisms with heterogeneous bidders.
The Q-Strategy is specified and realized for both consumers and providers. In
general, the Q-Strategy solves the multi-armed bandit problem for the owner’s
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transaction objects (TO) and for the specified scoring function, which may vary
for each of the different TO. A TO is described within the state space of the
Q-Strategy with its technical and economic attributes. The bids are probabilis-
tically and continuously explored and exploited for each of the different TO in
the Q-Strategy ’s state-action spaces. The adaptive ranking of bids is dynam-
ically updated in the Q-Strategy ’s Q-Table from the received rewards and for
each of the submitted bids. Moreover, the TOs are clustered according to a
similarity criterion in order to foster the ranking (learning) processes for the
TOs’ bids. The Q-Strategy adapts fully based on local information and past ex-
perience and thus it is applicable in markets with imperfect information, where
the dominant bidding strategy is unknown.
BidGenerator Framework. Bidding agents consist of decision making and inter-
active parts. The decision making part is designed and realized in the bidding
strategy module of the BidGenerator framework, the interactive part specifies
interfaces to realize agents and their interactions with the owner’s applications
or computing services, as well as the market. These interfaces implement the
actions based on an owner’s requests, initialization of the bidding strategy se-
lected by the owner, the reaction to the market messages (e.g., match) and the
update of the agent’s knowledge base (e.g., the incorporation of the rewards).
Therefore, the BidGenerator framework (Section 4.4) offers a platform for de-
veloping bidding agents and bidding strategies. The specified interfaces provide
a methodology for implementing the core capabilities of bidding agents (Sec-
tion 4.2). The advantages of decomposing BidGenerator from the target market
platform allows consumers and providers to implement, configure and execute
their own bidding agents and bidding strategies according to their preferences
and needs.
Message Exchange in Computing Service Markets (MX/CS). In order to al-
locate applications to computing services with market-based schedulers, this
work specifies the MX/CS communication protocol (Section 5.3). This pro-
tocol clearly differentiates between messages that are internal to their owners
(called PrivateMessage), public messages submitted to the market mechanism
(called PublicMessage) and match messages (called MarketMessage) created as
a result of the economic and technical matchmaking processes on the market.
Furthermore, the message stack introduces two new message types – Market-
Information and StateMessage, which are applied to query market information
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for the bidding strategies, as well as to update their state-action reward infor-
mation in the agent’s knowledge base. The communication protocol is specified
as an XML schema and ontology. The consumer, provider and SORMA mar-
ket components exchange XML messages according to MX/CS. The MX/CS
ontology explicitly defines the concepts and properties of MX/CS introduced
here. The binding of the XML schema elements and the ontology concepts are
implemented with the SAWSDL language. The modular design of the MX/CS
concepts enable their integration and extensibility with any other standard de-
scription language. Here, MX/CS was applied on top of the Job Submission
and Description Language, enhancing its technical attributes with economic
modules to support the market-based scheduling processes.
The following part maps the research questions in Chapter 1 to the related contribu-
tions of this work.
Research Question 1 ≺Design of Bidding Strategies
How can bidding strategies for market-based scheduling be designed and implemented,
which when instantiated into bidding agents, automate the bidding process for con-
sumers and providers?
This research question is elaborated in Chapter 3. The chapter contributes to it with
an introduction of general design desiderata for developing bidding strategies. The
design of a bidding strategy depends on the type of target market mechanism, and
its bidding, clearing and information rules. Therefore, the chapter elaborates bidding
strategies for settings of perfect information markets and imperfect information mar-
kets. Section 3.3.2 presents a general framework for designing bidding strategies for
imperfect markets, which was applied to the description of the benchmark bidding
strategies and the Q-Strategy. As an original contribution to the research, Section 3.4
presents the design and specification of the Q-Strategy, which automates the bidding
processes for consumers and providers. The Q-Strategy was implemented in the Bid-
Generator framework and evaluated in agent-based experiments against benchmark
bidding strategies in the Continuous Double Auction.
Research Question 2 ≺Design of a Framework for Automated Bidding
What are the characteristics of bidding agents and how can they coincide with bidding
strategies in an agent framework for market-based scheduling?
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This research question is elaborated in Chapter 4. The chapter deduces common
design desiderata for developing agent frameworks for a market-based scheduling do-
main. Based on the desiderata, an analytical evaluation of existing agent frameworks
is shown in this chapter. The BidGenerator component specifies and implements
a reference framework for realizing bidding agents and bidding strategies. Further-
more, as a proof of concept, the BidGenerator implements state-of-the-art bidding
strategies and the specified interfaces for developing bidding agents. The assignment
of agents to bidding strategies is specified within the consumer and provider prefer-
ences and performed dynamically on runtime. The BidGenerator framework has a
modular architecture and communicates over interfaces with the related components –
applications, resource managers and the market. The BidGenerator framework was
systematically developed, integrated and tested as a part of the SORMA project.
Moreover, the BidGenerator was integrated with a Discrete Event Engine to build
a Test Box for evaluating bidding strategies and market mechanisms (Nimis et al.,
2009). In this context, the Test Box can be used by other researchers to evaluate their
own bidding strategies and market mechanisms. The integration process with other
market platforms is facilitated with the communication interfaces provided. Chap-
ter 7 presents the integration of the BidGenerator framework in two case studies for
batch and interactive applications. The performance analysis showed that the im-
plemented agents, bidding strategies and communication protocol scale linearly with
the number of agents and exchanged messages.
Research Question 3 ≺Communication Protocols
What are the characteristics of a message exchange within a market-based scheduling
context? How can technical and economic preferences be expressed, communicated
and matched between consumers, providers and the market?
The characteristics and specifications of a message infrastructure in a system for
market-based scheduling is part of Chapter 5. The first part of this research question
is elaborated in Section 5.1, in which core design desiderata for realizing commu-
nication protocols are identified for market-based scheduling. The state-of-the-art
analysis showed that there are no existing protocols, which satisfy the desiderata
as needed. The second part of the research question is answered in Section 5.3,
which presents a newly developed communication protocol for expressing technical
and economic information on transaction objects (computing services). The MX/CS
communication protocol was one of the first to enable the market-based scheduling of
computing services. It has been developed and applied as part of the SORMA pro-
totype in three case studies (Chapter 7), as well as in a third-party application for
sharing storage services in social networks called Social Cloud (Chard et al., 2011).
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Research Question 4 ≺Evaluation of Bidding Strategies
How do learning-based bidding strategies score against benchmark bidding strategies
in settings with homogeneous and heterogeneous agents?
This research question is elaborated in Chapter 6. Section 6.1 presents the methodol-
ogy applied for the evaluation the Q-Strategy against the benchmark bidding strate-
gies in homogeneous and heterogenous settings. The evaluation methodology is con-
sistent with well-known works in the area of agent-based computational economics
domain. The evaluation results showed the applicability, adaptability and stable
behavior of the Q-Strategy in varying heterogeneous and homogeneous settings. In
contrast to the related work, the selected consumer scoring function is consistent
with the market-based scheduling domain. To reduce the complexity of the evalua-
tion, the definition of the experiments focused on the consumer side. The providers
are typically assumed to be profit maximizers. The repeated outcome of the 240
unique agent-based experiments showed that the Q-Strategy is competitive in more
than 70% of the settings for the consumers by outperforming the selected benchmark
bidding strategies in scenarios with real job profiles.
8.2 Future Research
This section concludes this work with the presentation of possible future research
directions and complementary research.
8.2.1 Hierarchical Bidding and Transfer Learning
Systems like Google’s search engine, AppEngine, Amazon’s bookstore and Web ser-
vices, Facebook and Twitter are highly distributed, interconnected and scalable to
thousands to millions of users. To achieve autonomous management of complex
systems big problems need to be broken down into smaller ones, solved, and the
solutions applied to the bigger ones. In the case of automated bidding, agents have
to make different decisions about i) which technical parameters are required for a
given application and whether these parameters can be determined for other similar
applications, such as, ii) what market to choose, iii) the available information on this
market, iv) how to bid, etc. These obvious questions result in multiple parameters,
which need to be estimated or learned simultaneously. The concept of hierarchi-
cal reinforcement learning is a promising one for specifying multiple objectives in
sub-units, whose parameters are adapted independently from each other and used to
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maximize future rewards in complex decision making processes (Barto and Mahade-
van, 2003). A hierarchical bidding strategy can have market, bidding and transfer
learning modules. The market module explores the different markets for computing
services available – different providers, service configurations, quality of services, etc.
The bidding module explores and exploits optimal bids for the selected market from
the market module, and the transfer learning module optimizes technical parameters
for actual or newly added applications based on the experience of the application
executions and available market information. Transfer learning is another area of
promising and ongoing research, which deals with the transfer of gained experience
from the execution of one task or application and improving the performance of a
similar, but different task or application. Transfer learning addresses the question
of how to select an appropriate application for the experience to be transferred to
and how to achieve this effectively and autonomously (Taylor and Stone, 2009). In
the context of bidding, and given the knowledge base for application types x1 to x20,
the question would be how to estimate an appropriate technical configuration for
application type x21 or y1?
8.2.2 Automated Bidding for Complex Service Mashups
Another area of future research is the bidding in combinatorial auctions for service
mashups. This scenario assumes that such web applications are designed with com-
patible Web service interfaces of input and output data formats. An application is
represented with its technical specification and interface description (WSDL), which
can be queried from so-called green pages (Bernstein, 1996; Diamantini et al., 2007)).
Service mashups are created from two or more web applications that work together,
integrate with mappings of their input and output interfaces, and exchange message
formats and quality aspects (Papazoglou et al., 2007). Moreover, to simplify the
integration of web applications, an explicit definition of the interfaces of the appli-
cations is required in terms of (machine readable) the semantic descriptions of their
parameters, as well as in relation to other existing parameters (Turner et al., 2003;
Cusumano, 2008). XML has succeeded in becoming a well-utilized basement lan-
guage for describing communication protocols, processes, artifacts and Web service
interfaces (Gold et al., 2004). Furthermore, description languages like BPEL and
WS-CDL are well applied by modeling the business processes of interconnected ser-
vices (Weske, 2007). A field of ongoing research is the automated bidding context for
complex services called Service Value Networks, which investigates methodologies,
risks and incentives for combining existing application services to create higher level
integrated applications (Blau et al., 2009; Michalk and Blau, 2010).
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8.2.3 Design of Flexible Market Platforms
Another research direction is the design and implementation of market platforms that
use Lisp- and ruby-based languages for configuring, deploying runtime and executing
market mechanisms easily. The Game Description Language (GDL) is a declara-
tive language with a Lisp-based syntax that is used to describe arbitrary games
(Thielscher, 2010; Love et al., 2006). This type of platform allows market mecha-
nisms and bidding strategies to be expressed and evaluated with more agility. Similar
to the Trading Agent Competition, a TAC Cloud game can be specified to incentivize
researchers to implement market mechanisms and bidding strategies for market-based
scheduling (Cai et al., 2009). The motivation for specifying a TAC Cloud points to the
need for more pragmatic and computationally tractable solutions that can interact
with research and industry.
8.2.4 Legal Issues and Matchmaking of Service Level Agreements
A match between binding bids results in a contract; this is a legal and binding agree-
ment between a consumer and a provider that captures the already negotiated tech-
nical and economic objectives, which are also called service level objectives (SLOs).
To ensure regular execution of a contract, a target institution monitors the SLOs
continuously to ensure that they are being fulfilled, and is also responsible for cal-
culating final payments or penalties (Becker et al., 2008; Wilkes, 2008; Papazoglou
and van den Heuvel, 2007). SLOs may include any quality of service attributes (e.g.,
“service availability of 99.95%”), technical attributes (e.g., number of CPUs), pay-
ment procedures, penalties, or legal stipulations. The enforcement of SLOs increases
the trustworthiness of consumers and providers (Kephart and Chess, 2003). Kephart
and Chess (2003) also identified the need for effective negotiation and matchmak-
ing algorithms, which provide clear rules and govern the processes that create the
final contract between consumers and providers. Similar to online markets, a market
information system in a market-based scheduling context can capture and provide in-
formation about the reliability and quality of services of providers through reputation
systems (Josang et al., 2007).
8.2.5 Information Services for Computing Service Markets
Like financial markets, market information systems (MIS) for computing services can
aggregate and provide market data with respect to supply and demand (Brunner
et al., 2008). Bidding agents can query market information from the MIS service
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and use it in bid generation processes (Borissov et al., 2009a). Furthermore, MIS
can provide the functionality of “green pages” and store references to running auc-
tions, as well as descriptions of the transaction object types traded. Such information
has to be stored in registries and made findable through a query language according
to a given technical specification. Websites like thecloudmarket.com and cloudex-
change.org already provide such information for humans, but do not offer interfaces
for machine agents.
8.2.6 Economic Resource Management
The provider’s local resource managers perform the actual allocation of the received
applications to their computing infrastructures. This means that control of the appli-
cation’s execution and satisfaction of the related service level agreement is part of the
provider’s scheduling policy (AuYoung et al., 2006; Maćıas et al., 2008). The design
of the provider’s bidding strategies is closely related to the provider’s local scheduling
policies and an important part of the provider’s business model since they affect the
happiness (outcome) of the consumers. Defining efficient local scheduling policies for
computing services by integrating bidding strategies is an area of ongoing research
(Kephart and Walsh, 2004b; AuYoung et al., 2006; Becker et al., 2008; Pueschel and
Neumann, 2009; Michalk et al., 2011).
8.2.7 Cloud Application Engineering and Standardization
In a market-based scheduling scenario, the definition and application of common
standards and tools is crucial for the practicability, trust and acceptance of such a
system. On the one hand, providers agree to apply common APIs and tools when of-
fering their infrastructure services to the market; on the other hand, consumers have
to utilize these APIs and tools to prepare their applications for such a scenario. Open
standards from non-profit organizations like the Open Grid Forum, Distributed Man-
agement Task Force (DMTF, 2010a), Open Science Grid and Open Cloud Manifesto
offer transparent mechanisms and communication protocols for adopting infrastruc-
ture services and reducing lock-in effects for consumers (Nelson, 2009).
8.2.8 Complementary Research
BidGenerator as a development framework for bidding agents and strategies can also
be applied for trading Cloud futures and derivatives, as well as in Ad Auctions (Meinl
and Blau, 2009; Lahaie et al., 2007). Ad Auctions is a promising research field for
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bidding strategies since these auctions are frequently executed each day and can be
modeled as repeated games with incomplete information (Lahaie et al., 2007). The
Q-Strategy is a promising candidate for such kinds of auctions and can be further eval-
uated as part of future research in the TAC/Ad competition (Jordan and Wellman,
2010; Jordan et al., 2010). Moreover, the BidGenerator, bidding strategies and the
MX/CS communication protocol can be applied in market settings for wireless sensor
networks, where mobile agents (smartphones, tablet computers) bid for bandwidth






According to the one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis methodology, each setting varies
only one parameter of the overall possible combinations.
Tables A.1 and A.4 show the outcomes of the Q-Strategy sensitivity analysis for
homogeneous settings of Q-Strategy consumers and providers with LLNL and HPC2N
data profiles. The combination of exploration rate εq = 0.3 ∈ [0.1; 0.3], learning
rate βq = 0.1 ∈ [0.1; 0.3] and discount factor γq = 0.9 ∈ [0.1; 0.9] achieved the
highest Total Consumer Score (TCS) of the aggregated consumer scoring function
Uj. The parameter ranges are commonly applied and selected from the respective
literature (Whiteson and Stone, 2006; Sun and Peterson, 1999; Even-Dar et al., 2003;
Even-Dar and Mansour, 2004). The parameter combination with the highest TCS
was initialized for all Q-Strategy agents and remained fixed for the duration of the
experiment.
Similarly, Tables A.2 and A.5 present the outcomes of the ZIP sensitivity analysis.
The ZIP learning rate βz = 0.5 ∈ [0.1; 0.5] and the momentum coefficient γz =
0.1 ∈ [0.0; 0.1] achieved the highest TCS for the LLNL data profile, βz = 0.2 and
γz = 0.9 scored highest for the HPC2N data profile. The target value ranges for
the ZIP parameters are taken as suggested and applied by Cliff and Bruten (1997).
The parameter combination βz = 0.5 and γz = 0.1 was selected to initialize the ZIP
agents and remained fixed for the duration of the experiment. The ZIP sensitivity
analysis showed that settings with βz = 0.5, γz = 0.1 or combinations thereof are
more likely to achieve higher TCSs than the related combinations of βz = 0.2 and
γz = 0.9.
Tables A.3 and A.6 display the sensitivity analysis of the GD strategy’s beta rate
parameter βg. The outcomes of βg = 250 and βg = 400 are not significantly different.
All GD agents have been initialized with βg = 250, also called the fast price compet-
itiveness choice, which remains fixed for the duration of the experiment (Gjerstad,
2003). Moreover, the selection of βg = 250 is justified due to the higher TCS with
the larger HPC2N data profile.
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Table A.1: Selection of Q-Strategy’s parameters in settings with Q-Strategy con-
sumers and providers with the LLNL data profile.
Strategy εq βq γq TCS
QStrategy 0.3 0.1 0.9 -179349326598
QStrategy 0.1 0.1 0.9 -188733048145
QStrategy 0.1 0.3 0.9 -190483060168
QStrategy 0.3 0.3 0.9 -194499799223
QStrategy 0.3 0.1 0.2 -197763518085
QStrategy 0.3 0.1 0.1 -199280734261
QStrategy 0.3 0.1 0.5 -203544555310
QStrategy 0.3 0.3 0.2 -209749749374
QStrategy 0.3 0.3 0.5 -209928051158
QStrategy 0.1 0.1 0.5 -210020950464
QStrategy 0.1 0.1 0.2 -216083986357
QStrategy 0.3 0.3 0.1 -217490521652
QStrategy 0.1 0.3 0.2 -222610889409
QStrategy 0.1 0.3 0.5 -228938118420
QStrategy 0.1 0.1 0.1 -245631045967
QStrategy 0.1 0.3 0.1 -253193066141
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Table A.2: Selection of ZIP-Strategy’s parameters in settings with ZIP consumers
and providers with the LLNL data profile.
Strategy βz γz TCS
ZIP 0.5 0.1 -214128131171
ZIP 0.5 0.2 -216255932497
ZIP 0.4 0.1 -216978086142
ZIP 0.4 0.2 -217822968998
ZIP 0.5 0.5 -222629681798
ZIP 0.3 0.1 -222876890288
ZIP 0.3 0.2 -224962053263
ZIP 0.4 0.5 -226750428720
ZIP 0.2 0.9 -226850161164
ZIP 0.3 0.5 -231266085703
ZIP 0.2 0.1 -231791908754
ZIP 0.2 0.2 -233607673291
ZIP 0.2 0.5 -236747889990
ZIP 0.5 0.9 -247485829207
ZIP 0.4 0.9 -249709032425
ZIP 0.3 0.9 -250636753971
Table A.3: Selection of GD-Strategy’s parameters in settings with GD-Strategy con-





Table A.4: Selection of Q-Strategy’s parameters in settings with Q-Strategy con-
sumers and providers with the HPC2N data profile.
Strategy εq βq γq TCS
QStrategy 0.3 0.1 0.9 -1233325468563
QStrategy 0.3 0.1 0.5 -1288804606586
QStrategy 0.3 0.1 0.1 -1297339420763
QStrategy 0.3 0.1 0.2 -1311908637690
QStrategy 0.3 0.3 0.9 -1325973901181
QStrategy 0.3 0.3 0.1 -1338159520143
QStrategy 0.3 0.3 0.2 -1368911141138
QStrategy 0.3 0.3 0.5 -1386422273595
QStrategy 0.1 0.1 0.2 -2096264081980
QStrategy 0.1 0.3 0.2 -2164988902096
QStrategy 0.1 0.1 0.9 -2202429703125
QStrategy 0.1 0.3 0.9 -2273741211411
QStrategy 0.1 0.1 0.1 -2279232288606
QStrategy 0.1 0.1 0.5 -2318536586561
QStrategy 0.1 0.3 0.1 -2346200703511
QStrategy 0.1 0.3 0.5 -3218125553768
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Table A.5: Selection of ZIP-Strategy’s parameters in settings with ZIP consumers
and providers with the HPC2N data profile.
Strategy βz γz TCS
ZIP 0.2 0.9 -1265165645908
ZIP 0.4 0.1 -1368204677550
ZIP 0.5 0.1 -1377655155815
ZIP 0.5 0.2 -1383321743681
ZIP 0.3 0.1 -1388478567842
ZIP 0.4 0.2 -1394243560545
ZIP 0.3 0.2 -1410936947078
ZIP 0.5 0.5 -1426500194951
ZIP 0.2 0.1 -1430473953714
ZIP 0.4 0.5 -1440322238509
ZIP 0.3 0.5 -1447431577568
ZIP 0.2 0.2 -1455115025598
ZIP 0.2 0.5 -1459452856239
ZIP 0.3 0.9 -1551589042240
ZIP 0.4 0.9 -1620128983229
ZIP 0.5 0.9 -1623809834826
Table A.6: Selection of GD-Strategy’s parameters in settings with GD consumers
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Appendix B
Full Tables of the Evaluation Results
B.1 Consumer Outcomes
Table B.1: Consumer outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL workload.
The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 50 Providers Combined CAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -68551
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -69067
3 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -147806
4 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -149139
5 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -155348
6 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -155786
7 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -158339
8 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -158985
9 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -161261
10 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -161600
11 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -163205
12 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers -169742
13 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -190029
14 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -216004
15 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -218088
16 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -228094
17 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers -228525
18 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -229104
19 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -230984
20 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -237423
21 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -244075
22 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers -248494
23 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers -257951
24 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -266514
25 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers -267779
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26 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers -276604
27 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers -287472
28 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -292435
29 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers -300680
30 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers -307262
31 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers -313886
32 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -316514
33 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers -316622
34 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers -323994
35 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers -324057
36 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers -333597
37 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers -334425
38 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -369474
39 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -438683
40 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers -465031
41 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -588712
42 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers -646030
43 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers -750562
44 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers -895138
45 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -903971
46 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -940491
47 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -966988
48 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers -1059026
49 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -1149451
50 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers -1207267
51 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers -1255518
52 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -1296764
53 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1314218
54 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1338354
55 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers -1340838
56 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers -1417129
57 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers -1480563
58 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -1586744
59 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers -1725407
60 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1830294
61 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers -1904263
62 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers -1915432
63 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers -2096641
64 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers -2366724
65 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers -5942040
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66 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers -11099648
Table B.2: Consumer outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL work-
load. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 100 Providers Combined CAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -60184
2 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -60323
3 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -73155
4 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -73956
5 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -85604
6 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -95449
7 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -110368
8 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -110553
9 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -124026
10 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -129126
11 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -136576
12 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -141748
13 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -146821
14 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -150837
15 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers -153308
16 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers -154328
17 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers -155774
18 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers -160295
19 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -160900
20 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers -169469
21 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers -170459
22 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -171239
23 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -174562
24 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers -175243
25 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -175353
26 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -177207
27 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers -179542
28 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -200096
29 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -200764
30 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -202447
31 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -206671
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32 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -210332
33 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -211281
34 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -211314
35 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -211368
36 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -211698
37 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -211921
38 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -212104
39 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -212456
40 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -213239
41 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -215568
42 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers -216548
43 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers -224802
44 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers -228521
45 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers -236838
46 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers -238517
47 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers -248712
48 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers -260289
49 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers -262761
50 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -262990
51 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers -266602
52 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers -267406
53 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers -269743
54 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers -270321
55 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers -272609
56 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers -272917
57 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers -273087
58 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers -283668
59 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers -332753
60 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers -452748
61 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers -457567
62 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers -571206
63 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers -678564
64 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers -1560568
65 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers -2025546
66 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers -3105745
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Table B.3: Consumer outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the HPC2N work-
load. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 50 Providers Combined CAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -1054218
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -1085099
3 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -1703405
4 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1945762
5 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -1945778
6 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -2200169
7 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -2535239
8 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -2632936
9 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -2725949
10 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -2855771
11 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -3120306
12 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers -3263527
13 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers -3454209
14 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers -3599000
15 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers -3708171
16 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers -3793523
17 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers -3929615
18 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers -3960010
19 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers -4030828
20 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers -4055351
21 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers -4167194
22 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers -4535178
23 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers -4949095
24 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers -5160078
25 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -5161114
26 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers -5446674
27 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -5693947
28 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -7218910
29 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -7506981
30 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers -7961652
31 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -8083268
32 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers -8098325
33 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -8206241
34 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers -8411912
35 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -8529931
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36 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers -8972354
37 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -9382095
38 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -9397618
39 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers -9435986
40 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -9563017
41 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -9615037
42 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers -9835239
43 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers -9852016
44 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers -11131176
45 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -11594640
46 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -11606811
47 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers -11672395
48 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -11924207
49 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -14586371
50 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers -15923835
51 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -18853631
52 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -22436211
53 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -25536325
54 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -25609324
55 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers -27581010
56 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -27611378
57 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -27807847
58 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -29238046
59 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers -30494378
60 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers -32650643
61 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers -33656891
62 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -34552918
63 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers -37592420
64 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers -39438291
65 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers -43640894
66 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers -46991008
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Table B.4: Consumer outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the HPC2N work-
load. The higher the combined CAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 100 Providers Combined CAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -576447
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -579618
3 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -734462
4 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -903385
5 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -974690
6 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -1028515
7 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1094188
8 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -1107360
9 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -1231504
10 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1392967
11 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -1471657
12 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -1487436
13 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -1487648
14 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -1494709
15 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -1502237
16 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -1522503
17 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -1541359
18 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers -1610839
19 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers -1670399
20 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers -1706291
21 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -1771652
22 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers -1786840
23 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -1799236
24 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1848090
25 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1854137
26 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1862732
27 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -1864071
28 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1872719
29 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -1887748
30 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers -1907666
31 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1920339
32 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -1926107
33 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1972506
34 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers -1993377
35 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -2006344
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36 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -2060957
37 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers -2062742
38 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers -2102548
39 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers -2151623
40 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -2178212
41 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers -2261270
42 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -2294685
43 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers -2315432
44 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers -2353024
45 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -2359334
46 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers -2364299
47 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers -2368400
48 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers -2383186
49 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers -2383867
50 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers -2384827
51 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers -2386808
52 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers -2397811
53 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers -2436342
54 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers -2458261
55 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers -2609021
56 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -2658497
57 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers -2683325
58 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers -2835382
59 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers -2837506
60 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers -3469464
61 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers -3511246
62 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers -4357397
63 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers -4383098
64 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers -4446110
65 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers -4819245
66 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers -9898191
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B.2 Provider Outcomes
Table B.5: Provider outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL workload.
The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 50 Providers PAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 6180
2 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers 6135
3 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers 6088
4 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 6018
5 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers 5977
6 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers 5937
7 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers 5867
8 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers 5841
9 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 5779
10 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers 5712
11 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 5595
12 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers 5523
13 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers 5420
14 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 5170
15 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers 5111
16 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers 4831
17 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers 4696
18 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers 4693
19 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers 4686
20 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers 4631
21 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers 4547
22 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers 4511
23 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers 4486
24 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers 4455
25 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 4412
26 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers 4384
27 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers 4353
28 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers 4340
29 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers 4272
30 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers 4208
31 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers 4197
32 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers 4147
33 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers 4049
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34 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers 3993
35 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers 3748
36 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 3693
37 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers 3348
38 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers 2866
39 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers 2509
40 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers 2497
41 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers 2453
42 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers 2443
43 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers 2439
44 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 2380
45 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers 2339
46 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers 2326
47 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers 2235
48 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers 2232
49 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers 2170
50 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers 2085
51 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers 2075
52 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers 2063
53 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers 1978
54 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers 1889
55 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers 1883
56 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers 1744
57 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers 1633
58 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers 1612
59 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers 1532
60 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 1484
61 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers 1345
62 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers 1096
63 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 811
64 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers 703
65 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 463
66 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers 455
B.2. PROVIDER OUTCOMES 250
Table B.6: Provider outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL workload.
The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 100 Providers PAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers 2095
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers 2079
3 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers 2029
4 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers 2023
5 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers 1953
6 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers 1934
7 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers 1887
8 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers 1833
9 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers 1804
10 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers 1734
11 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers 1732
12 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers 1627
13 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers 1592
14 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers 1522
15 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers 1456
16 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers 1380
17 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 1309
18 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers 1306
19 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers 1268
20 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers 1228
21 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers 1223
22 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 1155
23 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers 1154
24 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers 1136
25 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers 1133
26 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers 1096
27 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers 1089
28 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers 1077
29 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers 1054
30 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers 1045
31 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers 1023
32 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers 1023
33 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 999
34 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers 992
35 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers 973
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36 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers 958
37 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers 937
38 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers 919
39 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers 913
40 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 894
41 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers 891
42 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers 862
43 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers 861
44 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers 838
45 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers 817
46 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers 810
47 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 776
48 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers 773
49 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers 767
50 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers 767
51 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers 745
52 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers 715
53 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers 698
54 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers 687
55 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 658
56 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers 600
57 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 548
58 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers 524
59 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers 451
60 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 446
61 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers 362
62 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 340
63 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers 259
64 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 229
65 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers 191
66 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 103
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Table B.7: Provider outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the HPC2N workload.
The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 50 Providers PAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers 53314
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 53066
3 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers 52757
4 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers 52172
5 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 51785
6 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers 51670
7 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers 50804
8 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 50281
9 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers 49697
10 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers 49222
11 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 48436
12 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers 47866
13 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers 47313
14 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 45952
15 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers 45884
16 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers 44638
17 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 42491
18 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers 41716
19 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers 41680
20 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers 41223
21 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers 41084
22 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers 40748
23 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers 40363
24 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers 40253
25 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers 39759
26 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers 39507
27 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers 39309
28 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 38602
29 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers 38574
30 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers 38218
31 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers 37929
32 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers 37191
33 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers 37086
34 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers 36290
35 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers 34993
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36 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers 34616
37 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 34321
38 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers 32327
39 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers 32011
40 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers 31997
41 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers 31691
42 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers 31415
43 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers 31382
44 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers 31125
45 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers 31002
46 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers 30650
47 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers 30596
48 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers 30143
49 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers 30038
50 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers 29700
51 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers 29191
52 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers 29168
53 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers 28565
54 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers 28032
55 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers 27881
56 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers 27845
57 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 27493
58 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers 26894
59 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers 26244
60 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers 25831
61 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers 23127
62 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers 21709
63 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 20589
64 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers 17394
65 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 10038
66 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers 7714
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Table B.8: Provider outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the HPC2N work-
load. The higher the PAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 100 Providers PAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers 17669
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers 17619
3 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers 17122
4 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers 17049
5 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers 16593
6 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers 16408
7 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers 16139
8 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers 15631
9 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers 15459
10 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers 14843
11 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers 14761
12 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers 14095
13 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers 14074
14 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 14062
15 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers 13787
16 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers 13371
17 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers 13322
18 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 12817
19 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers 12543
20 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers 12468
21 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers 12227
22 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers 11910
23 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers 11147
24 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers 11117
25 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 11041
26 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers 10997
27 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers 10821
28 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers 10793
29 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers 10511
30 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers 10461
31 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers 10308
32 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers 10178
33 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers 10125
34 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers 9908
35 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers 9838
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36 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers 9791
37 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers 9682
38 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 9650
39 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers 9575
40 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers 9413
41 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers 9210
42 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers 9098
43 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers 9057
44 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers 8990
45 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers 8745
46 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers 8734
47 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers 8499
48 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers 8313
49 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 8124
50 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers 8022
51 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers 7989
52 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers 7950
53 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers 7494
54 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers 7474
55 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers 7079
56 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers 6990
57 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 6840
58 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers 6043
59 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers 5712
60 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 5496
61 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 4179
62 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers 3075
63 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 2902
64 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 1834
65 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers 1278
66 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers 845
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B.3 Combined Outcomes
Table B.9: Combined outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL workload.
The higher the CCPAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 50 Providers CCPAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -66042
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -66570
3 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -145479
4 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -146696
5 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -153113
6 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -154041
7 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -156360
8 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -156565
9 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -156814
10 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -159711
11 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -162742
12 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers -167657
13 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -189574
14 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -213552
15 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -216556
16 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -226665
17 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers -226892
18 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -227391
19 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -230174
20 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -235083
21 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -242591
22 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers -246261
23 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers -255876
24 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -264133
25 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers -265897
26 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers -274992
27 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers -286127
28 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -290372
29 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers -299583
30 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers -304396
31 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers -310538
32 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers -312269
33 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -312821
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34 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers -319860
35 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers -320246
36 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers -329604
37 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers -329914
38 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -365061
39 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -433852
40 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers -460400
41 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -583542
42 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers -641646
43 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers -746354
44 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers -890652
45 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -898860
46 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -935798
47 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -961393
48 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers -1054879
49 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -1144031
50 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers -1202812
51 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers -1249995
52 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -1290629
53 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1308439
54 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1332174
55 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers -1336498
56 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers -1412856
57 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers -1474851
58 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -1582696
59 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers -1719566
60 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1824275
61 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers -1898326
62 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers -1909565
63 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers -2090664
64 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers -2360636
65 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers -5937493
66 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers -11094962
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Table B.10: Combined outcomes of settings with 100 providers and the LLNL work-
load. The higher the CCPAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. LLNL 100 Providers CCPAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -59051
2 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -59169
3 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -71849
4 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -72647
5 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -84889
6 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -94704
7 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -108289
8 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -108458
9 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -123034
10 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -128168
11 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -135739
12 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -140857
13 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -146011
14 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -150070
15 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers -152447
16 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers -153415
17 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers -154855
18 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers -159272
19 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -160796
20 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers -168496
21 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers -169686
22 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -170422
23 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers -174107
24 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -174257
25 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -174371
26 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -176118
27 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers -178465
28 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -199050
29 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -199710
30 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -202188
31 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -205734
32 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -209471
33 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -210505
34 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -210765
35 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -210766
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36 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -210804
37 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -210922
38 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -211446
39 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -212116
40 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -212240
41 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -215338
42 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers -215781
43 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers -224103
44 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers -227921
45 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers -235611
46 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers -237993
47 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers -248261
48 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers -259927
49 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers -260732
50 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -262303
51 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers -264769
52 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers -265473
53 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers -268589
54 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers -268719
55 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers -271325
56 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers -271341
57 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers -271631
58 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers -282445
59 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers -331373
60 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers -451121
61 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers -456045
62 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers -569471
63 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers -676760
64 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers -1558615
65 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers -2023660
66 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers -3103722
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Table B.11: Combined outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL work-
load. The higher the CCPAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 50 Providers CCPAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -1022207
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -1053102
3 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -1695691
4 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -1904098
5 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1935723
6 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -2158453
7 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -2503549
8 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -2615542
9 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -2694534
10 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -2824769
11 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -3098597
12 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers -3232877
13 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers -3426177
14 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers -3568857
15 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers -3675844
16 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers -3752439
17 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers -3890107
18 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers -3925017
19 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers -4001660
20 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers -4017133
21 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers -4126832
22 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers -4507333
23 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers -4912009
24 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -5126498
25 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers -5134247
26 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers -5423547
27 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -5673358
28 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -7191417
29 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -7475856
30 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers -7925362
31 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -8051885
32 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers -8059751
33 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -8177051
34 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers -8382212
35 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -8501367
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36 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers -8933045
37 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -9355851
38 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -9367580
39 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers -9395733
40 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -9528696
41 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -9584441
42 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers -9808346
43 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers -9814825
44 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers -11090428
45 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -11566760
46 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -11568209
47 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers -11634466
48 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -11879569
49 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -14543880
50 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers -15884076
51 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -18807679
52 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -22387774
53 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -25483011
54 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -25556257
55 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers -27539786
56 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -27565494
57 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -27757566
58 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -29190732
59 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers -30446512
60 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers -32601421
61 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers -33607194
62 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -34501134
63 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers -37541616
64 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers -39386621
65 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers -43588722
66 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers -46938252
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Table B.12: Combined outcomes of settings with 50 providers and the LLNL work-
load. The higher the CCPAAS, the better the outcome of the setting.
No. HPC2N 100 Providers CCPAAS(×105)
Consumers Providers
1 (10Q:0GD) Q-Providers -565626
2 (10Q:0ZIP ) Q-Providers -568826
3 (0Q:10GD) ZIP-Providers -726968
4 (10Q:0GD) GD-Providers -885716
5 (0Q:10GD) Q-Providers -967701
6 (10Q:0ZIP ) GD-Providers -1010896
7 (10Q:0ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1080126
8 (10Q:0GD) ZIP-Providers -1093286
9 (0Q:10GD) GD-Providers -1221666
10 (0Q:10ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1392122
11 (1Q:9GD) ZIP-Providers -1463668
12 (6Q:4GD) Q-Providers -1478235
13 (4Q:6GD) Q-Providers -1478691
14 (3Q:7GD) Q-Providers -1486396
15 (0Q:10ZIP ) GD-Providers -1500959
16 (2Q:8GD) Q-Providers -1514553
17 (2Q:8GD) ZIP-Providers -1532860
18 (3Q:7GD) ZIP-Providers -1601741
19 (4Q:6GD) ZIP-Providers -1660717
20 (1Q:9GD) Q-Providers -1698818
21 (9Q:1GD) Q-Providers -1761191
22 (5Q:5GD) ZIP-Providers -1776532
23 (0Q:10ZIP ) Q-Providers -1796161
24 (2Q:8ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1845188
25 (3Q:7ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1849958
26 (9Q:1ZIP ) Q-Providers -1853561
27 (1Q:9ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1860898
28 (4Q:6ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1867223
29 (7Q:3GD) Q-Providers -1877957
30 (6Q:4GD) ZIP-Providers -1896519
31 (5Q:5ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1913499
32 (8Q:2ZIP ) Q-Providers -1915929
33 (6Q:4ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -1964382
34 (5Q:5GD) Q-Providers -1984321
35 (7Q:3ZIP ) Q-Providers -1996437
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36 (7Q:3GD) ZIP-Providers -2050831
37 (7Q:3ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -2051307
38 (6Q:4ZIP ) Q-Providers -2092973
39 (8Q:2GD) ZIP-Providers -2139155
40 (8Q:2ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -2167170
41 (5Q:5ZIP ) Q-Providers -2252060
42 (1Q:9ZIP ) GD-Providers -2288641
43 (9Q:1ZIP ) GD-Providers -2298383
44 (1Q:9GD) GD-Providers -2341907
45 (9Q:1ZIP ) ZIP-Providers -2346517
46 (6Q:4ZIP ) GD-Providers -2349538
47 (2Q:8ZIP ) GD-Providers -2359410
48 (8Q:2ZIP ) GD-Providers -2366778
49 (7Q:3ZIP ) GD-Providers -2368236
50 (5Q:5ZIP ) GD-Providers -2371040
51 (3Q:7ZIP ) GD-Providers -2375811
52 (4Q:6ZIP ) GD-Providers -2385268
53 (9Q:1GD) ZIP-Providers -2422971
54 (4Q:6ZIP ) Q-Providers -2449528
55 (2Q:8GD) GD-Providers -2596794
56 (8Q:2GD) Q-Providers -2648372
57 (3Q:7ZIP ) Q-Providers -2675304
58 (1Q:9ZIP ) Q-Providers -2829670
59 (2Q:8ZIP ) Q-Providers -2830427
60 (4Q:6GD) GD-Providers -3455369
61 (3Q:7GD) GD-Providers -3497925
62 (5Q:5GD) GD-Providers -4342554
63 (7Q:3GD) GD-Providers -4366959
64 (6Q:4GD) GD-Providers -4430651
65 (8Q:2GD) GD-Providers -4802652
66 (9Q:1GD) GD-Providers -9881069
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Appendix C
MX/CS – Communication Protocol Specification
The following XML Schema represents the proof-of-concept realization of the de-
veloped message protocols in Section 5.3 on top of the Job Submission and Defi-
nition Language. The corresponding ontology file, created with Protégé (<http:
//protege.stanford.edu>, version 4.0.2), consists of an explicit formal definition
of the concepts defined, their properties and relations to the well-known upper on-
tology OpenCyc (<http://www.opencyc.org>).
All the specifications in this thesis are open under the GNU Lesser General Public
License as published by the Free Software Foundation, either as version 3 of the
license, or any later version.
C.1 MX/CS – XML Schema Specification
1 <?xml version= ' 1 .0 ' encoding= 'UTF−8 ' ?>
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd= ' ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema '
3 xmlns :b id= ' ht tp : //www. sormapro ject . eu/message/ e j s d l /beans '
xm ln s : j s d l= ' ht tp : // schemas . gg f . org / j s d l /2005/11/ j s d l '
5 xmlns:wsa= ' ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2004/03/ addre s s ing '
xmlns : sawsdl= ' ht tp : //www.w3 . org /ns/ sawsdl '
7 targetNamespace= ' ht tp : //www. sormapro ject . eu/message/ e j s d l /beans '
elementFormDefault= ' q u a l i f i e d '>
9 <xsd : import namespace= ' ht tp : // schemas . gg f . org / j s d l /2005/11/ j s d l ' schemaLocation= '
j s d l . xsd ' />
<xsd : import namespace= ' ht tp : // schemas . gg f . org / j s d l /2005/11/ j s d l−pos ix '
schemaLocation= ' j s d l−pos ix . xsd ' />
11
< !−− ============================================== −−>
13 < !−− ==========Economic Extens ions ================ −−>
< !−− ============================================== −−>
15
< !−− ========== Private−Data Type ============ −−>
17 <xsd:complexType name= ' PrivateData Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
19 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : v a l u a t i on ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : s t r a t e g y ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
21 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id :Scor ingFunct i on ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
23 </xsd:complexType>
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<xsd :e l ement name= ' PrivateData ' type= ' bid:Pr ivateData Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference=
' mxcsProtocol#PrivateData ' />
25 <xsd :e l ement name= ' va lua t i on ' type= ' xsd :doub le ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#va lua t i on ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' s t r a t e gy ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol
#s t r a t e gy ' />
27 <xsd :e l ement name= ' Scor ingFunct ion ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#scor ingFunct ion ' />
29 < !−− ========== Publ ic−Data Type ================ −−>
<xsd:complexType name= 'Bid Type '>
31 <xsd : s equence>
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : b i dP r i c e ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
33 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : s i g n a t u r e ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid : requestType ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
35 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : p a r t i c i p a n t I d ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : e x p i r a t i o n ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
37 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id :du ra t i on ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id : s e rv i c eType ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
39 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid:paymentType ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
41 </xsd:complexType>
43 < !−− ========== Payment Type ================ −−>
<xsd:s impleType name= 'PaymentTypeEnumeration '>
45 <x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n base= ' x s d : s t r i n g '>
<xsd:enumerat ion value= 'BEFORE ' />
47 <xsd:enumerat ion value= 'AFTER ' />
<xsd:enumerat ion value= 'EITHER ' />
49 </ x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n>
</ xsd:s impleType>
51
< !−− ========== Serv i ce Type ================ −−>
53 <xsd:s impleType name= ' ServiceTypeEnumeration '>
<x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n base= ' x s d : s t r i n g '>
55 <xsd:enumerat ion value= 'WEBSERVICE ' />
<xsd:enumerat ion value= 'BATCH ' />
57 </ x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n>
</ xsd:s impleType>
59
< !−− ========== Request Type ================ −−>
61 <xsd:s impleType name= 'RequestTypeEnumeration '>
<x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n base= ' x s d : s t r i n g '>
63 <xsd:enumerat ion value= 'BID ' />
<xsd:enumerat ion value= 'OFFER ' />
65 <xsd:enumerat ion value= 'MATCH' />
</ x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n>
67 </ xsd:s impleType>
69 <xsd :e l ement name= 'paymentType ' type= ' bid:PaymentTypeEnumeration '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#paymentType ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' serv iceType ' type= ' bid:ServiceTypeEnumerat ion '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#serv iceType ' />
71 <xsd :e l ement name= ' requestType ' type= ' bid:RequestTypeEnumeration '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#requestType ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= 'BidType ' type= ' bid:Bid Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#BidData ' />
73 <xsd :e l ement name= ' b idPr i c e ' type= ' xsd :doub le ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol
#bid ' />
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<xsd :e l ement name= ' s i gna tu r e ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#s i gna tu r e ' />
75 <xsd :e l ement name= ' pa r t i c i p an t I d ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#pa r t i c i p an t ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' exp i r a t i on ' type= ' xsd : l ong ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol
#exp i r a t i on ' />
77 <xsd :e l ement name= ' durat ion ' type= ' xsd : l ong ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#
durat ion ' />
79 < !−− ========== Market−Data Type ================ −−>
81 <xsd:complexType name= 'MarketMessage Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
83 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : c l e a r i n gP r i c e ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : c on t r a c t I d ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
85 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid:ConsumerContext ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid :Prov iderContext ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
87 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid : requestType ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id :du ra t i on ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
89 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id : s e rv i c eType ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid:paymentType ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
91 </ xsd : s equence>
</xsd:complexType>
93
<xsd :e l ement name= 'ConsumerContext ' type= ' bid:Context Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference=
' mxcsProtocol#ConsumerContext ' />
95 <xsd :e l ement name= ' ProviderContext ' type= ' bid:Context Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference=
' mxcsProtocol#ProviderContext ' />
97 <xsd:complexType name= 'Context Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
99 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : s i g n a t u r e ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b i d : p a r t i c i p a n t I d ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
101 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id : b i d Id ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
103 </xsd:complexType>
105 <xsd :e l ement name= 'MarketMessage ' type= ' bid:MarketMessage Type '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#MarketMessage ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' c l e a r i n gP r i c e ' type= ' xsd :doub le ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#c l e a r i n gP r i c e ' />
107 <xsd :e l ement name= ' cont rac t Id ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#cont rac t ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' consumerId ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#consumer ' />
109 <xsd :e l ement name= ' prov ide r Id ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#prov ide r ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' bidId ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#id
' />
111
< !−− ========== Penal ty Type ================ −−>
113 <xsd:complexType name= 'Penalty Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
115 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid: funct ionName ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id :norma l i za t i onConstant ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
117 </ xsd : s equence>
</xsd:complexType>
119 <xsd :e l ement name= ' Penalty ' type= ' bid :Penalty Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' ht tp :
//www. im . uni−ka r l s ruhe . de/sorma/ f i l e admin / onto logy /mxcsProtocol#Penalty ' />
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<xsd :e l ement name= ' functionName ' type= ' bid:FunctionNameEnumeration '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' ht tp : //www. im . uni−ka r l s ruhe . de/sorma/ f i l e admin / onto logy
/mxcsProtocol#Function ' />
121 <xsd :e l ement name= ' normal izat ionConstant ' type= ' xsd :doub le ' sawsd l :mode lReference=
' ht tp : //www. im . uni−ka r l s ruhe . de/sorma/ f i l e admin / onto logy /mxcsProtocol#
Normal izat ionFactor ' />
123 <xsd:s impleType name= 'FunctionNameEnumeration '>
<x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n base= ' x s d : s t r i n g '>
125 <xsd:enumerat ion value= ' Defau l tPena l ty ' />
</ x s d : r e s t r i c t i o n>
127 </ xsd:s impleType>
129 < !−− ================================================= −−>
< !−− ========== Priva te Message ================ −−>
131 < !−− ================================================= −−>
<xsd:complexType name= ' Pr iva t eDe f in i t i on Type '>
133 <xsd : s equence>
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' j s d l : J o bD e f i n i t i o n ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
135 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid :Pr ivateData ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid :B id ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
137 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id :Pena l ty ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
139 <x s d : a t t r i b u t e name= ' r eque s t Id ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' use= ' r equ i r ed '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#reque s t Id ' />
</xsd:complexType>
141 <xsd :e l ement name= ' Pr i v a t eDe f i n i t i o n ' type= ' b id :P r i va t eDe f i n i t i on Type ' />
143 < !−− ================================================= −−>
< !−− ========== PublicMessage ================ −−>
145 < !−− ================================================= −−>
<xsd:complexType name= ' BidDef in i t ion Type '>
147 <xsd : s equence>
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' j s d l : J o bD e f i n i t i o n ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
149 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid :B id ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id :Pena l ty ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
151 </ xsd : s equence>
<x s d : a t t r i b u t e name= ' bidId ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' use= ' r equ i r ed '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#id ' />
153 </xsd:complexType>
155 <xsd :e l ement name= ' BidDe f i n i t i on ' type= ' b id :B idDe f in i t i on Type ' />
157 < !−− ================================================= −−>
< !−− ========== MarketMessage ================ −−>
159 < !−− ================================================= −−>
161 <xsd:complexType name= ' MarketDef in it ion Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
163 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' j s d l : J o bD e f i n i t i o n ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' bid:MarketMessage ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
165 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' b id :Pena l ty ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
167 <x s d : a t t r i b u t e name= 'marketMessageId ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' use= ' r equ i r ed '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#cont rac t ' />
</xsd:complexType>
169
<xsd :e l ement name= ' MarketDef in i t ion ' type= ' bid :MarketDef in i t ion Type '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#MarketData ' />
171
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</xsd:schema>
C.2 MX/CS – OWL Specification
<?xml version=” 1 .0 ”?>
2 < !DOCTYPE Ontology [
<!ENTITY owl ” h t tp : //www.w3 . org /2002/07/ owl#” >
4 < !ENTITY dc ” h t tp : // pur l . org /dc/ e lements /1 .1/ ” >
< !ENTITY xsd ” h t tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#” >
6 < !ENTITY owl2xml ” h t tp : //www.w3 . org /2006/12/ owl2−xml#” >
< !ENTITY r d f s ” h t tp : //www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#” >
8 < !ENTITY rd f ” h t tp : //www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#” >
< !ENTITY mxcsProtocol ” h t tp : //www. im . uni−ka r l s ruhe . de/sorma/ f i l e admin / onto logy /
mxcsProtocol . owl#” >
10 ]>
<Ontology xmlns=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2006/12/ owl2−xml#”
12 xml:base=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2006/12/ owl2−xml#”
xmlns:dc=” ht tp : // pur l . org /dc/ e lements /1 .1/ ”
14 xmln s : rd f s=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2000/01/ rdf−schema#”
xmlns:mxcsProtocol=” ht tp : //www. im . uni−ka r l s ruhe . de/sorma/ f i l e admin / onto logy /
mxcsProtocol . owl#”
16 xmlns:owl2xml=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2006/12/ owl2−xml#”
xmlns:owl=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2002/07/ owl#”
18 xmlns:xsd=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#”
xmlns : rd f=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /1999/02/22− rdf−syntax−ns#”
20 URI=” ht tp : //www. im . uni−ka r l s ruhe . de/sorma/ f i l e admin / onto logy /mxcsProtocol . owl”>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
22 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketInformation ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





28 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketInformation ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
30 <Constant>Market in fo rmat ion conta in s data o f the quantity , type , b ids
and c l e a r i n g p r i c e s o f the traded goods or s e r v i c e s .</Constant>
</Annotation>
32 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
34 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketInformation ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
36 <SubClassOf>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
38 <Class URI=”&owl ; Thing”/>
</SubClassOf>
40 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
42 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>The context o f a market document conta in ing data , which i s
generated by the market mechanism and submitted to the t a r g e t
consumer and prov ide r as we l l as r e l a t e d p a r t i e s e . g . f o r cont rac t
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<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
48 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; s eeAl so ”>




52 <Dec la ra t i on>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
54 </Dec la ra t i on>
<SubClassOf>
56 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PrivateMessage ”/>
<Class URI=”&owl ; Thing”/>
58 </SubClassOf>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
60 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PrivateMessage ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
62 <Constant>The context o f a consumer or prov ide r document , that conta in s
p r i va t e economic data , a v a i l a b l e only to the bidding agent o f the
consumer or prov ide r .
The bidding agent i s a l o c a l program to the consumer or provider , which u t i l i z e a
s e l e c t e d bidding s t r a t e gy and based on the economic data , i t g ene ra t e s bids ,
which are submitted to the market .</Constant>
64 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
66 <Dec la ra t i on>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PrivateMessage ”/>
68 </Dec la ra t i on>
<SubClassOf>
70 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
<Class URI=”&owl ; Thing”/>
72 </SubClassOf>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
74 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
76 <Constant>The context o f a consumer or prov ide r document , that conta in s




<Dec la ra t i on>
80 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
82 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
84 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
90 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>Status r ep r e s en t s an ac tua l min i to r ing data or f a c t
in fo rmat ion about a good , t rad ing object , s e r v i c e , job or
app l i c a t i o n a r t i f a c t , which i s v a l i d f o r the time o f request , but
can change in the time .</Constant>
92 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
94 <Dec la ra t i on>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
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96 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
98 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; auct ion ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketInformation ”/>
100 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
102 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; auct ion ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; s t r i n g ”/>
104 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
106 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; auct ion ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





112 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; auct ion ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
114 <Constant>An auct ion i s a p roce s s o f buying and s e l l i n g goods or
s e r v i c e s by o f f e r i n g them up f o r bid , tak ing bids , and then s e l l i n g
the item to the h i ghe s t b idder . In economic theory , an auct ion may
r e f e r to any mechanism or s e t o f t rad ing r u l e s f o r exchange .
[ h t tp : //en . w ik iped ia . org /wik i /Auction ]</Constant>
116 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
118 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; auct ion ”/>
120 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
122 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; bid ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketInformation ”/>
124 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyDomain>
126 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; bid ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
128 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
130 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; bid ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; double ”/>
132 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
134 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; bid ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





140 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; bid ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
142 <Constant>The generated bid pr i c e , based on the s e l e c t e d bidding
s t ra tegy , o f the consumer or prov ide r . </Constant>
</Annotation>
144 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
146 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; bid ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
148 <SubDataPropertyOf>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; b idId ”/>
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150 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumerContext”/>
</SubDataPropertyOf>
152 <SubDataPropertyOf>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; b idId ”/>
154 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; providerContext ”/>
</SubDataPropertyOf>
156 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; b idId ”/>
158 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
160 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; b idId ”/>
162 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
164 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; b idId ”/>
166 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; b idId ”/>
172 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>




176 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; b idId ”/>
178 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
180 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; c l e a r i n gP r i c e ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
182 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
184 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; c l e a r i n gP r i c e ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; double ”/>
186 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
188 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; c l e a r i n gP r i c e ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





194 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; c l e a r i n gP r i c e ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





200 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; c l e a r i n gP r i c e ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
202 <Constant>The s p e c i f i e d monetary value a s s i gned to an a r t i f a c t on market
c l e a r i ng , c a l l e d a l s o market−c l e a r i n g p r i c e . In an auct ion−based
scenar io , the p r i c e i s determined by the auct ion , based on the b ids
and o f f e r s o f p rov ide r s and consumers i n t e r e s t e d in t rad ing that
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a r t i f a c t . The p r i c e that a consumer has to pay to a prov ide r in




206 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; c l e a r i n gP r i c e ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; i sDef inedBy ”>




<Dec la ra t i on>
212 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; c l e a r i n gP r i c e ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
214 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; completionTime”/>
216 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
218 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; completionTime”/>
220 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; double ”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
222 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; completionTime”/>
224 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; completionTime”/>
230 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>The t o t a l time needed to complete a job , app l i c a t i o n or
s e r v i c e execut ion .</Constant>
232 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
234 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; completionTime”/>
236 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
238 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumer”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
240 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
242 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumer”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
244 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
246 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumer”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





252 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumer”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
254 <Constant>A consumer ( costumer ) has an i n t en t i on to purchase goods or
s e r v i c e s . A consumer might make the purchase e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or
through a bidding agent . </Constant>
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</Annotation>
256 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
258 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumer”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
260 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumerContext”/>
262 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
264 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumerContext”/>
266 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumerContext”/>
272 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>




276 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumerContext”/>
278 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
280 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; cont rac t ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
282 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
284 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; cont rac t ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
286 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
288 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; cont rac t ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





294 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; cont rac t ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
296 <Constant>A c o l l e c t i o n o f agreements . Each in s t anc e i s a l e g a l agreement
in which two or more ag ree ing agents promise to do ( or not do )
something . There are l e g a l consequences to breaking the promises
made in a cont rac t .</Constant>
</Annotation>
298 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
300 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; cont rac t ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
302 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; durat ion ”/>
304 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
306 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; durat ion ”/>
308 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
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</DataPropertyDomain>
310 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; durat ion ”/>
312 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
314 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; durat ion ”/>
316 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; long ”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
318 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; durat ion ”/>
320 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; durat ion ”/>
326 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>A measurable quant i ty that r e l a t e s a temporal th ing to the
l ength o f time , in m i l l i s e c ond s , dur ing which i t ex i s t ed , happened ,
or obta ined . </Constant>
328 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
330 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; durat ion ”/>
332 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
334 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; f i n a l P r i c e ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
336 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
338 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; f i n a l P r i c e ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; double ”/>
340 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
342 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; f i n a l P r i c e ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





348 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; f i n a l P r i c e ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
350 <Constant>The f i n a l p r i c e i s the market c l e a r i n g p r i c e a f t e r c on s i d e r i ng
the p e n a l t i e s .</Constant>
</Annotation>
352 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
354 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; f i n a l P r i c e ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
356 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; parameter ”/>
358 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
360 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; parameter ”/>
362 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
275 C.2. MX/CS – OWL SPECIFICATION
364 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; parameter ”/>
366 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>




<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; parameter ”/>
372 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>




376 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; parameter ”/>
378 </Dec la ra t i on>
<SubDataPropertyOf>
380 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p a r t i c i p an t ”/>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; consumerContext”/>
382 </SubDataPropertyOf>
<SubDataPropertyOf>
384 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p a r t i c i p an t ”/>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; providerContext ”/>
386 </SubDataPropertyOf>
<DataPropertyDomain>
388 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p a r t i c i p an t ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
390 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
392 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p a r t i c i p an t ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
394 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
396 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p a r t i c i p an t ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>




402 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p a r t i c i p an t ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
404 <Constant>Par t i c i pan t i s a consumer , prov ider , consumer agent , p rov ide r
agent , auc t i onee r or t rad ing manager .</Constant>
</Annotation>
406 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
408 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p a r t i c i p an t ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
410 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; paymentType”/>
412 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
414 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; paymentType”/>
416 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
418 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; paymentType”/>
420 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; s t r i n g ”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
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422 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; paymentType”/>
424 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; paymentType”/>
430 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>The type o f payment , BEFORE or AFTER job execut ion .</Constant>
432 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
434 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; paymentType”/>
436 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
438 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p rov ide r ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
440 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
442 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p rov ide r ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
444 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
446 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p rov ide r ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





452 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p rov ide r ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
454 <Constant>A prov ide r ( s e l l e r ) has an i n t en t i on to o f f e r ( s e l l ) goods or
s e r v i c e s . A prov ide r might prov ide i t s good or s e r v i c e s e i t h e r
d i r e c t l y or through a bidding agent . </Constant>
</Annotation>
456 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
458 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; p rov ide r ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
460 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; providerContext ”/>
462 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
464 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; providerContext ”/>
466 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; providerContext ”/>
472 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
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476 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; providerContext ”/>
478 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
480 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; query”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketInformation ”/>
482 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
484 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; query”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
486 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
488 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; query”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>
490 <Constant>Request o f a s p e c i f i c in fo rmat ion about a s p e c i f i c a r t i f a c t ,




494 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; query”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>




<Dec la ra t i on>
500 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; query”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
502 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; requestType ”/>
504 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
506 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; requestType ”/>
508 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
510 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; requestType ”/>
512 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; s t r i n g ”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
514 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; requestType ”/>
516 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; requestType ”/>
522 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>The type o f the r eque s t e . g . BID , OFFER, MATCH.</Constant>
524 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
526 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; requestType ”/>
528 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
530 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; r e sponse ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketInformation ”/>
532 </DataPropertyDomain>
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<DataPropertyRange>
534 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; r e sponse ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
536 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
538 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; r e sponse ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





544 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; r e sponse ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
546 <Constant>Provid ing a in fo rmat ion to an ob j e c t or agent on a method
invoca t i on .</Constant>
</Annotation>
548 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
550 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; r e sponse ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
552 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s cor ingFunct ion ”/>
554 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
556 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s cor ingFunct ion ”/>
558 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; s t r i n g ”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
560 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s cor ingFunct ion ”/>
562 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s cor ingFunct ion ”/>
568 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>A s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f a goal , based on wel l−de f ined and
measurable c r i t e r i a s .</Constant>
570 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
572 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s cor ingFunct ion ”/>
574 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
576 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; se rv iceType ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
578 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyDomain>
580 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; se rv iceType ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
582 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
584 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; se rv iceType ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; s t r i n g ”/>
586 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
588 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; se rv iceType ”/>
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<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





594 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; se rv iceType ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
596 <Constant>The type o f the reques ted s e r v i c e e . g . command l i n e batch job
execut ion (BATCH) or web app l i c a t i o n (WEBSERVICE) .</Constant>
</Annotation>
598 </EntityAnnotation>
<Dec la ra t i on>
600 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; se rv iceType ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
602 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s i gna tu r e ”/>
604 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketMessage”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
606 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s i gna tu r e ”/>
608 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
610 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s i gna tu r e ”/>
612 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; anyType”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
614 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s i gna tu r e ”/>
616 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s i gna tu r e ”/>
622 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>A d i g i t a l sequence , which r ep r e s en t s a va l i d and l e g a l &#39;
f ingermark&#39; o f a t rad ing party , market pa r t i c i pan t , consumer ,
p rov ide r or auc t i onee r .</Constant>
624 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
626 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s i gna tu r e ”/>
628 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
630 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PrivateMessage ”/>
632 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyRange>
634 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; s t r i n g ”/>
636 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
638 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>
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<EntityAnnotat ion>
644 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
646 <Constant>A bidding s t r a t e gy i s a complete plan o f a c t i on s f o r whatever
s i t u a t i o n might a r i s e ; t h i s f u l l y determines the agent behavior . A
bidding s t r a t e gy w i l l determine the ac t i on o f the agent w i l l take at
any s tage o f the bid gene ra t i on and market−based schedu l ing
proce s s e s , f o r every p o s s i b l e h i s t o r y and av a i l a b l e market




650 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; s eeAl so ”>




656 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; s eeAl so ”>




<Dec la ra t i on>
662 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; s t r a t e gy ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
664 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; e xp i r a t i on ”/>
666 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PublicMessage ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
668 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; e xp i r a t i on ”/>
670 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; long ”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
672 <EntityAnnotat ion>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; e xp i r a t i on ”/>
674 <Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; e xp i r a t i on ”/>
680 <Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
<Constant>The time in m i l l i s e c ond s a bid i s v a l i d in the t a r g e t auct ion
&#39;s order book . </Constant>
682 </Annotation>
</EntityAnnotation>
684 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; e xp i r a t i on ”/>
686 </Dec la ra t i on>
<DataPropertyDomain>
688 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lua t i on ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; PrivateMessage ”/>
690 </DataPropertyDomain>
<DataPropertyDomain>
692 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lua t i on ”/>
<Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; StateMessage ”/>
694 </DataPropertyDomain>
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<DataPropertyRange>
696 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lua t i on ”/>
<Datatype URI=”&xsd ; double ”/>
698 </DataPropertyRange>
<EntityAnnotat ion>
700 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lua t i on ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&dc ; r e l a t i o n ”>





706 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lua t i on ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; comment”>
708 <Constant>The va lua t i on i s the monetary u t i l i t y re turn o f a good or a
s e r v i c e . I t i s a s ub j e c t i v e term that has va lue to one party may
have no value to another . The va lua t i on i s the r e s u l t o f events in
which someone e s t imate s the amount that would be paid f o r a c e r t a i n
a r t i f a c t e i t h e r ( a ) i f i t were so ld , c a l l e d a l s o r e s e r v a t i o n p r i c e (





712 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lua t i on ”/>
<Annotation annotationURI=”&rd f s ; s eeAl so ”>




<Dec la ra t i on>
718 <DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lua t i on ”/>
</Dec la ra t i on>
720 <DataPropertyDomain>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lue ”/>
722 <Class URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; MarketInformation ”/>
</DataPropertyDomain>
724 <DataPropertyRange>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lue ”/>
726 <Datatype URI=”&xsd ; double ”/>
</DataPropertyRange>
728 <Dec la ra t i on>
<DataProperty URI=”\&mxcsProtocol ; va lue ”/>
730 </Dec la ra t i on>
</Ontology>
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C.3 State Message and Market Information
1 <?xml version= ' 1 .0 ' encoding= 'UTF−8 ' ?>
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd= ' ht tp : //www.w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema '
3 xmlns : i n f o= ' ht tp : //www. sormapro ject . eu/message/ e j s d l /beans '
xm ln s : j s d l= ' ht tp : // schemas . gg f . org / j s d l /2005/11/ j s d l '
5 xmlns:wsa= ' ht tp : // schemas . xmlsoap . org /ws/2004/03/ addre s s ing '
xmlns : sawsdl= ' ht tp : //www.w3 . org /ns/ sawsdl '
7 targetNamespace= ' ht tp : //www. sormapro ject . eu/message/ e j s d l /beans '
elementFormDefault= ' q u a l i f i e d '>
9 <xsd : import namespace= ' ht tp : // schemas . gg f . org / j s d l /2005/11/ j s d l ' schemaLocation= '
j s d l . xsd ' />
<xsd : import namespace= ' ht tp : // schemas . gg f . org / j s d l /2005/11/ j s d l−pos ix '
schemaLocation= ' j s d l−pos ix . xsd ' />
11
< !−− ================================================= −−>
13 < !−− ========== StateMessage ================ −−>
< !−− ================================================= −−>
15
<xsd:complexType name= ' StateMessage Type '>
17 <xsd : s equence>
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : S co r i ngFunc t i on ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
19 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o :Paramete r s ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
21 <x s d : a t t r i b u t e name= ' cont rac t Id ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' use= ' r equ i r ed '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#cont rac t ' />
</xsd:complexType>
23
<xsd:complexType name= 'Parameters Type '>
25 <xsd : s equence>
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : v a l u a t i o n ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
27 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' info :t imeToComplete ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : f i n a l P r i c e ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
29 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : d u r a t i o n ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
31 </xsd:complexType>
33 <xsd :e l ement name= ' StateMessage ' type= ' in fo :StateMessage Type '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#StateMessage ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' Parameters ' type= ' in fo :Parameters Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#Parameters ' />
35 <xsd :e l ement name= ' Scor ingFunct ion ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#scor ingFunct ion ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' va lua t i on ' type= ' xsd :doub le ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#va lua t i on ' />
37 <xsd :e l ement name= ' timeToComplete ' type= ' xsd :doub le ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#completionTime ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' f i n a l P r i c e ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#f i n a l P r i c e ' />
39 <xsd :e l ement name= ' durat ion ' type= ' xsd :doub le ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol
#durat ion ' />
41 < !−− ================================================= −−>
< !−− ========== MarketInformation ================ −−>
43 < !−− ================================================= −−>
45 <xsd:complexType name= ' Queries Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
47 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : a u c t i o n s ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
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</ xsd : s equence>
49 </xsd:complexType>
51 <xsd:complexType name= 'Response Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
53 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : a u c t i o n s ' minOccurs= ' 1 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
55 </xsd:complexType>
57 <xsd:complexType name= ' Auctions Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
59 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : a u c t i o n ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
61 </xsd:complexType>
63 <xsd:complexType name= 'Auction Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
65 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o :marke t in f o rmat i on ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
67 <x s d : a t t r i b u t e name= ' id ' type= ' x s d : s t r i n g ' use= ' r equ i r ed ' sawsd l :mode lReference=
' mxcsProtocol#id ' />
</xsd:complexType>
69
<xsd:complexType name= ' MarketInformation Type '>
71 <xsd : s equence>
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' in fo : lastNConsumerBids ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
73 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : l a s tNProv id e rB id s ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : l a s tNC l e a r i n gP r i c e s ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
75 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : consumerb id s ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
<xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : p r o v i d e r b i d s ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
77 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : c l e a r i n g p r i c e s ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' maxOccurs= ' 1 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
79 </xsd:complexType>
81 <xsd:complexType name= 'Value Type '>
<xsd : s equence>
83 <xsd :e l ement r e f= ' i n f o : v a l u e ' minOccurs= ' 0 ' />
</ xsd : s equence>
85 </xsd:complexType>
87 <xsd :e l ement name= ' que r i e s ' type= ' i n f o :Quer i e s Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#query ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' re sponse ' type= ' i n f o :Quer i e s Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#response ' />
89 <xsd :e l ement name= ' auc t i ons ' type= ' i n fo :Auct ions Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#auct ion ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' auct ion ' type= ' in fo :Auct ion Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#auct ion ' />
91 <xsd :e l ement name= ' market informat ion ' type= ' in fo :Market In format ion Type '
sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#market informat ion ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' consumerbids ' type= ' in fo :Va lue Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#bid ' />
93 <xsd :e l ement name= ' prov ide rb id s ' type= ' in fo :Va lue Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#bid ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' c l e a r i n g p r i c e s ' type= ' in fo :Va lue Type ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#c l e a r i n gP r i c e ' />
95 <xsd :e l ement name= ' value ' type= ' xsd :doub le ' sawsd l :mode lReference= ' mxcsProtocol#
value ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' lastNConsumerBids ' type= ' x s d : i n t e g e r ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#bid ' />
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97 <xsd :e l ement name= ' l a s tNProv iderBids ' type= ' x s d : i n t e g e r ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
mxcsProtocol#bid ' />
<xsd :e l ement name= ' l a s tNC l ea r i ngPr i c e s ' type= ' x s d : i n t e g e r ' sawsd l :mode lReference= '
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